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Despite the critical nature of the Social Security Contribution Evasion (SSCE) phenomenon, 
relatively few studies have investigated and analysed the problem. The vast majority of 
contemporary studies have been undertaken in the USA and Europe; very few in the countries 
of the developing world. This relative dearth of empirical studies on the SSCE clearly indicates 
a gap in our knowledge given the absence of reliable empirical evidence towards the cause and 
the extent of the problem. What is more, current taxation literature is clear in that it shows us 
that most studies are focused mainly on the individual taxpayer and the relation of these 
taxpayers to the general role of personal income tax. This is odd as there is a significant 
evasion problem in other domains, especially in areas such as where companies deliberately 
choose to evade social security contributions amongst others. 
 
What this thesis essentially sets out to do is to empirically examine the relationships between 
the SSCE and several explanatory factors related to the particular context of Jordan from the 
perspective of former corporate contribution evaders. This thesis gives special attention to 
Economic Factors (EF) (e.g. tax rate, and fine rate) and Non-Economic Factors (NEF) (e.g. the 
impact of the Corporation Management Effectiveness (CME), the Legal and Regulatory 
Structure (LRS), and Ethical and Social Considerations (ESC).  To the researcher’s knowledge, 
there is no study in Jordan that has investigated the problem of contribution evasion from the 
former corporate contribution evaders’ perspective. The aim of this dissertation is to fill this 
gap by evaluating the nature of contribution evasion at firm level and to develop an 
understanding of the main reasons why contribution evasion occurs in Jordan.  
 
To achieve the research objectives, this study uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies. The quantitative approach is represented here by multiple regression analysis 
that relies on the use of a self-administered questionnaire. The qualitative approach, however, 
is represented by the appliance of semi-structured interviews with key participants. In this 




The structured questionnaires that were used in this study were designed to include key 
variables identified from the existing literature in a standardised questionnaire, but also, vitally, 
included a number of questions developed by the researcher that pertained directly to the 
Jordanian context. 350 questionnaires were personally distributed and collected. Of these there 
were 229 valid returns.  
 
The particular use of regression statistics in this study was to analyse the research data in such a 
way as to attempt to discover the empirical relations between independent and dependent 
variables. The analysis was conducted in two discrete stages: the aggregate and at the 
disaggregated level.  
 
At the aggregated level, the regression model identified the EF, CME, LRS and ESC to be 
positively and significantly associated with the contribution evasion problem at the .01 
significance level. However, amongst this range of factors, the LRS was found to be the most 
powerful single explanatory factor. Subsequently, the EF was found to be the second most 
important factor, followed closely by the CME. The ESC did remain supported, but its 
coefficient was noticeably lower than any other factors, and thus ostensibly, it makes a smaller 
contribution to the determining of the contribution evasion problem. 
 
From the perspective of these former evaders, the findings revealed that there is moderate 
satisfaction with JSSC’s performance across the firms approached for this study. The most 
highlighted problems appear to stem from the way that the administration handles its corporate 
affairs and the lack of coordination between the corporation and outside parties. In addition, 
some firms believe there are real opportunities to collude with JSSC inspectors. 
 
The results also showed limited JSS provision
1
, a lack of a linkage between JSSS contributions 
and benefits and the absence of a morality within firms towards JSSCE policy; these were 
deemed the most important reasons for the problem of contribution evasion within ESC. The 
respondents' results indicated that the former firm evaders’ behaviour was unethical and 
socially irresponsible towards the problem of SSCE in Jordan.  
                                                 
1
 The JSSC focuses only on two types of insurance: - Insurance against injury in the workplace 
and occupational disease and Insurance against old age, disability and death. 
 V 
Furthermore, participants revealed negative opinions towards the efficiency of JSSC’s audit 
programme and penalty structure. In addition, they demonstrated that the most important 
economic variables that caused an employee to report contribution evasion are the high levels 
of unemployment within the country and companies’ financial problems at the time 
contributions were due. 
 
The disaggregated stage analysis was conducted in three distinct levels. These were based on 
the characteristics of individual firms, which were in turn categorized by industry type, 
ownership and size. The regression model for each of these industry groups also supported the 
hypothesis that LRS, CME and EF are the most significant factors in explaining variations in 
the contribution evasion across almost every sector studied. This is in contrast to the regression 
model of a firm’s ownership, where the LRS and EF remain the most important determinants of 
contribution evasion. 
  
The sub-sample that dealt with firm size, however, demonstrated that there were no significant 
differences between the sub-samples based on the small firm category and the base regression 
models. The results of medium-sized firms, did however, reveal a partial inconsistency with the 
base regression model: here, the EF and ESC factors were considered to be the most important 
determinants to the contribution evasion problem. In contrast, large firms, which represent only 
a small percentage of the total of firms (5.24%), confirmed some significant differences with 
the base regression model. The results showed a larger ESC coefficient and significance in the 
large firm category. EF proved to have the smallest significance. 
 
The thesis uncovered that whilst EF remains a significant determinant of the contribution 
evasion problem in regression models at the aggregated and disaggregated level, non-economic 
factors are revealed to have a vitally important impact on contribution evasion. Therefore, the 
thesis argues that it would be erroneous to design a Jordanian compliance policy based on 
economic factors alone. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of this thesis recommend a set of practical strategies both economic 
and non-economic that can be adopted by the JSSS administration to promote higher 
compliance amongst Jordanian firms and to generate increased revenue. 
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Sustainability of Social Security Schemes (SSS) is a huge challenge. A challenge refers 
to the ability of the scheme to maintain adequate resources to provide continuing and 
sufficient benefits for insured people, retired people and their dependants. It is well 
known that SSS can be considered as mechanisms for the allocation of consumption 
when transferring resources from workers to pensioners at the time the pensions are paid. 
Therefore, if contributions
2
 are not being paid by participants the scheme is unable to 
achieve its objective and the scheme deficit may have to be supplemented by the 
government. Generally, Social Security Contribution Evasion (SSCE) is considered 
illegal and takes place when eligible members, whether they are employees or employers, 
do not contribute, or under contribute, their mandatory Social Security payments.  
 
SSCE receives scant attention in the Social Security literature. In general, evasion can be 
investigated from a variety of perspectives. The major purpose of this thesis is to extend  
received knowledge on which factors have an impact on Jordanian Social Security 
Contribution Evasion (JSSCE) from the former firm evaders perspective (as shown in 
Figure 1.1) based on data collected from a field survey conducted in Amman (the capital 
of Jordan) in 2008. Furthermore, the researcher has been granted accesses to the JSSC 
                                                 
2 Contributions are normally paid by employers in respect of their employees and by self-employed persons 
themselves. 
 2 
archives (library) and the reports published by the JSSC
3
 such as Auditing and Inspection 
Department.  




















1.2 Social Security Contribution Evasion:  Problem Background 
 
 
Tax evasion is a significant phenomenon that affects both developed and developing 
economies. Although there is a degree of lingering uncertainty concerning the 
measurement accuracy., It is ostensibly clear that even the most conformist estimates 
suggest the black economy in the United Kingdom and United States is at least 10%of the 
measured economy (In the US, it is projected that the extent of revenue losses for 2001 
were US$ 353 billion (IRS
4
, 2006) (cited from Hindriks and Myles, 2006). 
 
                                                 
3
 The researcher is working as Director of Risk Management at JSSC and he has got formal permission to 
access the required information.  
4











Cobham (2005) works out the general level of tax income lost due to tax evasion in 
developing countries is roughly equal to US-$ 385 billion per year. (Cobham refers to 
Oxfam (2000) as the source for this number). As an overall assessment of the literature, 
most existing estimates of tax gab in developing countries are not based on reliable 
methods and data. This is partly due to the absence of data and due to methodological 
shortcomings of many existing studies (Fuest and Riedel, 2009). 
 
With regard to evasion of social security contributions, the phenomenon is not limited 
only to developing economies. Gillion et al. (2000) point out that this kind of evasion 
poses a threat in OECD
5
 countries too, although on somewhat of a smaller scale. The 
OECD estimates a 30% deficit in social security contributions due to undeclared work in 
Hungary, Mexico and South Korea, and a shortfall above 20% in Italy, Poland, Spain and 
Turkey (OECD, 2004a). In Turkey, firms that belong to the mainstream sector are 
estimated to underreport 28% of their salary bill, and for around 50% of the employees 
enrolled in the social security organisations of these states, salary levels reported by 
employers are at the minimum insurable level or less (World Bank, 2006).  
 
Evasion of social security contributions has long been a venerable problem in the 
countries of Latin America. Estimates for some Latin American countries in the early 
1990s show that 50 to 60% of contribution liability had not been collected, with Brazil at 
the top of the list. (Dimitrov et al. (2004). According to the World Bank, in Argentina, 
roughly 15 percent of workers receive pay partly on the books and partly off (World 
Bank, 2007). 
                                                 
5
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
 4 
In Jordan, social security evasion is a serious problem. For example, the JSSC director 
general reported
6
 that 25% of the members of the SSS did not pay their contributions 
between 1990 and 1999. Additionally, the new extended coverage program team in the 
city of Aqapa conducted an evaluation study for the feasibility of implementation of the 
program in 2009 and they found that, 36% of the firm within the program fail to send 
their contributions to the JSSC. Therefore, it is often argued, plausibly, that contribution 
evasion is widespread in Jordan.  
 
1.2.1 Contribution Evasion 
 
Mandatory payments by employees and employers which are used to finance Social 
Security benefits are considered to be taxable items by some policy analysts and 
contributory items by others. The term ‘contribution’ is used to show that the benefits 
employees accrue are related to payments that have been made by them or on their 
behalf. The relationship between a contribution and a benefit occurs when both are levied 
on the employee's earnings. A contribution implies that there is a right to guaranteed 
future benefits. A tax, on the other hand, is responsible for the financing of the general 
function of a government, but the state benefits the individual receives are not reliant on 
the amount of money they pay. 
 
In a number of countries, social security contributions are collected through the income 
tax system so it is impossible to pay one without paying the other. In that situation, the 
decision to evade social security contributions must be considered in tandem with the 
                                                 
6
  Al-dustuor  Jordanian  Daily Newspaper,  (Al Wazani. K, 2005) 
 5 
evasion of income tax. In other countries, to a greater or lesser degree, the payment of the 
two is separated (Turner, 1997). 
 
In Jordan, employers are obliged by law to pay social security contributions on behalf of 
all employees (except in the case of voluntary participants or the self-employed). 
Employers are subject to penalties if they fail to make the payments within specified time 
limits. Opportunities to evade the Scheme therefore are limited to collusion with 
employers and indeed sometimes the employer colludes with SSS inspectors. 
 
1.2.2 Principal Types of Evasion 
 
Employers can evade contributions by underreporting employees who should be covered 
by the SSS. For example, by designating employees as workers who are not required to 
contribute-such as casual, part-time, temporary, or are specified as contractors, the 
employer is able to bypass the SSS and thus avoid payment of the employer’s 
contribution. They can also underreport workers’ earnings that are registered with the 
scheme. Employers can delay remitting contributions to the SSS, contrary to the scheme 
regulations and make profit on the money while the delay is in effect; or, in the most 
insidious case, employers can fail to send contributions which they have withheld from 
their employees.  
 
The specific provisions of a scheme may facilitate evasion. For example, an employee 
may claim to be self-employed if the coverage of self-employed workers is voluntary. 
Where employers require a minimum number of employees (or turnover) for coverage 
under a scheme, they may decide to keep the number of employees below this number. 
 6 
Social security benefits are designed to replace a portion of the normal income of a 
worker, and it is this normal income contributions are based on. The portion of regular 
income in a worker’s wages can be reduced by exaggerating overtime compensation and 
allowances- e.g. for travel. 
 
Contribution evasion generally involves collusion between employers and employees. 
Often, the interests of employers and employees are mutually beneficial, with both 
reducing their immediate expenses by evading contribution to the scheme. Because 
employers are legally obliged either to make payments on behalf of their employees or to 
collect contributions, when evasion occurs and employees are aware of it, the employees 
are expected to report any violations to the social security institution enforcement office. 
Exceptions to the rule are when contribution evasion is the result of employer and 
employee collusion. Other situations might involve self-employed workers (who have no 
employer) and cases of the employer’s embezzlement of employees’ contributions 
(collecting where they are not sent to the government, and usually the employee does not 
consent or even be aware of the offence. Employees may only become aware of 
contribution evasion when they or a co-worker makes a claim for social security benefits 
(Bailey and Turner 2001). 
 
1.2.3 Taxpayers' Behaviour 
 
There are four types of contributing behaviour that are of interest to researchers:  
(1) Compliance 
(2)  Non-compliance 
 7 
(3) Avoidance and  
(4) Evasion.  
 
In the sections that follow, each concept will be briefly defined and similarities and 
differences between avoidance and evasion will be presented.  
 
It is worth noting that, not all the studies use the same definitions of contribution evasion: 
many uses the term ‘non-compliance’ which is a broader term, encompassing both 





According to Roth et a1(1989)  'Compliance with reporting requirements means that the 
contributor files all required contribution returns at the proper time and that the returns 
accurately report contribution liability. So, contribution compliance requires the 





This term describes the behavior of contributors who fail, intentionally or unintentionally, 
to meet their contribution obligations. Consequently, they may over-report or under-
report their contribution liability (Roth et al, (1989). The failure to comply may be 
intentional or as result of carelessness, misinformation, computational error and 
 8 
misunderstanding regarding contribution records and the contribution return should be 
completed. 
 
Tax (Contribution) Avoidance 
 
Tax avoidance (TA) is the act of ‘Deliberately performing acts not explicitly proscribed 
or not executing acts not explicitly prescribed, in order to pay less tax , where these acts 
or the result of paying less tax is not in accordance with the spirit of the law' (Elffers, 
1991). Such decisions on the contributors' part require considerable contribution planning 
and good fiscal knowledge or alternatively the use of a contribution expert. 
 
Tax (Contribution) Evasion 
 
Tax evasion consists of illegal and intentional action taken by individuals or firms to 
reduce their legally required tax obligations. Individuals and firms can evade taxes by 
underreporting incomes etc.  
 
Contribution evasion is the act of 'Deliberately performing acts explicitly proscribed or 
not executing acts explicitly prescribed in the SSS regulations, in order to pay less 
contribution ' (Elffers, (1991). Wallschutzky (1984) defines contribution evasion as the 
type of contributing behavior during which 'contributors deliberately or otherwise either 





Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Similarities and Differences 
 
Avoidance and evasion can be considered on three levels:  
(1) Legal 
(2) Moral and 
(3) Economic. 
 
‘On a legal level or according to the letter of the law, evasion is illegal or outside the 
letter of the law, while avoidance is legal or within the letter of the law’ (Bracewell-
Milnes, 1979). 
 
On both the moral and economic levels there is no difference between evasion and 
avoidance. On a moral level, in both types of behaviour there is an intention to pay less 
required tax than what it is actually owed. Therefore although avoidance is within the 
letter of the law it is outside the spirit of it. On an economic level, there are also no 
differences, since in both situations the required tax owed decreases (Sigala, 2000). 
 
Tax evasion might produce higher moral costs than TA, as the latter is more broadly 
accepted, being rather, and a legal strategy to escape from tax payments. 
 
Tax evasion is a direct violation of the rules and the law, while TA summarizes activities 
that do not violate the rules, but that “run counter to the spirit of the laws” (Leitzel, 
2003). A key difference between Tax evasion and TA is that TA reduces the moral costs 
of not behaving adequately. Surveys indicate that TA seems to be more widely accepted 
by the general population than Tax evasion (see, for example, Kirchler, et al, 2001). 
 10 
However, this use depends on individuals’ knowledge and information and on the degree 
of complexity of the tax laws. (Eliffers 1991) argues that ‘…the extent to which one may 
choose one of these two types over another will be determined by opportunity, 
knowledge and/or by the desire to maintain a respectable image’ (Sigala. 2000). 
 
1.2.4 Implications of contribution evasion  
 
The JSSCE is a serious problem for the financing of social security in Jordan. This 
behaviour has caused social security revenue to fall far short of that needed to pay 
benefits. The resulting loss in contribution revenue may lead to serious damage in the 
functioning of the scheme, and may ultimately threaten its ability to finance basic 
expenses. 
 
If participants fail to meet their contribution obligations, any pension scheme cannot 
achieve the objective of providing adequate retirement income for its pensioners and their 
dependants. Contribution Evasion has quite clear implications for individuals. That said, 
it also has implications for the government, which may be forced to supplement the 
resultant inadequate pensions from general revenues, which in itself is a major cause for 
concern in its resulting amplifier effect on the rest of the economy and wider society. 
 
Failure of participants to meet their contractual obligations to SSS is a problem which 
threatens not only the legitimacy of the schemes, but also the adequacy of the social 
protection of people whose contribution dues have been paid, as well of those who have 
not. It also directly affects the financial viability of Defined Benefit Plan (DBP). 
Generally, evasion of contribution obligations by employers and workers is illegal and 
 11 
high levels of evasion and avoidance can indicate low public esteem in a SSS and may 
also reflect on the quality of how the scheme is administered, and also on the efficiency 
of scheme administration (McGillivray,. 2001). 
 
Moreover, contribution evasion has a number of undesirable and unpleasant effects. It 
brings about inequities in effective contribution and contribution rates between 
contributors and non-contributors that may lead to an increase in the inequality of income 
distribution among otherwise similar workers. It brings about a situation where 
contribution rates are necessarily raised to produce adequate benefits than would be the 
case, had not the evasion taken place. The increase in the mandatory contribution rate 
may cause an additional problem and exacerbate evasion leading to an intermediate 
period of revenue shortfall.  
 
Contribution avoidance and contribution evasion may also distort labour market activity, 
which has related welfare costs. The movement of workers to the underground or ‘black’ 
economy may reduce overall economic growth. When evasion occurs due to the under-
reporting of earnings, it causes the replacement rate with respect to actual earnings to be 
reduced (Pashev (2005). In Jordan, evasion due to under-reporting of earnings is very 
common and which in turn, may distort benefit structure by changing an earnings-related 
benefit structure into one that is nearly flat. 
1.3 The Importance of the Research 
 
In spite of the critical SSCE problem, only a very small number of studies have 
investigated and analysed the phenomenon. The vast majority have been conducted in 
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America and Europe (see chapter three for further details). Very few studies have been 
conducted in developing countries and none (to the researcher’s knowledge) have been 
conducted in Jordan. With this in mind, evidence from other quarters should not be relied 
on to extrapolate conclusions for places such as Jordan from the empirical data garnered 
in America and Europe because of the many social and cultural differences between 
them. The lack of empirical studies on SSCE in developing countries speaks clearly of 
the absence of reliable statistics towards the cause and the extent of the problem. 
Furthermore, it is harder to obtain trustworthy information on such sensitive topics as 
there is no history of this kind of inquiry.  
 
The literature tells us that most studies focused on individual taxpayers and on income 
tax particularly, in spite of the significant evasion problem in other areas, especially 
where companies choose to evade corporate income tax, sales tax, and Social Security 
contributions as mentioned by Sandmo (2004): “The models surveyed so far all concern 
evasion by individual taxpayers, while the role of firms has been very much in the 
background. I have briefly noted the possible role of firms in the black labour market, but 
Firms could also have a more independent role in tax evasion activities as evaders of 
indirect
7
  taxes for which they act as tax collectors for the government”. 
 
Therefore, the basic intention of this thesis is to conduct an empirical analysis into the 
problem of SSCE in countries such as Jordan, so as to understand and explain the key 
determinants of the problem at the firm level given the lack of previous studies in this 
area. The current study attempts to analyse SSCE as a dependent variable working with 
                                                 
7 Direct tax is including (income tax and surtax and contributions for social security, as well as profit tax) and indirect 
taxes (valued added tax, excise on tobacco). 
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Survey data over the period 2003-2008 and looks for factors that systematically influence 
SSCE.  
 
Generally, findings, in the review of the literature, have revealed that the Basic Economic 
Model of Tax Evasion based on an expected utility maximisation approach, predicts a 
lower level of tax compliance than that actually scrutinized. As a result, it has been 
argued that other factors might explain such a lower evasion level. The theoretical model 
of this study, (the model is explained in detail in Chapter 4) used here to explain the 
Jordanian Social Security contribution evasion (JSSCE), gives special attention to 
economic and non-economic factors namely; the impact of Economic Factor (EF), the 
Corporation Management Effectiveness (CME), the Legal and Regulatory Structure 
(LRS), and Ethical and Social Considerations (ESC). Furthermore, this thesis will 
examine whether participants’ responses will provide us with an indication of the 
importance of these factors in determining SSCE behaviour in Jordan. In both regression 
models used in this thesis we will consider if Non-Economic Factors (NEF) are revealed 
to have any impact compared to EF across the multiple regression analyses.  
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are few prior studies which have 
analysed contribution evasion. De Oliviera (1997) studied SSCE by assessing the 
conceptual issues involved in designing and reforming an economy’s SSS’s. He 
categorised problems into three major groups for analysis, namely the general 
characteristics, costing and operational issues. Whilst, the study of Baily and Turner 
(2001) advocated a mixture of strategies to reduce SSCE, namely, the structure of the 
SSS, individual attitudes, administration and the macroeconomic environment. In 
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addition, study carried out by McGillivray (2001) focused on a number of other issues 
related to implications of contribution evasion in SS.  
 
One study of particular interest to this thesis has been conducted in the Middle East, 
namely in Israel. Awad et al (1998) reviewed the theoretical aspects of non-compliance 
decisions and examined empirically the relationships between the extent of non-
compliance and a number of explanatory variables. The study revealed significant 
statistical relationships between employers’ compliance with Israel’s minimum wage and 
economic and demographic characteristics, namely the unemployment rate, the wage gap, 
and the proportion of non-Jews among low paid workers. 
  
Finally, I chosen to engage with this subject and the main drift for undertaking the 
research is rooted in my own experience as an employee in Social Security Corporation 
in Jordan since 1988. I am a member of avoiding and evasion contribution committee 
which has responsibility for advising the managements on matters of contribution evasion 
and avoiding strategy. Finally, I am also currently working as a head of risk management 
department in JSSC and this problem is one of the critical risk factors which face the 
sustainability of the Social Security Scheme (SSS). 
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the nature of SSCE and to develop an understanding 
of the main reasons why SSCE occurs in Jordan. By sampling former firms who were 
once contribution evaders, a number of hypotheses will be developed and tested in 
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relation to the impact of evasion and the motivation to evade contribution compliance. 
The specific objectives of this study are four-fold. They are to:  
 
 Present a critical overview of the JSSC and its administration of Jordanian Social 
Security scheme (JSSS). 
 Develop an appropriate model to undertake empirical analysis to explain the main 
determinant(s) of SSCE. 
 Undertake a series of interviews with which to assess the reasons for compliance 
of former contribution evaders. 
 Propose suitable strategies for the JSSC to adopt when reforming the scheme, 
with the aim of reducing SSCE. 
 
It is essential to identify the fiscal history and the present JSSS structure in order to 
understand the behaviour of the Social Security contributor. Accordingly, the first 
objective of this thesis is to demonstrate a descriptive analysis of the major 
characteristics of the current JSSS.  
 
However, earlier research in developed countries has argued that evasion cannot be 
clarified completely by the level of enforcement: analysts began to search for other 
factors than detection and punishment in order to ascertain and explore the determinants 
of taxpayer attitudes and tax evasion. Thus, this thesis attempts to concentrate on the 
effects of alternative factors other than the traditional one, namely contribution rate, 
penalty and inspection variables. Therefore, the second objective of the present study is 
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to empirically examine the relationships between SSCE and a number of explanatory 
factors related to the particular Jordanian context. These factors refer to: LRS, EF, CME, 
and ESC of Jordanian firms towards the JSSCE problem. In addition, the current study 
tests for potential influences of key firms’ characteristics (industry type, ownership and 
size) on the relationship between the independent factors and evasion problem. The 
examination of the second objective will be carried out at both aggregated (overall 
sample) and disaggregated (industry type, ownership and size) levels. 
 
The third objective of this thesis is to carry out a series of interviews to understand in 
depth the respondents’ motivations and attitudes towards SSCE. The results of the 
qualitative research will provide a valuable contribution to support the quantitative stage 
by enhancing research robustness and to improve the ability of the researcher to draw 
conclusions and recommendations for JSSC with greater clarity and confidence. 
 
Finally, the findings from this thesis are expected to enhance the strategies which will 
finally be adopted by the JSSS administration to increase contribution compliance and to 
generate more revenue. Therefore, the fourth objective of this dissertation will conclude 
by recommending a set of practical strategies to promote compliance amongst Jordanian 
firms.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
To achieve the research objectives, this study uses a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods in order to improve the quality of information which is required for 
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conducting this study. The quantitative approach is represented here by multiple 
regression analysis using a self-administered questionnaire. The qualitative approach, 
however, is represented by the appliance of semi-structured interviews with key 
informants. Two methods of data collection have been used: secondary data has been 
collected through literature review, reports, statistics, census and previous surveys, etc, to 
achieve background information about SSCE and the JSSS, and primary data has been 
collected from semi-structured interviews and self-administrate questionnaires to 
undertake an empirical analysis to explain the main reasons for SSCE in Jordan. 
 
The model was developed to follow the line of previous tax evasion studies with 
particular attention toward SSCE studies so as to solve the research problem. The general 
research design is explanatory in order to discover any cause/effect relationships between 
particular variables, and due to the time horizon, data for this study is cross-sectional.  
 
The sample frame list was supplemented by asking the inspection department within 
JSSC to supply the names, sectors, locations and telephone numbers of firms who had 
evaded in the past.  In this study, stratified random probability samples were chosen from 
the target population (2264 firms), which contains all firms in the city of Amman the 
capital of Jordan, from 2003 until 2008 who had previously evaded contributing and were 
currently participating in the scheme. These were organized into groups or strata 
according to the criteria of their economic sector. In addition, proportionate sampling was 
carried out where the number of groups selected for the sample reflects the relative 
numbers in the population as a whole, and after that, a simple random sample was drawn 
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from each stratum by using readily available computer programs. The researcher tried to 
ensure the sample size was large enough to provide adequate representation of any sub-
populations of specific interests and so the results are expected to be informed by the 
level of saturation that is needed to achieve a strengthening of the generalisability. 
 
Structured questionnaires in a Likert format have been designed to gather data about the 
basic research question SSCE. The questionnaires were designed mainly on the basis of 
key variables identified from the existing literature (standardised questionnaire) and a 
few questions developed by the researcher. A pilot study was conducted in order to 
construct and test the data collection method by using a pre-test questionnaire and 
procedure to identify problems prior to the survey, so as to confirm its appropriateness 
and robustness. Furthermore, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was undertaken to 
reduce the selected attitudinal variables in a number of the main groupings through the 
consideration of the statements combined with the same shared factors in order to be able 
to interpret the underlying common attitudes. The questions of this survey were 
addressed to the head of the firm, financial and personnel managers. 350 questionnaires 
were personally distributed and collected and the response was that 229 valid 
questionnaires were returned which translates to a response rate of 65.5%.  
 
Multivariate regression statistics have been used to analyse the research data based on 
data collected from a field survey seeking empirical evidence between independent and 
dependent variables in order to test the research hypotheses. Data analysis was conducted 
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using SPSS 15 computer software into manageable forms. In addition, there will be 
standard descriptive analysis of trends and results. 
 
Finally, a qualitative method using semi-structured interviews was used to support the 
results of the quantitative research. The method employed comprised two kinds of 
interviews were carried out to elicit reliable information of relevance to the thesis: 17 
case studies, 10 face-to-face interviews with representatives of evading firms or 
employers and 7 face-to-face interviews with employees at different levels within the 
JSSC. 
 
1.6 The Organisation of the Study 
 
The organisation of this thesis (as shown in Figure 1.2) comprises nine chapters. The first 
chapter is an introduction.  
 
The second chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the major characteristic of the 
current JSSS. The discussion focuses on the objectives and principles of this scheme, its 
organizational structure, investment policies and performance, coverage, benefit levels, 
financial sources, valuation of obligations against Social Security benefits and current 
trends.  
 
Chapter three starts by reviewing the literature underpinning a rationale for SSCE. After 
the introduction, the second section presents the Basic Economic Model of evasion 
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problem. This is based on Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and concentrates on traditional 
economic variables (such as audits, penalties and contribution rates). Researchers provide 
evidence that there are considerable limitations in model’s capability to explain major 
aspects of tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, the second section continues to discuss 
several extensions to the Basic Economic Model that tried to incorporate such findings 
into a more sophisticated EUT. The third section of chapter three analyses the role of 
non-economic factors (LRS, CME, and ESC) which considerably affect and possibly 
determine the JSSCE problem. In general, this chapter argues that those three key factors 
mentioned above and also EF seems to be very important for understanding SSCE.  
 
Chapter four demonstrates the methodology employed in this thesis by the researcher to 
achieve the thesis objectives. The chapter discusses research philosophy, methods, 
approaches, strategies, research method selection and data availability. In addition, this 
chapter introduces the theoretical model and its factors used to test the thesis hypotheses, 
whereas the section that follows, is devoted to setting up the research hypotheses and 
discusses the rationale for each hypothesis. Then, the chapter moves further towards the 
sampling procedure and identifies and explains the data collection method and 
procedures, their validity and reliability. Furthermore, details of the pilot study, the 
statistical technique (Multiple Regression Analysis) that has been used by the current 
study to test the hypotheses are presented. 
 
Chapter five presents the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) used in this thesis to 
identify the factor structure or model for a set of factors. This often involves determining 
how many factors exist, as well as the pattern of factor loading.  In general, PCA 
 21 
provides an opportunity for consolidating factors and for generating hypotheses about the 
underlying processes. 
 
The empirical analysis in chapter six begins by providing descriptive data about the firms 
that comprise the research sample, and then descriptive analyses and interpretation of the 
results with regard to the dependent and independent variables are presented. 
  
Chapter seven presents the results of the quantitative method used in this thesis 
(questionnaire) to analyse whether there is a correlation and a cause and effect 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. After the introduction, the 
second section tests the basic assumptions of the regression technique. The following 
sections describe the results of multiple regression analysis and the effect of the 
explanatory factors on the explanation of the SSCE problem. However, the multiple 
regression analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, a base regression 
model was made to investigate the full collective relationship between all the independent 
factors and contribution evasion and to examine whether a particular factor predicts an 
outcome when the effects of other factors are controlled. In the second stage, a 
supplementary regression model involving firms' characteristics was conducted at three 
levels based on firm characteristics (industry type, ownership and size). This chapter ends 
by summarising the results of the multiple regression analysis. 
 
Chapter eight presents the results of the qualitative method used in this thesis (semi-
structured interviews). The method used encompasses two types of interviews: the first 
one with 10 representatives of evading firms and the other with 7 employees at different 
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levels of the JSSC. The result reflects the interviewees' attitudes and their involvement in 
the process of SSCE. In general, the chapter is structured as follows: the second section 
8.2 introduces the objective of the interview; Section 8.3 presents the participants' 
descriptions; Section 8.4 displays the interview procedures. This is followed by two 
sections, 8.5 and 8.6, devoted to the results of the interviews concerning the reasons that 
encourage firms to evade their contributions. This is from the perspective of both groups 
of interviewees mentioned above. The chapter concludes with a section dedicated to 
summarising the results of the interviews. 
 
Chapter nine summarises the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis as well as 
proposing suitable strategies to overcome the evasion problem. In addition, it presents the 
limitations of the study and suggests some topics for further research. The chapter 
contains five sections: section 9.1 is the introduction; Section 9.2 presents theoretical 
conclusions; Section 9.3 provides the empirical conclusions that can be drawn from 
conducting this research; Section 9.4 introduces strategies to reduce the JSSCE problem. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEME IN JORDAN:   





Jordanian Social Security Law (JSSL) was first issued provisionally in 1978. Its 
introduction was to address groups of workers who did not have the benefit of retirement 
rules or regulations unlike the government and military sectors. There was a perceived 
need for a socio-economic umbrella to protect those productive groups in the private 
sector and grant them security, safety and stability, especially after the introduction of the 
Jordanian Labour Law at the beginning of the 1960s, with the growth of the labour 
market in Jordan and the development of its economic and social conditions (JSSC, 
Annual report, 2006).  
 
The JSSS has had an enormous impact on everyday Jordanian people's lives and the 
economy as a whole. Social Security legislation (SSL) has been aimed at providing the 
means of economic welfare and social security for the people as well as allowing them to 
lead a dignified life within a constructive environment suitable for work and creativity 
that would be unaffected by changes in the economic climate (JSSC, Annual Report, 
2004). Therefore, the SSS in Jordan contributes significantly in the alleviation of poverty 
and prevents abrupt falls in the standard of living upon retirement, death, disability, 
occupational injury or disease, or unemployment.  
 25 
The Sections that follow summarise the major characteristics of the formal Social 
Security arrangements in Jordan. The discussion focuses on the objectives and principles 
of the JSSS, the organisational structure, the investment unit, coverage, benefits levels, 
financial sources, and the valuation of obligations against Social Security benefits and 
current trends.  
 
2.2 Analysis of the Existing Social Security System 
 
There are two distinct and separate examples of Social Security Pension Scheme (SSPS), 
Defined Benefit Plan (DBP) or Defined Contribution Plan (DCP).  
 
In a DBP such as that which exists in Jordan, the rules for calculation of the benefit’s 
value are predefined, usually on the basis of the most recent contribution salaries. The 
value of that benefit which is paid out does not depend on the yield of the reserves. If the 
actuarial forecasts prove wrong in the long term, the only thing that can be done is for the 
plan’s contribution rates to be re-evaluated and restructured. If, on the other hand, the 
plan is a DCP, it is the value of the benefit that is adjusted according to the yield of the 
reserves. In terms of motivation for entering the scheme, from an individual perspective, 
a fixed DBP is usually more of an attraction, with the proviso that someone is responsible 
for payment when contribution rates increase. From the perspective of the scheme 




The DCP is designed to collect contributions, make investments and roll out payments to 
those in the scheme. It has long been the case that those in the field have declared policy 
analysis has little or no effect the behaviour of those who contribute. The DCP is 
considered to be merely a savings plan that has no effect on retirement age or on 
calculations of labour supply.  
 
It is also reported that DCP has no noticeable effect on the distribution of income. The 
World Bank looked carefully into DBP in 1994 in the report: ‘Averting the Old Age 
Crisis’. The World Bank argued convincingly that DBP does in fact have a demonstrable 
distorting effect on labour supply decisions, including those of whether to retire and 
whether to work in the private sector. They also concluded that it adversely affects 
income distribution, and is a major cause of contribution evasion. They went on to say 
that DBP is actually subject to particular demographic and political risks (Turner, 1997).   
 
The main tasks of the JSSC are based on a fundamental understanding of the function of 
social security, which involves a comprehensive insurance system comprising several 
types of insurance aimed at protecting the worker (the insured party) from certain risks. 
This is done by providing an income if the insured party loses productive and earning 
capacities due to an accident at the work place, disability, old age or death, and to ensure 
the material and psychological stability for the insured party during their lifetime, and 





2.2.1 Objectives and Principles of the Jordanian Social Security Scheme 
 
The JSSC was founded in order to enforce the rules of the JSSL by attempting to meet 
the following objectives: 
- To secure a respectable life for a citizen and their family members by allocating a 
pension for the insured person or their family. This should be at the time of entitlement 
for such a pension whether owing to the reaching of the pensionary age, disability, 
sickness, or death. 
- To extend the social security umbrella in order to cover more and bigger groups and to 
secure psychological, material, and work stability for as many as possible. 
- To participate in economic and social development plans through contribution to 
strategic national economic projects as well as by creating new job opportunities. 
- To raise health standards in society through the implementation of insurance against 
work injuries and occupational diseases, taking into consideration that this trend 
imposes diligence in participation in the efforts exerted for work safety and health. This 
is intended to reduce the number of the work injuries and their risks and negative effect 
on the national income.  
- To deepen the values of solidarity in society and to participate in reducing poverty 
through securing a minimum income for the employee and their family. 
- To guarantee effective and correct administration of contributions to ensure continuity 
and to achieve equity and justice in income distribution between the same generation 
and successive generations. 
- To enhance the abilities of JSSC employees so they can obtain knowledge, skills and 
the support needed to work professionally, and to maintain a clear environment and a 
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positive atmosphere where knowledge is valued and has the effect of improving quality 
of life and helps creativity and motivation.  
- To highlight the social security philosophy and expand insurance consciousness at the 
national level to create mutual responsibility, both towards the corporation's role and to 
the protection of the applied insurance systems in an attempt to develop them (JSSC, 
Annual Report, 2004). 
 
The JSSS is based on several principles and standards which are represented by the 
following: 
 
- Compulsory saving: SSS consists of compulsory saving plans for the benefit of the 
labourer when they lose the capacity to work. 
- Self funding: SSS is self-funded through the monthly contributions deducted from the 
wages of labourers and contributions paid by the employers to the accounts of the 
labourers. 
- A Pension/Wage Link: the increase in pensions is linked proportionately to the increase 
in wage rates (wages indexation). 
- The Comprehensiveness of the SSS: this means that all labourers in the society working 
in any economic sector are covered by social security. 
-  Compulsory affiliation: the SSS applies compulsorily to both the labourer and the 
employer according to the legislation issued by the state. 
- Integration of SSS: SSS reflects the principle of integrity among the parties of 
production in society in order to achieve social and economic stability. 
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- The continuity of the SSS: By maintaining the balance between revenues and 
expenditures (social security benefits) in the long run. 
- The flexibility of the SSS: by allowing both transference of contributions among 
pension funds especially among formal ones according to insurance equations issued by 
amended legislative articles of the Civil and Military Pension Law (JSSC, Annual Report, 
2002).  
 
2.2.2 The Organisational Structure 
 
The JSSC has a juristic personality and financial and administrative independence. The 
Board of Directors has a tripartite hierarchy, as it is composed of representatives of the 
government, employees and employers in an attempt to reflect its transparency and 
justice. The main objective of the Board of Directors is to assist in increasing the national 
savings rate, and to provide greater certainty in the application and amount of pensions to 
retired people. 
 
The Corporation is known to apply the principle of decentralisation when providing 
benefits through the activation of the role of the various departments and branches 
distributed across the Kingdom. The organisational structure of the Corporation reflects 
the framework of the organizational units responsible for operating the SSS and spreads 
its benefits throughout Jordan in order to achieve the Corporation's goal of providing 
insured people with the benefits to which they are entitled. Appendix 6.1 demonstrates 
the Corporation organisational structure.  
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The number of the JSSC staff stood at (1,237) by the end of 2009, distributed among 
different departments and branches. Males made up 63.5% of employees compared to 
(36.5%) females. Bachelor degree holders ranked highest at 48.4%, followed by those 
with secondary high school education or lower, at of 17%. The majority of employees are 
distributed among technical departments due to the nature of the JSSC’s core business 
and services, which are delivered through 15 central administrations and 18 branches and 
offices in all the governorates. This is in addition to three liaison offices abroad serving 





- The Social Security Investment Unit 
 
For any SSPS, the investment strategies and performance are very important. Investment 
Operations was a department within the JSSC until the end of 2001. The Social Security 
Investment Unit (SSIU) was started in early 2002 to be a financially and administratively 
independent body. The Unit, however, does not have a separate legal status; it is part of 
the JSSC. The result was the creation of a specialised investment body charged with the 
duty of professionally managing reserves and rationalizing investment returns. 
 
Its mission is specified as building a modern investment institution that will manage 
Social Security reserves and its associated investment portfolio, according to 
international standards in terms of governance, accountability and management. 
                                                 
8
 According to JSSC annual report issued in (2010) 
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Generally, Investment strategies are carried out through the following investment 
principles and objectives: 
 
1. Adopt a conservative approach in order to preserve assets and reserves of the 
JSSC. 
2. Maintain the real value of assets. 
3. Achieve maximum possible profitability to extend the actuarial equilibrium 
period. 
4. Provide the necessary liquidity to meet current and short-run obligations and 
liabilities. 
5. Participate in projects that have a positive influence on the national economy and 
social development. 
 
 The SSIU Main Investment Guidelines 
 
• National Investment: priority is given to national viable investments within 
parameters and standards that ensure soundness of investment and meet liquidity 
requirements. 
• Investment Diversity: diversifying investments with a focus on medium and long 
term instruments to reduce risks and ensure the highest possible returns. 
• Investment Fundamentals: avoiding speculative instruments and basing 
investment decision on economic fundamentals. 
• Protection against Inflation: investing in instruments that secure the real value of 
the fund. 
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• Code of Ethics: preventing any conflicts between fund management and 
individual interests (JSSC, Annual Report, 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Coverage  
 
It is important to distinguish between coverage, or those who take part in a SSS by either 
law or regulation and hence are obliged to contribute to it, and compliance, which refers 
to the extent to which those who are covered meet their contribution obligations. As 
Rofman and Demarco, (1999) state ‘social security schemes can only function with the 
support of their participants’. Extending compulsory coverage to different categories of 
workers who may not wish to participate in such a scheme and which cannot be 
effectively enforced may lead to political benefits through its populism; it can also bring 
about negative effects when participation is seen as merely an illusion (McGillivray, 
2001). 
 
The JSSC covers six different types of social security insurance, and gradually 
implements the relevant sections of law which deal with a variety of issues that relate to 
the topic of social security. It does, however, focus mainly on two types of insurances: 
 
- Insurance against injury in the workplace and occupational disease. 
- Insurance against old age, disability and death. 
 
Coverage is expected to be extended in the future through the gradual implementation of 
the insurance in the following areas: 
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• Insurance against temporary inability to work through maternity. 
• Health insurance for the employees and their dependents. 
• Subsidies for families. 
• Insurance against unemployment (JSSC, Annual Report, 2006). 
 
The application of these types of social insurance is expected to take place progressively, 
according to concomitant economic and social development and improvements in wage 
levels. It is further expected that these changes will be made in accordance with decisions 
made by the Cabinet of Ministers upon the recommendations of the Corporation's Board 
of Directors. 
 
The SSS adopted by the corporation covers workers in the following fields: 
 
- All employees of government ministries, public departments and organisations 
that are not subject to civil or military pension schemes. 
- All labourers subject to the rules of Labour Law regardless of their sex or 
nationality, ranging between the ages of 16-60 for males and 16-55 for females.  
- Jordanians employed at foreign political, military or international missions in 
Jordan or overseas. 
- All workers of the Greater Amman Jurisdiction, and those in municipalities, 
village councils, universities and institutes. 
- Those who take part in voluntary contributions according to the instructions of the 
board of directors of a corporation. 
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- Those who join on a voluntary basis from private sector firms that employ four 
persons or fewer. 
  
Categories excluded in law: 
 
1. Public employees subject to civil or military retirement law. 
2. Foreign employees at foreign political, military or international missions in Jordan.  
3. Labourers who have an authorised relationship with their employers, provided that the 
authorised relationship is accepted in the regulations issued by the board of directors of 
the company. 
 
Categories where the implementation of law is suspended: 
 
1. Labourers employed in agricultural, forestry and pastoral activities except for those 
who use mechanical machines or are involved with regular irrigation work, or those who 
work in such activities for the government and public institutions 
2. Sailors and sea fishermen 
3. House servants (JSSC, Annual Report, 2006) 
 
Each employee mandatorily contributes 5.5% and employer 11.0 % of the employee’s 
monthly wage giving a total of 16.5%. For most of the private sector, this plan has 
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The JSSS umbrella covered more than 50% of the total number of workers at more than 
17856 establishments covered by the JSSL in the Kingdom by the end of 20099. Figure 
2.1 demonstrates the growth rate of covered active firms for the period 2006-2009.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Growth Rate of Covered Active Firms 














The covered active enterprises were concentrated mainly in the Capital governorate 
(Amman) with 63.5% of total active enterprises in year 2009, compared to 70.2% in 
2008. Figure 2.2 below shows the proportional distribution of Active enterprises by 
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The JSSC continued extending social protection, which resulted in the raising of the 
number of actively insured persons from 351,000 in 1999 to 835,000 workers in 2009, 
demonstrating a growth rate of 9.4%. The percentage of total Jordanians insured stood at 
87.4%, while the percentage of non–Jordanians covered reached 12.6%. It was noted that 
insured males figured at 75.5% compared to 24.5% for insured females. The number of 
voluntary insured persons was noted as 41000, of which 75.8% were males and 24.2% 
were females by the end of 2009 (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
 
- Extending Coverage: 
 
The year 2008 was earmarked as the year of extending coverage which was launched 
under the patronage of His Majesty King Abdullah II, with the ultimate aim of gradually 
covering every Jordanian citizen. This was to be done by the implementation of a new 
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extended coverage program. Due to the efforts of the JSSC staff and cooperation from all 
partners, there was a noticeable increase in the rate of those insured. The JSSC continues 
to work with its goal of further extension of insurance to those currently covered, so as to 
ensure social protection to all workers. The aim of this is to increase their productivity 
and so by a system of accelerators, to reflect positively on the Jordanian Economy.  
 
Initiatives such as this one have resulted in taking the national the coverage rate to nearly 
half, or 50.2% of those employed by the end of the fiscal year for 2009. This can be 
favourably compared to the beginning of 2008, where the comparable figure was only 
46.7% (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). Figure 2.3 below shows the ratio of insured persons 
to labor force and employed persons.  
Figure 2.3 
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2.2.4 Benefit Levels  
 
Benefits provided for claimants are mainly long-term. These include pensions for 
retirement, employment injury, and disability. In addition, there are lump-sum benefits 
for the relations of beneficiaries of these long-term benefits. These include grants for 
funerals, lump-sum payments for early retirement, and low-level injuries and disabilities.  
 
Retirement pensions are normally paid to men and women at the age of 60 and 55 
respectively. To qualify, pensioners should have contributed through insurance systems 
for at least 18 years according to the specific predetermined formulas. The benefit 
formula is calculated by multiplying the person’s base earning by a service factor of 2.5 
percent, where base earning is measured as the median average wage when calculated 
over the prior two year-period before retirement. The age of retirement, the number of 
years of contribution, and the family status of the retiree (number of dependents) is also 
added to the calculation of the final rate paid to the pensioner. Total benefit, however, 
cannot exceed 80 percent of the base earning. 
 
In addition, the JSSS allows employees to receive retirement benefits at ages that are 
younger than is typical by international standards. The economic implications of this are 
to distort labour market activity and may distort benefit structure by changing an earning-
related benefit structure into one that is nearly flat. In Jordan, both men and women can 
retire at the age of 46, if they so wish. They receive reduced benefits for the period 
between the age of retirement and the age of 60 when regular retirement is expected to 
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Other pensioners, i.e. the survivors, the injured, and the disabled are paid under strict 
qualified conditions. All kinds of pensions are adjusted to the statutory wage (or 
minimum wage), and the minimum pension is equivalent to the minimum wage.  
 
As for the various advantages offered by the JSSL to those insured persons, the JSSC 
provides more than 118,000 pensions, paid on a monthly basis to around 835,000 
pensioners and beneficiaries in the year ending 2009. Of these, 97.7 % were Jordanians 
against 2.3 % for non–Jordanians. Men made up 87.6% of this total compared to 12.4% 
for women.  
 
Old–age pensioners (Early and mandatory pensioners) ranked as the highest number of 
claimants at 72.5%, followed by “natural disability” pensioners at 14.6%. Also, “natural 
death” pensioners made up 8.5%, “work injury disability” pensioners, 2.7%, and spouses 
of those who died in industrial accidents pensioners ranked as the lowest rate 1.6% the 
new early retirement pensioners made up 78.8% of the total old–age pension 
(Compulsory and Early Retirement). See figure 2.4 below. 
Figure 2.4 
 










                                                                                              






In addition to lump sum compensations paid to about 22000 insured persons,43.0% of 
them were Jordanians and 57.0% were non– Jordanians in the year ending 2009. (JSSC, 
Annual Report, 2009) 
 
The total number of work accidents registered at the JSSC reached 17,243 in 2009, 
11,523 of which were considered as work injuries. The rate of fully recovered injuries 
stood at 90.5 % in 2009, while the rate of injuries resulting in 30% disability reached 
8.7% and those resulting in death of insured person reached 0.6%. Furthermore, 0.2% of 
injuries resulted in more than 30% disability of those who were entitled to work injury 
disability pensions (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
 
History of Social Security Reform  
 
The first reforms with regard to the raising of benefits were made in 1999. The JSSS 
reforms in 1999 were aimed at increasing the system benefits. High inflation was 
probably the major motivating factor for the reforms. In general, it is plausible to say that 
an important aim of the scheme was to find a simple way to raise benefits, revenues, to 
promote equality and efficiency without making the sustainability of the system difficult 
to realize. The Board of Directors decided in 1999 on a set of recommendations: 
 
1. To improve old age benefits by raising the factor to 1/40
th
 (2.5%) instead of 1/50
th
 
(2%), thus raising the maximum achievable pension to 80% of a person’s wage 
(retroactively), and therefore attracting more contributors to the scheme. By increasing 
the accrual rate, one improves the work incentive for those who can expect to move 
above the minimum pension, thus reducing labour market distortions. 
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2. To raise disability and survivors’ pensions at the rate of 0.5 percent of the contributor’s 
salary for every year exceeding a minimum 10 year contribution period (retroactively). 
3. To raise contribution rates to cover the insurance against old age, disability and death 
in order to achieve a balance between social benefits and the resources to finance these 
benefits in the medium to long run. The employer was expected to pay 9 percent of the 
wages of labourers, instead of 8 percent, while the employee was to 5.5 percent instead of 
5 percent (JSSC, Annual Report, 2008). 
 
The second fiscal reforms related to the scheme design and the organisation is in progress 
in the current year 2011. They will be officially introduced later in the year in order to 
ensure the scheme remains sustainable and is able to expand its resources and programs. 
The main intention of the new reforms is to rationalize early retirement so as to better 
achieve a balance between the number of years in work and those in retirement. Early 
retirement pensions are expected to be allocated for those contributors who have a 
contribution period of not less than 23 years instead of the current 18, but only if the 
contributor’s age is 50 or more. This early retirement pension will reduce at the rate of 10 
percent, if the age of the insured is 50 and will reduced at the rate of 1% for each year 
after that until the insured reaches the age of 59.  
 
2.2.5 Financial Sources Social Security Corporation  
 




1. Contributions of those who are eligible are made according to the law, 
whether paid by the insured employee or by the employer. This applies to 
all employees as well as any revenue from voluntary contributions. It also 
includes any previous service in years where they were not included by 
law.  
2. Interests, fines and additional amounts in cases of delay in contribution 
payment, not including the employees, delay in notifying at service 
termination, or any other cases stipulated in law.  
3. Investment revenues of social security accruals in different fields of 
investment. 
 
First: Revenues of Monthly Contributions paid by Insured Persons and Employers: 
 
The JSSC financial data indicated a growth in the revenues of the contributions paid by 
the insured people and employers which reached JD585.4 million at the end 2009 against 
(JD141.779) million in 1999. The percentage of monthly contributions paid by both the 
insured and the employer was 16.5% of the deductible wage, covering them through 
insurance against Old–age, Disability, and Death. This is in addition to insurance against 
Work Injury and Occupational Disease (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
 
Second: Revenue from Voluntary Contribution 
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Voluntary contribution is considered one of the SSC’s means to extend its social 
protection. Article 8 of the JSSL stipulates that: “the Jordanian laborer who works for an 
employer or who is self–employed, whether residing inside the Kingdom or abroad, or 
the person is a Jordanian insured person who becomes uncovered by the provisions of 
this law, shall have the right to voluntarily opt in, so as to be covered under national 
insurance against old age, disability and death. To do this, the contributor is expected to 
pay in full any the entire contributions due from the employer and the insured, at a total 
rate of 14.5% of the deductible wage”. Revenues from voluntary contribution rose from 
JD1.609) million in 1999 to JD32.9 million in 2009 (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
 
Third: Revenues from the Inclusion of Previous Periods of Service: 
 
The insured person has the right to apply in writing directly or through the employer to 
include previous periods of service, provided that they are not entitled to a pension by 
virtue of Civil Pension or Military Pension laws. Such benefit is accrued after completing 
certain conditions of entitlement for compulsory old–age pension or to increase it. In this 
case, the insured person shall bear total payment of all due amounts. The total revenue for 
including previous periods of service in 2009 amounted to JD1.9 million.  
 
Fourth: Default Interests and Fines 
 
The JSSL stipulates in articles 19, 20, and 21 of its code that the employer is required to 
pay the JSSC any contributions deducted from the wages of laborers and those still due, 
within a maximum of the first 15 days of the following month after they fall due. In case 
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of default, the employer must pay 2% interest per month on delinquent contributions 
provided that the amount of such interest does not exceed 12% of annual contributions. In 
addition, the employer who fails to deduct contributions from some or all of the laborers, 
or fails to pay contributions on the basis of actual wages, is required to pay an additional 
sum of 30% of the contributions which were not initially paid, without prior warning or 
notice. The JSSC financial data indicates that, the total revenue default in interests and 
fines for 2009 amounted to JD12.3 million.  
 
JSSC insurance revenues have increased up to JD 632.3 million in 2009. Table 2.1 
indicates the revenues of insurance contributions in 2009. (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009) 
The insurance expenditures include a set of the JSSC insurance benefits: 
• Frequently paid pensions. 
• Expenditure for Work Injuries. 
• Expenditure of Lump Sum Compensation. 
 
Insurance and administrative expenditure reached a total of JD406.9 million in 2009 
compared to JD 66.565 million in 1999, which had a growth rate of 19.6%. The total 
amount of paid pensions stood at JD 345.7 million, constituting a rate of 92% of total 
insurance expenditure, while the expenditure on work injuries reached JD5.3 million. As 
for the expenditure in lump sum compensation, it reached a figure of JD 23.5 million in 
2009. 
 
Administrative expenditures stood at JD32.4 million in 2009, reflecting the depreciation 
of fixed assets and the provision for staff indemnity and contingencies that is estimated at 
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JD4.5 million. This is in addition to the expenses of maintenance and infrastructure 
services. (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
 
The JSSC achieved a surplus of insurance contributions that stood at JD225.4 million at 
the end 2009, and held a growth rate of 8.4%. This surplus represents the discrepancy 
between total insurance revenues and total administrative and insurance revenues. The 
following table illustrates the revenues, expenditures and surplus of insurance 
contributions in 2009 (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
 
Table 2.1 Revenues, Expenditures & Surplus of Insurance Contributions 2005-2009 
 
 
2009 8002  8002 2006 2005 Type of Revenue 
528.0 427,248 347,762 304,557 252,551 
Contributions of Old-age, Disability, 
and Death 
57.4 47,609 39,013 33,971 28,196 Contributions of Work Injuries 
32.9 27,515 23,372 18,019 13,320 Voluntary Contribution 
1.9 2,417 2,462 3,766 7,377 
Revenues of Including Previous Periods 
of Service 
2.1 2,344 2,124 1,364 1,138 Different Revenues* 
10.2 9,484 8,457 7,313 7,095 Insurance Activity Yields 
632.3 516,617 423,190 368,990 309,677 
Total Revenues 
(after subtracting Contributions Stamps) 
Amount 
    
Type of Expenditure 
5.473 340,269 260,666 222,598 196,542 Insurance Expenditures 
7.5.3 315,541 239,885 204,719 181,754 Frequently Paid Pensions 
5.7 3,743 3,675 3,799 2,667 Expenditures paid for once. 
57.5 20,985 17,106 14,081 12,120 Lump Sum Compensation Cases 
5674 29,783 22,061 20,219 16,141 Administrative Expenditures 
406.9 




**242,828 **215,979 Total of General Expenditures 
225.4 340,269 260,666 222,598 196,542 Surplus of Insurance Contributions  
  
*In Million JD  
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Fifth: Investment revenues  
 
The total assets of the investment portfolio reached JD5013.9 million at the end 2009 
which was equivalent to 46.2% of GDP. In addition, investments in equities amounted to 
65.5% of total investment in 2009, followed by the figure for the capital market of 
21.1%, and the monetary market at 8.1%, the real estate sector figure of 4.4%, and finally 
other assets at 1.0% (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). The SSC covers almost every 
economic sector in the Kingdom, and so the JSSC is considered to be both the biggest 
and most important investor in the Jordanian economy (JSSC, Annual Report, 2009). 
Table 2.2 provides allocation of SSC investment assets, by type of investment in 2009. 
Table (2.2) Allocation of SSC Investment Assets, by Type of Investment 2005-2009  
 
Type of Investment 8005  8006 2007 2008 2009 
Bank deposits 297.9 307.4 308.3 387.1 365.0 
Bonds and 
Corporate Bonds 778.8 811.2 763.3 771.6 978.1 
Stocks 3134.9 2938.9 2141.6 2802.6 2890.8 
Lands and Real 
Estates 385.9 494.2 255.0 106.9 331.9 
Loans 150.0 109.6 109.3 115.2 177.4 
Fixed Assets 118.6 177.3 151.9 153.5 27.8 
Other 114.3 85.0 75.5 61.2 242.9 
Total 4980.5 4923.4 3804.9 4398.1 5013.9 
       
                * Preliminary data & In Million JD    
 
 
2.2.6 Valuation of Obligations against Social Security Benefits 
 
Because the JSSS was relatively new, having very few beneficiaries relative to the 
number of contributing workers, it was in the process of building its assets. Both 
employers and employees contribute to the financing of this SSS, with the employer 
contributing a higher amount in general. 
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The JSSL states that the financial position of the Corporation is to be examined by one or 
more actuaries at least once, in every five year period. The importance of this in the 
social insurance system is to aid the calculation of revenues and insurance expenditures 
in the coming years, and to examine trends and directions over the progression of the 
system. It also acts as a way of drawing conclusions and offering suggestions to reform 
the system so weaknesses are excluded and a better overall financial balance is created, 
so as to streamline the whole system. The Corporation should perform such studies taking 
into consideration the changes in demography and economy in order to insure the 
continuity of insurance for the current and coming generations in Jordan. 
 
Six actuarial studies were performed in the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 
2007. The Sixth Actuarial Valuation as at 31 December 2007 has been prepared in 
accordance with Article 15(a) of the Social Security Law No. 19 of 2001 to shed light on 
JSSC's future demographic and financial condition (ILO, 2007).  
 
In the context of the Decent Work Country Programme in Jordan, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) has been collaborating since 2005 with the JSSC to develop 
actuarial projection systems permitting the assessment of JSSC current benefit 
programmes and various parametric pension reform packages. The ILO has carefully 
studied the past experience and the benefit and financing provisions governing the JSSC. 
 
The main findings thus only refer to the current situation disregarding the SSC pension 




First: JSSC demographics 
 
Based on the demographic changes in the Kingdom, the Sixth Actuarial Valuation 
estimates that the number of working-age persons per retirement-age person in the 
general population will decline from nearly ten persons in 2007 to three by the middle of 
the century. For the JSSC, this translates into a situation whereby the ratio between the 
number of contributors (expected to rise from 764 thousands in 2007 to more than two 
million by 2057) and the number of pensioners and survivors (expected to increase 
substantially from 156 thousands in 2007 to almost two million by 2057) will deteriorate 
from roughly five contributors for each pensioner in 2007 to around three by 2027, and to 
one contributor against one pensioner by 2057. The substantial increase in the number of 
pensioners directly stems from the extensive use of the early retirement provisions as 
nearly 80 per cent of new retirees in recent years were effectively withdrawing from the 
labour market at ages prior to the normal retirement age of 55 for women and 60 for men. 
This is a demographic burden that would need to be carried by future generations of 












Second: JSSC benefit expenditure 
 
In light of the above-mentioned demographic indicators, especially the increase in the 
number of JSSC total number of beneficiaries, the sixth actuarial valuation reflects that 
JSSC total benefit expenditure will likely increase annually from JD 288 million in 2007 








The past performance review covered by the sixth actuarial valuation sheds light on the 
fact that despite the relatively good investment performance, an increase in the number of 
insured workers and higher contribution revenues that JSSC witnessed over the period 
since 2002, there will be a resulting increase in pension liabilities in the long-term, partly 
associated with the accrued rights of the newcomers who are expected to espouse a 
retirement behaviour similar to the one of new retirees today. 
 
The study recommended limiting security benefits, particularly as far as the conditions 
for early retirement are concerned. They are emphatic that this issue should be given top 
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priority. Furthermore, as from the year 2010, the retirement age for new subscribers 
should be gradually raised, and subscription percentages should be increased over a 
period ranging of ten to fifteen years effective from 2008. 
 
The actuarial study recommended charging the employer and/or the employee with some 
of the medical costs relating to work injury and professional ailments both in the 
medium, as well as the long term. The study pointed out that the recommended 
adjustments effective from the year 2008 is expected to relocate the overall breakeven 
point from 2051 to 2062. 
 
2.3 Current trends 
 
The JSSC looks forward to continue to develop strategies and action plans, update 
mechanisms and tools, and improve the skills of its staff over the coming years so as to 
reach the highest levels of competence in the field of insurance services. The JSSC 
therefore reviewed its strategic plan, set its priorities for the year 2009-2011, and 
prepared an action plan that is based on the following three goals: 
 
First: to promote the insurance system to secure continuity and expand its resources and 
programs. It will do this by: 
 
– Reforming insurance loopholes 
– Reforming the terms and condition of early retirement  
– Controlling contribution evasion. 
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– Reducing debts payable to the JSSC and improving methods of the 
collection of contributions           
– Covering particular geographical areas and sectors under  the SSS 
– Linking investment polices to actuarial evaluations to achieve higher rates 
of return. 
 
Second: to promote the best insurance services to meet customers' expectations and 
needs. They will do this by: 
 
– Adopting and rooting quality education for all JSSC staff. 
– Launching a set of projects, including the Data Processing Project, which 
aimed at processing all data related to insured people, and the PPR Project, 
that aimed at re-examining all procedures and work mechanisms in a bid 
to facilitate the possibility of paying insurance entitlements in less than 48 
hours. 
– Offering a set of new insurance services: 
        1. The JSSC ambassador 
       2. Financial decentralisation of institutions and individuals 
–    Adopting specified and clear performance measures and standards. 
These approved activating E–payment and bank payment for departments and branches. 
– Activating administrative goals and strategies representing the core of the 
SSC’s work for 2009 based on a quarterly evaluation service. 
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Third: The implementation of the principles of modern management in addition to 
investing in human resources through modernisation, development and growth. This will 
be done by: 
– Restructuring and setting occupational duties 
– Adopting flexible staff regulation that deal with the requirements of 
modern management and link incentives to performance through action 
plans 
The JSSC aspires to achieve more, including new studies that will add a basket for new 
insurance services. This is in addition to a reconsideration of the lower rates of entry to 
pension schemes, as well as a desire to link them to inflation.  
 
Additionally, the JSSC proceeded to activate a system of international sharing with other 
national schemes throughout the world. This was done through exchanging experiences, 
signing memorandums of understanding with different social insurance institutions, and 
benefiting from international best practice in a bid to strengthen its position as an active 
member at the International Social Security Association (ISSA) and International Labor 

















This chapter aims to introduce theories that provide a rationale for explaining the SSCE 
problem and to explore several key issues. Since the Basic Economic Model created by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) based on the EUT, literature on the determinants of 
taxpayers’ evasion decisions have proliferated (Franzoni, 1999). Studies have strongly 
increased in the last four decades. Researchers, like Vogel, 1974; Witte and Woodbury, 
1985 Smith and Stalans 1991; Smith 1992; Torgler, 2003; Kanniainen et al 2004 and 
Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008 on the whole, offer psychological reasons for tax evasion in 
the literature and over the last twenty years, other economic researchers have emerged, 
such as Cowell 1990; Sloman 1997; Andreoni, et al, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; 
Schneider, 2007; Brautigam et al, 2008 and Mirco Tonin, 2010 who propose economic 
reasons rather than psychological ones for the basis of tax evasion research.  
 
More specifically, early tax evasion studies tried to examine the relative importance of 
the reasonably well-formulated EUT, which was influenced by the model of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) and other authors such as Yitzhaki (1974) and Spicer and Becker, 
(1980). Based on this theory, economists examined the level of change in tax compliance 
as a response to a diverse range of deterrence policies. However, most studies revealed a 
higher level of compliance than the EUT model might have predicted (Alm, 1999).  
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As will later become obvious, deterrence and EFs are not the only factors that seem to 
affect the level of tax evasion. Literature in more recent years has started to test and to 
analyse the importance of new economic and numerous non-economic factors
10
 and to 
incorporate these factors in formal theories of tax evasion decision-making. It will 
become clear that taxpayers do not respond only to deterrents within the tax evasion 
game but also to the context within which they operate. Alm (1998) argues that tax 
evasion is not a single choice decision but is actually a range of multiple decisions. He 
adds that more analysis of the multidimensional nature of evasion is required. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: after the introduction, the second section discusses 
the issues that arise in firms’ tax evasion. The third section, describes the Basic Economic 
Model created by Allingham-Sandmo, its basic structure, and considers its weaknesses in 
the light of more recent developments. It then turns to explore the issue of how to 
determine optimal levels of auditing and punishment when the behaviour of taxpayers 
corresponds to the predictions of this model.  
 
The fourth section, introduces the extensions and modifications of the Basic Economic 
Model by including more economic factors (e.g., employment level and labour-cost 
reduction). Consequently, the fifth section analyses the role of  NEFs which considerably 
affect and determine the SSCE problem; namely, the impact of the effectiveness of a tax 
agency and its administration, the legal and regulatory structure, and ethical and social 
considerations. Finally, a summary and conclusion are presented.  
                                                 
10
 Non-economic factors refer to these variables studied in the disciplines of sociology, psychology, 
management and law. 
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3.2. The Evolving Theory of the Firm  
 
Much of the literature on tax evasion looks at the actions of individual taxpayers and 
what motivates them to observe or break the law. The role of firms has been neglected in 
this literature in the main. Similarly, the emphasis normally is on individuals with regards 
to the black economy and not firms. Thus it seems appropriate to assess tax evasion 
issues from the theory of the firm rather than from an individual perspective. Such a 
course of action requires this thesis to summarise some of the more recent developments 
with respect to the theory of the firm 
 
Penrose (1959) commented that initially the theory of the firm was constructed with the 
main purpose of understanding the way in which prices and resource allocation took 
place. Accordingly only those aspects of firm behaviour that was considered relevant to 
that particular issue were addressed by the theory of the firm. Other issues of note such as 
uncertainty or the actual behaviour of firms such as the growth and limits to the growth of 
firms or why firms evade tax were outside the dominant paradigm. 
 
The organisational entity, the firm, in this theory in its simplest form is represented by an 
upward sloping supply curve where output adjusts seamlessly to market price signals. 
The firm is perceived as a passive responder to market signals that simply maximises its 
profit under highly competitive conditions where equilibrium is usually the norm.  
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But by the early 20th century, some economists and organisational theorists were arguing 
for an alternative view of the firm saying amongst other things that realism rather than 
needless abstraction was important and that the assumptions inherent in the theory were 
only partially relevant to contemporary problems. Consequently, a number of major 
attempts have been made during recent years to construct a theory of the firm by 
substituting other models for profit or value maximization. A number of key theories are 
presented below. 
 
A key issue of the separation of ownership and control was identified by Berle and 
Means (1932) who noted the growth of big corporate business that was characterised with 
ownership being divorced from control and the consequent rise of the importance of the 
corporate manager and company directors. The implication was that this separation of 
ownership and control could result in the corporate managers taking business decisions 
and following their own personal objectives according to their agenda rather than 
implementing the wishes of the owners as represented by the shareholders.  
 
A further issue, transaction costs, was identified by Coase (1937) who highlighted their 
nature and their importance. Transaction costs were associated with the external 
additional costs a firm incurs when dealing with markets through the use of contracts. 
They can be grouped into search and information costs, bargaining costs and the costs 
associated with costs of policing the contract. Later the identification of managerial 
opportunism and other opportunistic behaviour by Williamson (1976) deepened 
transaction cost theory. The implication of the developing theory was that firms exist as a 
means of minimising transaction costs. Once again the implication is that there is a 
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conscious individual will being expressed within firms who make such decisions and that 
the means by which firms address their internal administrative arrangements becomes a 
crucial question. 
 
A third issue that has been highlighted is agency theory. In its simplest form, the theory 
discusses the relationship between two people, a principal and an agent. It is normally 
presented as the principal, the owner, and the agents those managers who take decisions 
on behalf of the owner. Principal-agent theory as it became known examined how the 
principal, the owner, could be confident that the agent, the manager, would act on the 
principal’s behalf. Such a development forced the opening up of the ‘black box’ and the 
investigation of the workings of the firm itself. 
 
The internal arrangements within firms and between firms has thus become subject to 
numerous studies. A highly influential work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed a 
theory of the firm based upon conflicts of interests between various contracting parties, 
where attempts to resolve issues are through the use of contracts and associated 
incentives within the company to influence a manager’s behaviour.  
 
These researchers (ibid) state that contracts are used where, ‘one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.’ If both of these 
bodies are people who maximise their own utility, there is no reason to suppose that the 
agent will always work in the best interests of the principal. Thus the principal may seek 
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to minimise any possible deviation by setting up inducements for the agent to reduce the 
agent’s actions. 
 
Hence a focus on an individual’s contractual obligations and how outlays and rewards are 
to be shared amongst participants has grown in research importance. Thus there is 
recognition that the behaviour of individuals in organisations as well as the behaviour of 
managers is dependent on the nature of these contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). And 
agency problems arise because of the impossibility of being able to design a contract that 
covers every possible course of action. McColgan (2001) states that managers bear the 
entire cost of failing to pursue their own goals but capture only a fraction of the benefits. 
Thus when managers do pursue their own goals independently, agency costs can thus be 
seen as value losses to shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) calculate agency costs 
as the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and any residual loss.  
 
Previously, the ‘nexus of contracts theory’ and the ‘principal/agent theory’ were used as 
the basis on which to argue particular views regarding the relationships between 
shareholder and owner, and those of management. New managerialist theories argued 
that a firm’s behaviour was now deliberately aimed at the maximisation of managerial 
objectives with regard to firm size, growth, and sales maximisation, but under the chief 
constraint of profit (Williamson, 1964). It was rationalised that managerial objectives 
were essentially related with levels of managerial compensation and power. 
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On a slightly different track, Holmström and Milgrom (1994) saw the firm more as an 
‘Incentive System’ stressing the significance of seeing the firm as a system of a coherent 
set of ‘complementary contractual arrangements which mitigate incentive conflicts‘. 
They argued that it was deceptive to concentrate on any one solitary facet of the total as 
the company should not be characterised as being an entity where the employee did not 
own the assets, or was not subject to a proper system of incentives or subject to the sole 
authority of the employer. These ’incentive instruments‘, they argued, were purely 
complementary. 
 
And finally Kreps (1990) utilises interaction interdependent game theoretic models 
arguing that both employers and employees are both involved in what might be termed a 
prisoner-jailer ‘dilemma-game’, where over time, a co-operative norm can be established, 
and that such norms or organisational culture informs not just the employees but also any 
outside agents that the management of the firm will not abuse their position. Kreps sees 
the firm not as a collection of physical assets but rather as something that acts as a carrier 
of reputation capital and seeks to protect such capital as well as seeking to diminish 
conflicting incentives. 
 
In sum, this brief review of the literature on the essence of the theory of the firm with its 
focus on managerial objectives, agency theory and transaction costs underlie an approach 
to the firm that looks beyond the boundaries of the firm simply as a market phenomenon 
rather than the methods and operation of alternative possibilities for the allocation of 
resources (Knudsen, 1993).  One ostensibly common denominator has often been marked 
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out by critics, and that is the work begins from a perspective that human nature is more 
diverse and complex than the conventionally assumed theory of economic rationality and 
profit maximisation. The essence of this is that theorists have assumed too often that 
contracting partners’ opportunistic or morally dangerous behaviour occurs for economic 
reasons alone and this may not be the case if non-economic factors are considered as 
well. 
 
3.2.1 Implications for the Study of Tax Evasion 
 
Thus from the 1930’s onwards, an important body of work began that suggested 
alternative problems that firms had to address.  Firms therefore could now be considered 
as proactive rather than passive; populated with managers with a personal will and with 
corporate managers who had the potential to pursue objectives divergent from their 
owners; and that a firm’s administrative structure was the means through which 
transaction and agency costs could be reduced. Indeed the varying managerial ability and 
the human ingenuity of managers to manage became paramount. 
 
In the context of this thesis, clearly it is not only individuals who seek to avoid paying tax 
but also firms or more precisely their managers. As Jordanian firms act as collectors of 
tax for the government, they have an important independent role in the effectiveness of 
the social security system. Decisions may be taken by the managers to evade the payment 
of such taxes most notably the taxes to the JSSC for which they are responsible. Of 
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course, firms may not just evade paying indirect taxes, they may also evade corporate 
income tax, and other tax, which is ostensibly even more important (Slemrod, 2003). 
  
In terms of tax evasion, firms or more accurately corporate manages, have to make the 
decision as to whether their firm should evade tax payment or not. Any legal 
responsibility in this is purely on them. Firms who are contemplating evasion will attempt 
to ascertain the benefits of providing certain contributions for their employees against the 
various costs that might be incurred. These costs might include: the direct costs of 
providing them with certain degrees of social cover; the cost of higher wages workers 
may require to work for an employer that does not contribute to a social system; the costs 
they will accrue in the attempt to conceal their actions as part of an evasion plan; and the 
expected monetary and reputational cost of paying a penalty if caught in the act of 
evasion (Bailey and Turner, 1997). 
 
Legally, firms are not individuals per se although the decision makers are individuals. 
Firms are a construction made in law and acting as the focus for a series of multifaceted 
processes where contradictory actions and goals of diverse individuals clash within the 
structure of contractual relations in order to pursue a course of external action. Therefore, 
the behaviour of a company is influenced both by external and internal factors, both 
economic and non-economic. An understanding of tax behaviour requires ascribing 
motivations and intentions to the managers’ activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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At this juncture it may be appropriate to introduce the concept of moral hazard, a 
phenomenon closely linked to agency theory. A moral hazard arises where one party to a 
contract takes a hidden action that benefits him or her at the expense of another party. 
Clearly tax evasion is a clear demonstration of moral hazard in action. As the government 
cannot observe the actual tax behaviour of the firm or its efforts put in by its management 
to calculate or to pay the full amount of tax, the incentive to evade is increased. Moral 
hazard in action requires the principal, in this case the JSSC, to seek to avoid the 
deadweight loss of tax evasion. But not all firms are the same. The financial affairs of 
large firms are highly complex and much less transparent. On the other hand, it is 
comparatively easier for small and medium sized firms to hide their liabilities than to 
postpone the payment. Therefore, Kelchev (2006) suggests that under normal conditions, 
such firms are more likely to declare only what they intend or are capable of paying 
unless contingencies to minimise tax evasion are in place. 
 
Sandmo (1975) outlined three possible solutions in designing an optimum tax structure. 
Firstly to design a system that minimised collection costs, secondly in terms of justice 
and fairness or thirdly in terms of minimising the deadweight loss of associated with 
inefficiencies such as tax evasion.  In this specific case, the best tax rate could be the one 
that minimises the chance to evade payment managed by the chance of discovery and the 
associated penalty function.  
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It is in the next section which will introduce in detail the analysis of the Allingham-
Sandmo basic model of tax evasion. It will seek to demonstrate how the level of evasion 
is determined and how this could be affected by the model’s parameters. 
 
3.3. The Allingham-Sandmoor (Basic Economic Model) 
 
Based upon the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968), 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) formulated a formal economic model for analysing tax 
compliance based on EUT. Their model explains taxpayer behaviour as an evasion 
gamble between the economic rational taxpayer who is prepared to undertake prospect 
risk in order to avoid paying taxes and the tax agency. Therefore, the taxpayer balances 
the opportunity cost of being detected and likely punishment against the idea of 
maximizing his income (Sandmo, 2004). 
 
In this model, it has been assumed so far that the decision by any taxpayer to comply with 
the tax law is independent of what other taxpayers are doing. This decision is based 
entirely on the enforcement policy and economic opportunities. In addition, no account is 
made of the taxpayer’s “real” decisions; any labour supply and therefore any gross 
earnings are taken as given, and the same is true of income from capital. The model 
pictures the taxpayer at the moment of filling in income tax returns: how much of income 
should be reported and how much should be evaded? 
 
The model assumes that taxpayers have an income on which they should pay tax at a 
certain rate. Taxpayers may choose not to comply and report a lower actual income and 
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evade a certain amount of tax, or they may choose to comply and report all of their 
income. Taxpayers know that there are tax audits and they also know the probability of 
the audit. The model assumes that (a) the probability of an audit is known to taxpayers, 
(b) tax authorities always find out taxpayers' true income in the case of an audit, (c) the 
probability of the audit is independent of one's reported income, and (d) there are only 
financial costs following detection.  
 
Therefore, people rely upon these assumptions. When taxpayers evade payment they save 
money for future consumption if they are not detected. If they are detected, however, they 
are obliged to pay more than what was initially owed and thus have less money for future 
consumption than if they had complied in the first place. Taxpayers’ utility will depend 
on the rate of the penalty and the amount of their concealed income. 
 
To determine how tax evasion in varying degrees is affected by changes in the model’s 
variables, there are three that must be considered as part of the study: the rate of tax; 
detection probability, and the fine rate. When looking at the chance of detection, the 
quantity of declared income increases, so an increase in the probability of detection 
lowers the level of evasion. This is an expected result, as a rise in the chance of detection 
reduces the reimbursement from evasion and makes it less attractive. 
 
A amendment in the fine rate, however, merely changes income when a taxpayer is 
caught in the process of evasion. The result of a rise in fine rate is, therefore,  that budget 
constraints turn on what can be referred to as the ‘honest report point’ and therefore 
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becomes more acute. A fine rate increase subsequently leads, therefore, to a lower level 
of tax evasion. This result, and the one previous, shows that the effects of detection and 
punishment on the evasion level are unmistakable. 
 
The final variable to consider is the tax rate, an increase in the tax rate moves the budget 
constraint inwards. However, when absolute risk aversion is decreasing, the effect of the 
tax increase is to reduce tax evasion. This last consequence has been discussed widely 
because it is seems counterintuitive. A high tax rate is often believed to provide a driving 
motive for people to evade paying tax, while the model predicts precisely the opposite. 
Why the result comes out as it does, is because the money paid by the consumer is 
determined by tax rate multiplied by fine rate. Any increase in the rate of tax therefore, 
has the effect of raising the fine. This action takes income away from taxpayers when 
they have been caught out; this is the very state where they have the least money to pay 
such a fine. It is through this methodology that, it is argued, a higher tax rate can reduce 
evasion. 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that a higher gross income will increase evasion if it is 
believed that people become more willing to engage in risky activities as they get richer. 
This is also predicted by the model if the additional assumption is made that the measure 
of absolute risk aversion is decreasing. With regards to the effect of the regular marginal 
tax rate, a notable feature of the original A-S model is that an increase of the tax rate has 
an ambiguous effect on tax evasion. There is an income effect which is negative; higher 
taxes make the taxpayer poorer and therefore less willing to take risks. But there is also a 
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substitution effect that works in the direction of increased evasion. Yitzhaki (1974) 
pointed out that this result depends crucially on the assumption that the penalty is 
imposed on the amount of income evaded. If instead the fine is imposed on the evaded 
tax, there would be no substitution effect and accordingly no ambiguity.  
 
However, The analysis of empirical evidence on the Basic Economic Model variables 
indicates that there is a strong positive relationship between higher audit rates and tax 
compliance (e.g. Witte and Woodbury 1985; Dubin and Wilde 1988; and Slemrod et al. 
2001). Alm et al., (2004) confirmed that “tax audits are considered to have both direct 
deterrent effects on the taxpayers’ actually audited and indirect deterrent effect on 
taxpayers not audited”. 
 
Regarding the tax rate, most empirical evidences report that a higher tax rate generally 
leads to more tax evasion (e.g. Crane and Nourzad 1992). Spicer and Becker (1980) 
conducted an experimental study with fifty-seven students, at the University of Colorado 
which identified that the percentage of tax evaded was the highest within the group of 
students who were told that their tax rates were higher than average, and the lowest 
within the group of students who were told their tax rates were lower than average. 
Slemrod (1985) found by using individual tax return information that people compliance 
decreases with higher tax rates and the proportion of taxpayers who cluster in the top of a 
tax-reporting category tend to increase modestly with marginal tax rates. 
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Christie and Holzner, (2006);  studied tax compliance in a number of European countries, 
using national accounts data together with official tax structures, returns and revenues. 
They found that tax evasion is positively correlated with the tax rate itself. That is to say, 
a very simple policy implication would be that of reducing average effective tax rates. 
This should positively impact on compliance rates. In addition, Kumarasingam (2010) 
found that, high rates of tax on labour may discourage people from working, and so result 
in lower tax revenue than there would be if the tax rate were lower. 
 
It is also posited that a heavy tax load is an important determinant of the black economy. 
Accordingly, increases in the effective tax rate enhance the possibility of a firm’s 
willingness to operate in that black economy (Johnson et al. 1998 and Schneider, 2007).  
However, other studies such as Webley et al. (1991), Feinstein, 1991 and Friedman et al. 
2000) did not find the same effect, meaning there was no significant conclusive impact of 
marginal tax rates on non-compliance. Generally, the theoretical economic model of 
compliance suggests that a higher tax rate will lead to higher TE problem.  
 
More studies supported that tax rate, the audit probability, and the fine rate are very 
important policy variables. Friedland, et al (1978) conducted a simulation study with 
fifteen Israeli university students. They tried to find out the effects of fines and audits on 
tax compliance behaviour and they found that larger fines were more effective 
preventions than frequent audits. An increase in tax rate decreased the reporting income. 
In rounds where the random check was one third of the students and the fine three times 
the sum evaded, tax compliance was less than in rounds with a random check of one out 
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of fifteen and a fine magnitude of fifteen times the sum evaded. The empirical results 
suggest that tax authority should use the tool of fines instead of increasing the probability 
of auditing.  
 
Cebula (1997) persuaded a new, updated insight into the determinants of the size of the 
underground economy
11
 in the United States by using official data from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) to determine the affect of (1) IRS tax-rate policies, (2) IRS audit 
probabilities, and (3) IRS penalty structure. The empirical evidence showed that the 
relative size of the underground economy is significant when correlated with an increase 
of marginal personal income tax rate and a decrease of both the IRS audit rate and IRS 
penalty assessments for unpaid taxes. The uniqueness of the Cebula study, unlike most 
previous studies was due to the inclusion of the social security tax rate.  He found there 
was evidence that the social security tax rate payable by the self-employed may have 
contributed to the size of the underground economy.    
 
Blackwell (2002) who investigated the influence of traditional economic variables such 
as the tax rate, audit probability and the fine rate, found an increase of the audit and the 
fine rate leads to more tax compliance. There is an inclination for higher tax rates to 
increase TE, but it is not significant.  
 
Generally, some empirical studies demonstrate that the direction of the change in tax 
evasion as a response to different deterrence variables is not always consistent. Results 
                                                 
11
 The most important aspect of the underground economy is tax evasion problem 
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have a tendency to suggest that higher audit rates reduce tax evasion and that tax 
compliance is an increasing function of income and a decreasing function of the tax rate 
(Alm, 1991).  
 
Theoretically, where there are low levels of audit and penalty, taxpayers are likely to 
evade taxes, if they were rational, because there would be a lower probability that cheats 
would be caught and punished. Nevertheless, a high degree of compliance is observed. In 
the following case, United States enforcement policies with regard to the percentage of 
individual income tax returns that are subject to be audited is fairly small and has 
decreased in recent years to a figure of roughly one percent. In the same way, the penalty 
likely to be paid on even fraudulent evasion is only 75 percent of unpaid taxes, and these 
penalties are rarely imposed. Civil penalties on non-fraudulent evasion are even lower 
(20 percent of unpaid taxes) but in spite of this fact, the majority of American taxpayers 
actively comply with the tax law (Alm, 1998). 
 
Finally, it is clear to many researchers, that tax evasion cannot be explained entirely by 
the tax administration deterrence polices and its financial incentives (Graetz and Wilde, 
1985; Smith and Kinsey, 1987; Elffers, 1991; Alm, et al, 1992; Cowell, 1992 Andreoni et 
al., 1998). The researchers suggest that the compliance behaviour must be influenced by 
other variables, more than that reported by the Basic Economic Model because the main 
problem with EUT analysis of tax evasion is that it considerably over-predicts the extent 
of TE (e.g. Dhami and Nowaihi, 2006).  
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To summarise, this approach suggests that the chance of being caught and the size of the 
penalty in the case of being caught, negatively affect the amount and extent of tax 
evasion. Perhaps more importantly, the model assumes that the probability of any tax 
audit and the size of the given penalty are independent of each other. The conclusion can 
be drawn that the penalty rate and the probability of incurring deductions substitute for 
each other. Instead of the expensive policy of increasing the number and frequency of tax 
audits, by increasing the size of penalties, evasion could arguably be just as easily 
discouraged. Thus, the policy tools available to tax authorities for the purpose of 
combating evasion are the actual  rates of tax themselves, increasing the probability of 
the auditing process and structure of the penalty system (Elffers, 1991). 
 
In spite of the criticism of the Basic Economic Model, one might ask why most of the 
economists who adopt the Basic Economic Model insist on working with it. Cowell 
(1992) answers the proposition by declaring: “Even if tax evasion is not a gamble... it is 
still a risky business. If it was not, then either the detection of non-compliance would be 
immediate and certain....or alternatively non compliance would never be punished; so, it 
seems that people's reaction to risk is found to be a fundamental component of any 
comprehensive model of tax evasion”. 
 
The next section turns to discuss the issue of determining the optimal levels of auditing 




3.3.1. Compliance/Detection and Punishment Issues 
 
Tax evasion is considered a criminal activity by the tax authority. Becker (1968) was the 
first economist to develop the basic economics of crime methodology. He identified 
criminal activity as a rational human decision dependent upon the probabilities of 
auditing, conviction and levels of punishment. Becker believed this methodology could 
be applied to Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance.  
 
The main aim of Becker's investigation was to make an effort in determining the 
"optimal" choice of punishment strategies. The researcher’s intention was to find out to 
what extent resources and punishment should be used to enforce different types of 
legislation (Sandmo, 2004). To answer this question, he required a positive theory of 
criminal behaviour which he presented as a rational utility-maximising decision-maker; 
this has become the most significant part of his analysis.  
 
In Becker’s model, people will be involved with a crime if the expected utility from the 
crime exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity. He says that “Some people 
become “criminals,” therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of 
other people, but because their benefits and costs differ” (Sandmo, 2004). 
 
The analysis of the tax evasion decision assumed that the probability of detection and the 
rate of the fine levied when caught evading, were fixed. This is a satisfactory assumption 
from the perspective of the taxpayer. From the government’s perspective, though, these 
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are variables that can be chosen. The probability of detection can be raised by the 
employment of additional tax inspectors, and the fine can be legislated or set by the 
courts (Hindriks and Myles 2008). 
 
Any rise in the level of the fine will therefore raise revenue if tax evasion is taking place. 
Of course, the fine has no consequence if there is no act of evasion. These terms show 
that if evasion is taking place, there is an increase in the chance of detection or the fine 
will increase government revenue. 
 
The government’s problem can now be dealt with. It has been mentioned that a rise in 
detection probability is achievable if there is the recruitment of more tax inspectors. Tax 
inspectors require compensation, and so one consequence of employing more tax agents 
is a rise in probability of detection but at a cost. On the other hand, there is no cost 
involved in increasing or decreasing the fine. What this means is that raising the fine rate 
is essentially costless. These observations, can therefore, form the basis of a policy that 
will optimise revenue collection, and minimise the level of evasion. Therefore, it can be 
argued that  government need not pump revenues into  tax evasion, but should maximise 
the level of fine to deal harshly with those it catches. This is, of course, an extreme 
policy, and it is notable that no such policy in existence, even though the model points 
towards this being the mostly highly effective—and cost-effective—method of dealing 
with tax evasion (Hindriks and Myles 2008).  
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Much can be said about these conclusions. The first of these must deal with government 
objectives. There is ostensibly, a noticeable difference between policies designed to 
maximise revenue and those that maximise welfare. For example, inflicting an 
unsupportable fine on a tax evader will have a notably negative impact on that person’s 
welfare. Even if a government does not pursue such a policy, there are considerations that 
may act as restraints on fiscal recovery projects such as the very real political need for 
governments to be popular in the run up to an election. With policies such as these, they 
might prove exceptionally unpopular with the voting public (Hindriks and Myles 2008). 
 
This could be argued, at least from a non-partisan approach, as being irrelevant, as, if the 
sentence is sufficiently large enough to deter evasion, it should not matter to those who 
are unaffected as to the severity of that sentence. If fear is able to completely prevent 
evasion, the sentence is never actually inflicted and its cost is irrelevant. The problem 
with this, is that it ignores the risk of those who will evade no matter what the fine level 
might be, and the chance of error. The detection process may not work adequately, or a 
taxpayer might erroneously understate their taxable income. If the punishment is so great, 
even for small tax underpayments, then errors could be very expensive in political terms 
for a government. To reduce the chance and cost of error, the sentence should be small 
enough to deter cheating. Arguably, minimal deterrence accomplishes this purpose 
adequately. 
 
Finally, putting all of these arguments together suggests adopting a different perspective 
on choosing the optimal probability of detection. With a tax rate fixed in economic policy 
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and a fine level set by discussion between the administration and the judiciary, the sole 
aspect completely under the control of the revenue service is the probability of detection. 
As has been already noted, any increase in fine raises revenue, but only at a cost. Optimal 
probability exists when marginal gain in revenue merely equals marginal cost. This 
action could occur at a very low percentage of the probability of detection (Hindriks and 
Myles 2008). 
 
Generally, when taxpayers have to pay taxes, but, for one reason or another, fail to do so, 
they break the law and have to face sanctions. Tax agencies that collect tax or social 
insurance have to have the possibility of being able to enforce compliance and payment 
of social security contributions. Additionally, higher interests, fines, or even criminal 
sanctions may be prescribed by law. 
 
Revenue agencies can begin enforcement procedures for basic debt, or the unpaid 
contribution, with a certain degree of interest. This could be carried out in agreement with 
civil law, and special administrative procedure, or even, indeed, following tax recovery 
procedure. This interest would also be paid into the contribution collection systems and 
not general government fiscal funds. 
 
The interest for non-paid contributions or for late payment, has two functions. It should 
guarantee that the contribution retains certain value (the value of money decreases 
through time), and guarantee financial discipline (the punitive part of this kind of 
interest). Fines have to be high enough so that people would rather pay social security 
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contributions than high interest. On the other hand, they should not be too high, so as not 
to discourage voluntary payment. It is important that the payment of due contributions 
with interest are able to be forced in a court procedure(Grega Strban 2007). 
 
Moreover, those taxpayers who do not comply with their contributory duty or who do not 
allow an inspection, should be liable for misdemeanour fines. This system of fines may 
be set differently for employers, for those responsible within a company, the self-
employed and others in various roles within organisations. Once more, penalties should 
not be set at too high a rate, but high enough to deter. An employer should not obtain 
further profit by paying tax or social security contributions at a later date with interest, 
than for paying fines when they are due to be paid. All enforcement should be carried out 
at the appropriate time. Company compliance with revenue collection could be made 
easier by allowing those liable for contributions are aware that that there is a monitoring 
system, that they are being monitored and any delay in payment will be met with a quick 
and harsh response. Improving enforcement times and responding in the same repeatable 
way each time will ostensibly improve effectiveness, accuracy and efficiency. 
 
3.4. Extensions and Modifications of the Basic Model by including more Economic 
Factors  
 
However, more recent studies added more economic factors to improve the predictive 
power of the Basic Economic Model. In a large number of cases the probability that the 
firm will be discovered not complying with SSPS is largely decided upon by the chance 
that one or more of their employees will report any actions of this kind. Therefore, one of 
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the most important factors for an employee reporting firm’s non-compliance is the 
unemployment rate and the likelihood of the employee finding alternative employment if 
they lose their job as a result. Empirical results support this, for example, Yaniv, (1994) 
investigated employees decisions to complain about evasion as a function of the labour 
market (employment level) and regulation promoting compliance. The empirical 
evidence of his study indicates that employees would decide to complain to the 
authorities about being paid as long as they have a chance of getting another job. 
 
Awad, et al, (1998) examined the relationships between a number of factors and 
variables, including compliance with the minimum wage law in Israel. The researchers 
concluded that, “A higher unemployment rate apparently decreases employers’ fears of 
workers’ complaining about being paid below-minimum wages, therefore encourages 
reduced compliance”. 
 
Furthermore, the possibility that employers may evade social security contribution arises 
from the fact that compliance with the scheme reduces profits gained from productive 
activity. Consequently, in SSS where employers pay on behalf of their employees; 
labour-cost reduction could be the most important incentive to evade Social Security 
contributions (Mcgillivary, 2001). 
 
Moreover, the amount of current consumption needs can lead employers to try and evade 
the payment of social security contributions, especially when the contributions rate is 
high, during times of temporary financial hardship. This is particularly the case for new 
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employers, or where expenses related to urgent responsibilities are more immediate and 
pressing than paying taxes for a future retirement benefit (Mcgillivary, 2001).   
 
Carroll (1986) carried out a survey study of criminal behaviour. She noted that lack of 
money often motivates the search for an opportunity to commit a crime. Therefore the 
taxpayers’ tendency to evade will be greater in the case of economic strain where the 
taxpayer’s expenses are higher than their income.    
 
Another study conducted by Ritsema et al (2003) provided evidence by using data from 
the 1997 Arkansas Tax Amnesty Program that morality was not an important reason to 
pay during the amnesty period and the lack of money at the time taxes were due was the 
main factor in the decision to evade.  Also, Strban (2007) studied contribution evasion 
problems in former Yugoslavia – particularly in Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and found that poor financial performance in business appears to be the 
main reason why employers do not pay contributions. Sometimes employers decide to 
save costs by bribing officials rather than pay the requisite contributions.  
 
Furthermore, the role of accountants has been studied by tax compliance literature which 
focuses mainly on the compliance level of taxpayers who used tax agents and on factors 
that influence accountant’s behaviour. Many researchers demonstrate that the level of 
non-compliance is higher for those who used paid assistance (e.g., Erard 1993).  
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On the other hand, other studies attempted to examine the role of paid accountants might 
play in the analysis of tax evasion (Reinganum and Wilde, 1991; Beck et al. 1994). Roth, 
et al (1989) state: “Great knowledge about the relationships between tax practitioners and 
taxpayer compliance could offer one of the most promising areas for improving 
compliance”. Sometimes, tax law and regulations can be manipulated by the taxpayer and 
accountants in a creative way. They consider this a great opportunity to exploit the law to 
transform the firm’s own financial interests. However, this use depends on the 
accountant’s knowledge and information and on the level of complexity of the tax laws 
and regulation. 
 
Generally, taxpayers who aim to reduce their taxes and who are high-risk takers will find 
many accountants to assist them (Sakurai and Braithwaite 2001). A rational taxpayer will 
compare the marginal benefits, which can be acquired with the use of tax accountants, 
with the marginal cost. Long and Caudill (1987) have been among the first to examine 
the role of accountants on tax compliance. They state that benefits would include such 
things as time saving and a reduction in tax liability based on an accountant’s better 
understanding of the tax law. They stated that: “The age and growth of the tax return 
preparation “industry” is probably the strongest evidence of its ability to provide 
beneficial services to taxpayer-consumers, and it is doubtful that anything except 





3.5. Extensions and Modifications of the Basic Model by Including Non-Economic 
Factors 
 
Apart from the financial incentives that influence tax evasion behaviour that is based on 
economic literature, there are other factors that assume a vital role and have been studied 
in the fields of sociology, psychology, and legal literature (Cowell, 1990). In addition to 
this, the enhancement of a tax agency's public image and its fair treatment of taxpayers 
could assist in an increase in compliance and so could explain why tax evasion behaviour 
may not be possible only by looking at the financial inducements of the tax system alone. 
 
As is clear below, it is plain that recent economic models have added non-economic 
factors related to taxpayers' compliance decision-making behaviour (e.g. Torgler and 
Schneider 2007) and extended previous models by establishing the extent to which 
informal and formal institutions are important in determining tax evasion problems. 
 
New institutional economics defines institutions as “the necessary framework for human 
interaction or as the rules of the game”. These human-made constraints determine 
incentives and shape human interactions (North, 1990). This discipline differentiates 
between two types of institution: formal and informal. Formal institutions include tax 
authorities, laws, and rules, while informal institutions include norms of behaviour and 
established conventions. A combination of formal rules, informal norms, and 
enforcement characteristics determines economic performance. In general, when formal 
and informal institutions are in conflict; it is here that more tax evasion is observed 
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(Gërxhani, 2003). While the laws and rules may be changed for a brief period of time, 
informal norms usually change only gradually.  
 
Everest-Phillips (2008) points out five characteristics of a state that has constructed a 
workable tax system. This system requires political inclusion (i.e. paying taxes 
incentivises workers to engage with government and the political process and so 
strengthens the democratic process), accountability and transparency (i.e. the use of tax 
revenues is warranted to tax payers), perceived fairness (i.e. tax payers distinguish the tax 
system as being fair which is the case if tax exemptions for special interest groups and the 
unofficial economy are reduced to a minimum), efficacy (i.e. administrative capability 
that translates public revenues capably into public goods) and the political commitment to 
shared wealth (i.e. the tax system must be linked to the national strategy of promoting 
economic growth and prosperity). 
 
Generally, the size of a country’s tax shortfall will also depend on the range and 
efficiency of the national tax administration. When applied to developing countries, this 
suggests that an increased transfer of resources to the national tax administration could 
help reduce the national tax shortfall. Yet, some claim this faith to be naïve with respect 
to developing countries (Bahl and Bird, 2008). 
 
The next sections analyse the extent of important insights which can be obtained by 
including formal and informal institutions for the purpose of evaluating what factors 
determine tax evasion.  
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3.5.1 The Effectiveness of Tax Agency and its Administration  
 
The aim of this section is to present an institutional analysis of tax evasion. In particular, 
this section aims to show that tax compliance literature is influenced by Game Theory 
(GT) which means to integrate the tax agency as a player in game theoretic strategies. 
Both government and tax agencies understand that they must keep up-to-date with 
taxpayers’ calculations of payoffs by changing the costs and benefits of the tax evasion. 
 
Researchers criticise the Basic Economic Model on the grounds that the probability of 
detection is expected to be random and tax administration is not allowed to use data from 
taxpayers' returns to determine whom they should choose as eligible for audit. In reality, 
tax administration performance might be improved in its ability to identify tax evaders, if 
it benefits from the transmission of information from taxpayers rather than if it just 
ignored the information and audited all taxpayers with equal frequency. The evidence 
suggests that the tax administration is rather more interested than taxpayers to behave in a 
rational manner that aims to optimise its performance (Alm, 1999). Accordingly, GT 
concepts allow the tax administration to modify the strategy of the audit and the 
enforcement with regards to the information discovered in the taxpayers’ report and so 
includes the tax authority as a strategic actor in the model.  
 
GT has become important for economic analysis, and a large degree of the development 
in this field has come from inside the profession of economics. The object of study in GT 
is the game itself, which is a formal model of an interactive situation. The formal 
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definition sets out the players, what they prefer, their information, and the strategic 
choices available to them, and how these might influence the outcome. The strength of 
GT is the very methodology it creates for structuring and analyzing problems of strategic 
choice. A situation as a game requires the decision-maker to explicitly quantify the 
players and their discipline required in the construction of such a model. It has the 
potential of providing the decision-maker with a clearer and broader view of any situation 
(Chris Georges, 2009).   
 
There are two main areas of GT: cooperative and non-cooperative GT (Levin, 1999). 
Cooperative GT investigates coalitional games with respect to the amounts of power held 
relatively by opposing players, or how a successful coalition should divide its takings. 
This is perhaps most obviously applied to situations that come up in political science or 
international relations, where concepts such as power are most important. In contrast, 
non-cooperative GT is concerned with the analysis of strategic choice. The paradigm of 
non-cooperative GT is concerned with the details of the ordering and timing of players’ 
choices that are crucial to determining the outcome of a game. A non-cooperative 
bargaining model argues for a specific process which pre-specifies who makes an offer at 
a given time. The term “non-cooperative” means this branch of GT explicitly models the 
process of players making choices out of their own interest. Cooperation therefore, can, 
and often does, arise where non-cooperative models of games exist, and when players 
find it in their own best interests to follow certain paths (Levin, 1999).  
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Theory also differs in players’ assumptions. A central assumption in many variants of GT 
is that the players are rational. A rational player is one who always chooses something 
which results in the outcome the player most prefers, given what they expect their 
opponents to do. The goal of GT analysis in these branches, is to predict how the game 
will be played by rational players, or, related to this, to give advice on how best to play 
the game against opponents who are rational. This kind of GT can be viewed as rather 
more “descriptive” than the prescriptive approach taken here (Georges, 2009). 
 
Aspects of cooperation have been taken into account in GT because the GT of tax 
compliance can yield results both distinct from and richer than models that incorporate 
only the taxpayer. Incorporating the tax agency into a GT analysis of tax evasion 
provides greater opportunity for insights and predictions that are actually not possible in 
the Basic Economic Model of law enforcement. The tax agency and taxpayers interact in 
sequential moves in the assumption of the actions of this model. First, taxpayers report 
their income; then the tax agency determines whether to make an investigative audit. If 
the taxpayers are not audited, their report determines their final tax liability; if taxpayers 
are audited, their tax liability is calculated on the basis of true income, plus any 
appropriate fines (Alm, 1999). 
 
Graetz, et al (1986) stated that, incorporating the tax authority into an economic analysis 
of tax evasion requires explicit assumptions about specific tax authority behaviours so as 
to identify the kind of behaviour that it will take in response to actions taken by the 
taxpayers themselves. It is assumed that the tax authority strategy attempts to maximize 
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total government revenue, including taxes, and penalties, as well as reducing net audit 
costs.  
 
Tax agencies play very important roles in influencing behaviour toward tax compliance 
and the implementation of the law. An agency's ability to collect taxes depends on its 
organization, institutional infrastructure, and operations, including access to sufficient 
financing and additionally depending upon cultural factors, economic conditions and 
legal mandates (Vazques-Caro et al 1992). Therefore, the integration of other factors such 
as institutional variables is crucial to understanding SSTE. McGillivray (2001) stated that 
“A lot of attention is paid to the design, structure and administration performance of 
contributory social security schemes. However, unless an administrative operation is well 
implemented, all other aspects of the scheme are irrelevant”.  
 
One of the main responsibilities of any SSPS is to be structured in such a way so as to 
encourage participation and promote the goals of SS insurances within an efficient and 
equitable system. In reality, if participants do not recognize the requirement to contribute 
to the SSS to provide financial stability in old age, and if the tax agency cannot influence 
them to do so, evasion is a likely result. Mcgillivary (2001) stated that, “Evasion of social 
security contributions is possible if the social security organisation tolerates evasion or if 





- Efficiency of the social security system 
 
One of the main problems of many countries, however, especially in developing 
countries, is the limited capability to collect social security contributions. Thus, many 
countries are faced with the challenge of reforming the SSS and its administration. In the 
implementation of the social security law, the Social Security Corporation plays a key 
role. Many researchers point out that tax administration is tax policy (Casanegra and 
Bird, 1992).  
 
Several studies, particularly in the USA and in other developed countries, revealed many 
examples of the influence of the Institutional aspect such as efficiency on tax evasion. 
Friedman et al. (1999) found that “the positive relationship between the share of the 
unofficial economy and the ineffective institutions is strong and consistent”.  
 
In addition, it could be argued that dissatisfaction with the SSS administration or a 
generally negative attitude towards the tax system might increase the incentives to talk to 
individuals to get a better idea about the opportunities to evade and the probability of 
getting caught.  
 
Cummings, et al (2001), analysed taxpayer behaviour among different cultural 
backgrounds in three different countries (U.S., Botswana and South Africa) which have 
similar tax systems. They found different compliance rates between these countries which 
were not related to differences in risk attitudes across these various countries but was 
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related rather, to the differences in tax institutions instead (tax agency performance and 
behaviour).   
 
In addition, Kelchev (2006) concluded that the aims of reducing the hidden economy 
should be included more in tax administration than in tax policy. He emphasised that a 
decrease merely in tax rates, without the development of a modern, efficient 
administration oriented towards better quality of services, can only reduce the level of 
evasion of taxes and social security contributions to a limited extent. 
 
- Equity of the social security system 
 
As mentioned above, a number of economists have criticised the Basic Economic Model 
on the grounds that it takes a rather narrow minded view of tax evaders’ (Cowell, 1992). 
Subsequently, the Basic Economic Model has been expanded to incorporate taxpayer’s 
perceptions of the equity of the tax system. 
 
Literature shows that reciprocity is considered as an important determinant for 
compliance behaviour. The likelihood of compliance could be increased by positive 
behaviour undertaken by the tax agency towards taxpayers. On the other hand, the 
likelihood of tax evasion can be seen as result of negative reciprocity. For that reason the 
influence of the institutional environment on the control of positive and negative 
reciprocity is a most important issue.   
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Many researchers underline the importance of reciprocity. Cowell and Gordon, (1988), 
stated that, people pay taxes because they compromise what they get for their taxes, and 
they are ready to pay more as far as tax agency commitments go to provide them with 
good services. The relationship between taxpayer and tax agency is modelled as an 
implicit contract. Positive actions by the tax agency are encouraged to increase taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour. Smith and Stalans (1991) stated that, the most significant social 
psychological explanation for expecting cooperation is reciprocation. 
 
Cowell (1992) reveals that economic analysis can bring about the same results as 
psychological research if the patterns of personalised inequity are integrated into the 
Basic Economic Model. Taxpayers will therefore increase tax compliance when 
perceiving equity.  He did, however, argue conversely that: “The issue of inequity, 
according to virtually any interpretation one may give to the term, is essentially a matter 
of social interaction rather than being individualistic in nature”. He defined inequity as 
"an unfair exchange' between citizens and the State, as unwarranted disparities in tax 
assessments, or as perceived income inequality”. 
 
Furthermore, Cowell (1992) proposed that perceptions of inequity may be measured; with 
respect to the taxes imposed, to the income of others in the community and to the supply 
of public goods and services. According to Cowell, the interaction between taxpayers' 
perceptions of inequity and their attitudes to risk, as this is argued in the Basic Economic 
Model, have an effect upon tax compliance. Wenzel (2002) studied the impact of justice 
perceptions on self-reported tax compliance behaviour. Using a survey methodology, 
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Wenzel found that Australian taxpayers reported being more compliant when they 
thought they had been treated fairly and respectfully by the Australian Taxation Office 
(Tax Office). 
 
Generally, an unfair tax system could create greater incentives to justify cheating. Even 
though, Social psychological research suggests that a lack of equity in an exchange 
relationship produces a sense of distress (Walster, et al, 1978). A number of survey 
research studies have reported positive correlations between perceptions of fiscal inequity 
and non-compliance (Spicer 1974; Song and Yarbrough 1978; and Richardson, 2006).  
 
Employers may try not paying their social security taxes if they lack trust in the SSS.  For 
example, if the legitimacy and equity of the scheme are under question and there could be 
a better rate of return on contributions placed elsewhere, this may encourage them to 
evade payment. 
 
The sociology literature contains two basic perspectives on compliance: instrumental and 
normative (Tyler, 1990). From the instrumental perspective the key variables determining 
compliance are the severity and certainty of sanctions, and from the normative 
perspective, the key variables determining compliance in the normative perspective are 
individuals’ perceptions of the fairness and appropriateness of the law and its institutions. 
Therefore, the researchers pay more attention to the fundamental issues of institutional 
design. Institutions in society should devote great effort to developing legitimacy. It 
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seems that efficiency and equity may be complements instead of substitutes, at least in 
the context of institutional design and implementation. 
 
Some psychological theories of leadership, argues that legitimacy depends in large part 
on the authority’s ability to provide favourable outcomes. That is, people perceive as 
legitimate and obey the institutions that produce positive outcomes for them. However, 
other evidence indicates people place great importance on procedural issues. The 
principal result of Tyler’s (1990) study is that the perception of legitimacy is closely 
linked to people’s views of the fairness of the procedures used by the authorities. More 
strongly, he demonstrates that the people he studied comply more with the law if the 
procedures employed by the legal or political authority are perceived by them to be fair. 
 
In compliance literature, there are four sets of an authority’s characteristics which are 
associated with legitimacy. Two are related to the tax authority’s outcomes, and two are 
related to the processes of the authority. Two are related to matters of justice, and two are 
not. The first of these matters: the effectiveness of the outcome, may involve the extent to 
which conservation is realized and a taxpayer is made better off. The second, distributive 
justice of the outcome involves the perceived fairness of how the benefits or sacrifices are 
shared among the affected parties. The third, efficiency of the process, involves the speed 
and efficiency with which taxpayers perceive the tax authority responding to problems 
within the scope of the authority’s jurisdiction. The fourth, procedural justice involves 
how fairly the authority treats people and the concerns of those affected by the process 
(Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). 
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Tyler’s research (1990a, 1990b, 1997) emphasises the importance of legitimacy and 
allegiance to authority in compliance decisions. He found that, the way people are treated 
by the tax agency affects their evaluations of authorities and affects their willingness to 
co-operate. Feld and Frey (2002) claim, “If they treat taxpayers as partners in a 
psychological tax contract, instead of inferiors in a hierarchical relationship, taxpayers 
have incentives to pay taxes honestly”. 
 
Another study by Smith (1992) attempted to study positive incentives that increase 
citizens’ normative commitment towards tax compliance. Smith pays more attention to 
aspects of reciprocity, legitimacy, and procedural fairness for tax compliance and he 
found that positive incentives lead to more commitment towards tax compliance as a 
result of responsive services and procedural fairness. 
 
Pommerehne, et al (1994) studied the relationship between a government’s public good 
provision, governmental waste, fairness considerations, and taxpayer compliance, 
achieving the same result which is that there is a necessity to adjust the output of good 
public provision to people’s needs.  
 
- Corruption and Lack of trust in the tax administration 
 
Some economic researchers have taken into account the aspect of institutional corruption. 
Kasper and Streit (1999) stressed that, “Strong institutional controls and accountability 
are required to control deeply-rooted agent opportunism. The rule of law has to be 
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imposed on all government agents”. Therefore, another institutional determinant of tax 
evasion is the problem of bureaucratic corruption in tax administration. One analysis 
found that an increase in the tax rate creates lower net revenue, when auditors are corrupt 
and enforcement costs are minimal. Actually, in this case, it would be preferable for the 
tax agency to set lower audit probabilities and allow some cheating (Gang et al, 2000). If 
corruption is low enough, however, revenues generated from capturing taxpayers 
cheating may exceed those from selecting an audit structure in which everyone declares 
their true income.  
 
The incentives of enforcement agents to find out violations have been investigated by 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000). They emphasised the importance of this topic for two 
reasons: Firstly, the incentive of enforcement agents to find out violations is influenced 
by the structure of their payments. Secondly, it is possible that enforcement agents are 
corrupt and might take payments in exchange for not reporting violations. The standard 
models of optimal tax systems assume all bureaucrats are benevolent and have no 
thoughts of using the tax system to their own advantage. 
 
Frey and Eichenberger (1999) indicate that developing countries are often in a state of 
“over-government” and “under-government” (There is substantial combination of 
interventionism and bureaucracy). The government has strong discretionary powers over 
the allocation of resources which increases corruption. Thus, corruption affects the 
magnitude of resource allocation and income distribution (Jain 2001). In a corrupt 
bureaucracy, goods and services will not be awarded to the most efficient or efficient 
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producers, but to the producer who offers the largest bribe. Further, bureaucrats have an 
incentive to delay transactions in order to take out higher payments (Rose- Ackerman 
1997). 
 
Levin and Satarov (2000) examine the influence of corruption on institutional 
performance in Russia. They conclude that corruption is an important part of Russia’s 
economy but that corruption has a negative influence in that people have a reduced 
confidence in the authorities. 
 
These findings were rationalised by Choi and Thum (2005) they point out that the choice 
of entrepreneurs of whether to escape to the shadow economy or not, restricts corrupt 
officials in their desire to ask for bribes. Dreher and Schneider (2006) explicitly 
accounted for a relationship between corruption and the black economy in high-income 
and low-income countries. Moreover, they modeled the effect of the reverse relationship 
from the black economy to the level of corruption. They found that dishonesty and the 
black economy are complements in low tax countries: i.e. increases in the black economy 
challenge political and social institutions and augment corruption. On the other hand, for 
high-income countries, the authors found that a higher shadow economy goes hand-in-
hand with reduced corruption.  
 
When the employers pay the employees’ taxes directly, handling those transactions 
becomes significant and depends heavily on employers’ record keeping. Fewer people 
and businesses would evade, no doubt, if record keeping were more mechanical. Less 
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corruption would probably be detected if employers had to go through the scrutiny of 
cross checks and audits (Gary and Mitchell, 1995). Therefore, a lack of coordination 
between the tax authority and other governmental bodies is bound to increase tax evasion. 
Alm, et al, (1996) suggest that information sharing, could thus increase agency revenues 
and reduce tax evasion. 
 
Investigations into the influence of trust on tax evasion decision behaviour has also been 
carried out. In general, the results show that if taxpayers are more trusting of the tax 
administration, they are more likely to be willing to be honest. The relationship between 
taxpayers and the tax agency can therefore be seen as a contract sustained by the positive 
actions of the tax agency, and based on trust. This trust can only be produced if tax 
agency’s commitment acts in line with people’ needs and desires, and thus is very 
important for any tax administration wanting to influence people’s behaviour towards 
positive tax compliance (Hardin 1998). 
 
Survey findings of Yankelovich, et al (1984) indicated that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) in US may face credibility problems because only 58 percent of the individuals 
agreed that the IRS and its employees are knowledgeable, while 37 percent do not. The 
same results are found for the perceived fidelity (59% versus 38%).  This problem 
emerges to stem from the IRS’s relationship with the tax system: the majority of the 
individuals considered the IRS’s system complicated and unfair. It also may permit for a 
variety of tax-loopholes that enhance the view of a biased and unfair tax system.  
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Briefly, high degrees of evasion can be seen by some experts as a result of low public 
credibility of SSS and reflect the quality of organisation of the scheme and the efficiency 
of a schemes administration.  
 
- The effect of information, education and Technology on compliance 
 
Furthermore, this thesis tries to pay more attention to the effect of information and 
Technology on the tax evasion problem. Basic Economic Model of tax compliance take 
for granted that taxpayers are completely informed of all the aspects that cover the tax 
law and procedures. However, this is not true as the level and quality of knowledge and 
information provided by the tax authority might be a significant determinant in taxpayers’ 
behaviour. 
 
Researchers have been making an effort to incorporate asymmetry of information over 
tax administration policies in order to achieve a better understanding of the evasion 
problem. Vogel, (1974) for example, examines the determinants of taxpayer attitudes and 
tax ethics in Sweden. The study concludes that, “taxpayers usually need more tax 
structure information than that provided by the tax forms in order to complete their 
returns”. 
 
Survey results also make clear that the less educated component of the sample was: (1) 
Less exposed to tax compliance information, (2) less informed about relevant tax 
regulations especially deduction authorizations, and (3) more often in need of assistance 
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in return preparation than members of the sample generally; This pattern suggests that 
lower socio-economic groups are less able than others to take advantage of available tax 
minimisation opportunities.  
 
Spicer and Thomas (1982) examined whether more accurate information provided by tax 
agencies lead to more opportunities to changes in the audit probability. The results 
indicated that the percentages of taxes evaded were negatively and significantly 
correlated with audit probabilities. They stated that in the absence of accurate 
information, people drew less attention to the amount evaded. 
 
Witte and Woodbury (1985) found that evasion is lower with those who are better 
educated. Additionally, they concluded that, the main variable which motivates taxpayers 
to search for tax information is the relevance of information. This motivation might 
depend on taxpayers’ financial situations, for example, self-employed taxpayers, have 
higher likelihood to commit tax evasion and thus have the motive to search for more 
information about the tax law. 
 
Generally, tax compliance literature indicates education, which is related to taxpayer’s 
knowledge about the tax law could be an important determinant for tax compliance. 
Better educated taxpayers are supposed to know more about tax law and regulations, they 
are better aware of the benefits and services the tax agency provides for the taxpayers and 
so would be in a better position to evaluate the extent of compliance (Lewis 1982 and 
Houston and Tran 2001). On the other hand, educated taxpayers could also be more 
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knowledgeable of possible government inefficiencies and may be less compliant because 
they more aware of the opportunities for evasion and avoidance. 
 
A developing area of research has begun to analyse how computers might influence tax 
evasion decisions. In many countries, the tax administration attempts to develop 
computerised tax decision support systems. These systems might reduce the requirement 
for tax accountants. The key advantages are that they supply technical knowledge, 
especially relating to tax law and regulations, and help to notify taxpayers if they make 
certain types of error (Masselli et al. 2000). Masselli et al. (2000) analysed the influence 
of computerised audit flags (information about specific audit mistakes) on taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour. Their findings proposed that taxpayers who are shown audit flags 
reported significantly more income than taxpayers without audit flags. They argue that 
people with low tax task experience will be likely to over-rely on decision assistance as a 
result of a lack of knowledge. 
 
In addition, modern information systems could lead to the identification of potential 
taxpayers. Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1995) investigated reforms in India aimed at 
computerising the information system with basic taxpayer identifications. They found 
that computerisation has the following benefits: 
 
“(1) a tamper-proof, readily accessible and updateable information base on the identity of 
taxpayers, their payment records, and third party information; (2) cross-matching of 
information from different sources concerning the activities of any taxpayer, (3) efficient 
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collection of tax recovery operations; (4) sophisticated audit selection programs and 
enhanced information on taxpayer activities speedily available to tax auditors during 
audits; (5) less corruption owing to reduced scope for person-to-person contact between 
officials and taxpayers, and reduced auditor discretion over conduct of audits; (6) 
improved taxpayer information and assistance services; and (7) a comprehensive 
information base for managerial planning and supervision”. 
 
However, in spite of many advantages for using computerised tax decision support 
systems they also incorporate some deficiencies. For example, the collection process may 
cause some difficulties, imposing high costs and therefore generating a lower amount of 
tax revenues (Masselli et al. 2000). 
 
In addition, computerisation needs adequate knowledge. The process of computerising 
the tax administration could face difficulties due to deficits in staff training and 
hardware/software maintenance and is dependent upon information inserted into the 
programme. This emphasized the importance of regularly training tax administration staff 
from the lowest to the highest level (Silvani and Baer 1997). 
 
To summarise, this section analyses the extent of important insights which can be 
obtained by including issues of tax administration into the focus of the theoretical 
literature on tax design and examines their link to tax evasion for the purpose of 
evaluating what factors determine tax evasion. The literature concludes that there are key 
indicators which have an influence on tax compliance, namely, the effectiveness of the 
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tax agency, perceived honesty and fairness of tax agency and the perceived help and 
information firms get from the tax agency.  
 
3.5.2 The Legal and Regulatory Structure 
 
The intention of this section is to show the relevance of tax law and regulation and to 
explore related areas such as tax complexity as key players in the tax evasion problem. 
Rules might be a good reason why people behave co-operatively instead of behaving 
consistently with the Basic Economic Model of tax evasion. 
 
The behavioural implications of imperfect choice have been studied by Heiner (1983) 
who argued that rules are put into place because the mere existence of rules automatically 
restricts certain behaviour and regulates choices into predictable patterns of activity and 
behaviour. Heiner assumes that there “is a gap between an agent’s competence and the 
difficulty of the decision problem. The gap is influenced by two variables: environmental 
variables which determine the complexity of the decision problem, and perceptual 
variables which characterise an agent’s competence”. According to Heiner, uncertainty is 
negatively related to the perceptual abilities and positively to the complexity of the 
environment. Consequently, the study indicates that such an analysis can provide a better 
understanding of the behavioural consistency with rules.  
 
Many researchers report that complicated tax laws is significantly related to tax evasion 
and it is one of the main determinants of tax evasion (e.g. Richardson, 2006). Taxpayers 
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may evade paying social security contributions because of the complexity of compliance 
procedures. Sometimes split-contribution assessment and collection arrangements for 
different social security benefits and multiple collection agencies to which contributions 
must be allocated and remitted make compliance more difficult and evasion more 
attractive and possible (Mcgillivary, 2001).  
 
On the other hand, in the light of tax complexity, it is not easy to identify honest 
taxpayers from those who are not. Krause (2000) stated that when rules are complex, 
compliance and enforcement will be imperfect. It implies there will be extra costs on the 
taxpayers and the tax agency and this weakens the effectiveness of the tax policies. Tax 
inspectors in the tax agency will have greater problems in distinguishing non-compliers 
and determining whether the violation was intentional or not (Erard 1997). This can 
increase tax collection costs. Furthermore, the ambiguity of tax laws can lead to a wide 
range of interpretations (Krause 2000). 
 
Additionally, taxpayers’ perceptions about the tax systems equity can be influenced by 
tax complexity. By simplifying the tax law and its regulations taxpayers would be able to 
reduce their cost in time and money and conform to the tax law (Blumenthal and Slemrod 
1992). 
 
Smith (1992) used data from a national survey of taxpayers conducted by Louis Harris 
and Associates to study, among other variables, the influence of tax system complexity 
and procedural fairness by the IRS in US. What is indicated is that complexity 
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significantly decreases the perceived procedural fairness within the IRS. Moreover, 
individuals believed that the simplification of the whole tax collection system is the most 
effective way of better-collecting tax revenue. Conversely, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) did 
not find a systematic relationship between perception of complexity and perception of 
unfairness. 
 
Tyler (1997), however, argues that understanding what people need in a legal procedure 
helps to explain why people become dissatisfied with the law and points towards 
solutions for building public support. 
 
Alm et al, (1993; 1999) analysed the importance of how tax law and regulations were 
implemented. They concluded that, there is a considerable difference between those tax 
rules which have been implemented by a legitimised political process and those imposed 
by a political process which is not to a greater or lesser degree, legitimate.  
 
Several studies examine the correlation between tax evasion and generally acceptable 
views of the definition of justice and inequities in tax law such as the lack of connection 
between contributions and benefits. (Spicer 1974; Spicer and Becker 1980 and Tyler and 
Smith 1998) They agreed that an equity theory is very important because it expects that 
fulfillment and actions are connected not only to the objective outcome levels, but also to 
the relation of the outcome to what is judged justice, they have posited positive links 
between observations of justice and economic inequality and tax evasion. Others argue 
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that there is a stronger link between paid contributions and any entitlement to benefits in 
that they may increase effectiveness of the contribution collection (Strban, 2007). 
 
One of the most important studies regarding social security contribution evasion; was 
conducted by McGillivary (2001) who attempted to analyse the implications of 
contribution evasion for SSPS. He concluded that some provisions of SSPS can enhance 
tax evasion. For example, an employee may claim to be self-employed if coverage of 
self-employed workers is not compulsory. Where employers must have a minimum 
number of employees (or turnover) for coverage under a scheme, they may arrange to 
keep the number of employees lower than this number for example in Jordan (the 
minimum number needed to be covered by the scheme is five employees). 
 
Also, some systems utilize design features that encourage evasion. In DBP the retirement 
pension is often worked out in accordance with a formula which links a worker’s 
earnings near retirement to the period during which the worker contributed to the scheme. 
Therefore, in many schemes such as this, the link between benefits and contributions is 
not often transparent. The scheme may have been open to strategic manipulation by 
workers who could organise their employment to take better advantage of their expected 
pensions and minimize their contributions, and this was reflected in high rates of tax 
evasion. 
 
To summarise:  this section revealed that there are other factors that play a vital role on 
tax compliance and have been studied in the field of legal literature such as tax 
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complexity. Therefore, simplicity and clarity should be the guiding norms in tax-law 
design in transitional and developing countries. In addition to this, the development of an 
equitable and fair tax law could assist in an increase in compliance and so could explain 
why tax evasion behaviour may not be explained merely by looking at the financial 
inducements of the tax system alone. Consequently, the literature indicates that such an 
analysis of these factors can provide a better understanding of the behavioural 
consistency with the stated rules. 
 
3.5.3 Ethical and Social Consideration 
 
This section presents a brief overview of tax evasion based on processes of ESC 
influences in the area of taxation. This aims to enhance the understanding of taxpayers' 
decisions, behaviour and their ability to better develop tax enforcement strategy. 
However, in most circumstances people have a greater tendency to fall under social 
influences when dealing with uncertainty (Turner, 1991) and given that, all theoretical 
models of tax evasion cover decisions made under uncertainty, a correlation is clear (e.g. 
EUT). Therefore, if attitude and social norms direct taxpaying behaviour then researchers 
have to know more about how they are formed and how they can be changed (Lewis, 
1982). It is worth noting that, paying taxes is a process during which taxpayers acquire 
information, form opinions and conduct certain actions. 
 
In the Basic Economic Model, social influence did not exist; people behaved in a social 
vacuum and thus made tax decisions free from those of other taxpayers, i.e. independent 
rational decisions. 
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Outside economics, recent research in psychology and sociology emphasises the 
importance of socialization processes in affecting behavior. Compliance with rules and 
regulations is hypothesised to be related to both the internal capacities of the individual 
and external influences of the environment, where the socialisation process is the linkage 
between the individual and society. 
 
There are two leading psychological theories to explain how socialization processes work 
with respect to compliance behaviour: cognitive and social learning. According to 
cognitive theory, the key variables determining compliance is the individual’s personal 
morality and level of moral development and according to social learning theory, the key 
variables determining compliance include peers’ opinions, and the extent of social 
influence an individual encounters. It is obvious that, social influence plays a significant 
role in everyday social exchange. Similar to enforcement authorities, peer groups can 
reward and punish their members, either by withholding or conferring signs of group 
status and respect (Geerken and Gove, 1975; Vogel, 1974; Witte and Woodbury, 1985). 
Combined, moral obligation and social influence potentially might generate significant 
levels of compliance even in the face of a weak deterrent effect. 
 
More practical evidence is essential with regard to the impact of social influences on 
contribution evasion. Paldam (2000) stated that “Social capital is a new field, suffering 
from a great lack of good, reliable data. However, it will take some time and a lot of work 
has to be done before it is known if social capital can deliver what it promises”. The 
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forms generally used in economics to illuminate and forecast behaviour towards a tax 
system bring very little attention to the effects of social influences and moral values.  
 
- A social norm and social interaction for tax compliance 
 
In general, social norm is defined as “a pattern of behaviour that is judged in a similar 
way by others and that therefore is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval” 
(Elster, 1989). Therefore, if individual groups behave in line socially in approved modes 
of behaviour, it is likely that other people will behave in a similar way. Social norms are 
consistent with other approaches such as those that rely upon social customs or upon 
people’s ethics or feelings of guilt and alienation. Generally, it is proposed that people 
comply as long as taxpayers believe that compliance is the social norm. Conversely, if 
evasion becomes widespread, then the social norm of compliance disappears. 
 
Social norm influence on tax compliance can be separated into two basic categories. The 
first refers to how taxpayers judge their own compliance behaviour in light of the 
individual's own beliefs about what is appropriate, approved, or moral behaviour (what 
might be termed "internal norms"). The second refers to how taxpayers recognize that 
they are treated by a tax authority in such areas as the payment of taxes, the quality of 
public provision services, or the responsiveness of tax administration decisions (or 
"external norms").  
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Falkinger (1995) suggested two reasons to explain how taxpayers' knowledge of inequity 
affects their perceptions of the risk involved in tax evasion. The first is consistent with 
the Basic Economic Model. This is where taxpayers concentrate on public services 
provided from taxes as an alternative way to increase their utility. Particularly, if 
taxpayers believe that taxes are spent on the public services that they prefer most, then 
tax evasion is more risky because it involves more economic cost than benefit. Given that 
taxpayers are considered to be risk averse they will not evade payment. His second 
reason talks of non-economic cost following the act of evasion, which he refers to as the 
'psychological argument'. The reason states that: ‘if the socioeconomic scheme is 
considered to be relatively equal and fair, individuals reduce evasion.’ The fairness of a 
system a person lives in may damage an evader’s reputation if people presume evasion to 
be something worthy of blame. Therefore, risk aversion will increase with a perceived 
equity which means there are also social costs following the act of evasion: namely social 
disapproval.  
 
Furthermore, Cullis and Lewis (1997) have suggested a model that tries to incorporate 
social psychological elements in an economic model of tax compliance. The model 
proposes that people can increase their utility by being compliant with social norms. They 
especially believe that “general tax compliance is a utility generating social norm that 
varies with the ability of different societies to solve the inefficiencies associated with the 
provision of a public good and hence the price of conformity”. The model considers tax 
compliance as a process rather than just an outcome as well as considering social norms 
as a very important element towards social influence that has a vital role in the model. 
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The authors conclude that, the relationships between taxpayers are restricted to 
interpersonal communication with others whom the taxpayer personally knows and 
interacts with.  
 
Falkinger, (1995) and Erard and Feinstein, (1994), additionally, postulate that these 
norms correlate to the level of which people were brought up as law–abiding citizens and 
internalised certain moral beliefs about crime (known as the socialization approach). 
Furthermore, Antonides and Robben, (1995) confirmed that people can also acquire 
taxpaying norms through a social learning process by observing and copying the 
behaviour of taxpayers in our immediate, close environment (or social learning 
approach). 
 
Both approaches demonstrate taxpayers obey norms through mechanisms such as guilt 
and/or shame. For example, According to Lewis (1971), “guilt arises when individuals 
realize that they have acted irresponsibly and in violation of a rule or social norm they 
have internalized”. Since the commitment of paying taxes to the government is an 
accepted social norm, it is sensible to conclude that taxpayers who choose not to pay all 
of their taxes may feel guilty. Grasmick and Bursik’s (1990) confirmed that, feelings of 
guilt have influenced tax compliance but argued social disapproval does not, because of 
the private nature of taxpaying. 
 
Conversely, Hasseldine and Kaplan’s (1992) findings specify that feelings of shame 
affected tax compliance decisions behaviour but feelings of guilt did not. In addition,  
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Murphy (2004) revealed that, an individual’s emotional response to chastisement is found 
to play a central role in the determination of whether or not they will consequently 
comply with their legal obligations. Survey data collected from 2292 taxpayers who were 
accused of avoiding tax payments demonstrate that perceptions of procedural injustice 
can ultimately affect future tax compliance through a set of mediating variables that 
correspond to emotions of shame and guilt. 
 
Regarding to the SSCE in particular, employees may be unaware of contribution evasion, 
as there is no way for them to check the contributions paid by employers on their behalf 
(Magillivary, 2001). Moreover, social security taxpayers may not be aware that their 
evasion could cause serious financial problems for the sustainability of SSPS in the 
future. Consequently, SSCE may produce psychological costs regarding their awareness. 
 
Despite the fact that researchers have always found evidence for the influence of 
taxpayer’s personal norms on degrees of tax evasion, findings for the role of social norms 
on tax evasion have more than one possible meaning.  
 
Vogel (1974) found that among a sample of Swedish taxpayers that thirty-six percent had 
contacts with tax evaders, and reported that their likelihood of evasion were larger than 
average as compared with twenty-four percent of taxpayers who had no contact with tax 
evaders. The author concluded that: “….group support seems to be of some importance in 
the formation of attitudes to tax system, attitudes to tax evasion and actual behaviour. 
Such group support includes the transmission of deviant norms, techniques of tax 
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evasion, and techniques of neutralising deviant behaviour to keep up a positive self-
conception”. 
 
By using data from a survey with Australian citizens, Wenzel (2002) presented an 
analysis of “the role of social identification as a process transforming a social group into 
a self-category and reference group whose norms are internalised and acted upon as one's 
own personal views”. The main conclusions were that: firstly, people were more likely to 
be influenced by others who are considered members of their one relevant self-category; 
that is to say, those members of the group with which one identified in a given situation. 
Secondly, such influence means that the views and behavioural tendencies of fellow 
group members are internalised as ones true personal convictions. 
 
However, the extent of evasion appears to have an effect on taxpayers' behaviour even if 
they do not know these evaders personally. Jackson and Milliron (1986) report the 
findings from a study by Kaplan and Reckers (1985) that, the aim of taxpayers to evade 
“are influenced considerably by their perception of the extent of evasion of others who 
may not be known personally, but who are perceived to have high moral character”. 
Whereas, Song and Yarbrough (1978) found that taxpayers' attitude about tax evasion 
were significantly linked with their perceptions of the dominance of tax evasion among 
other taxpayers. 
 
- Tax morale and tax evasion 
 
Finally, aspects of tax morale have increasingly drawn more attention. Andreoni, et al, 
(1998) point out that “Adding moral and social dynamics to models of tax compliance is 
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as yet a largely undeveloped area of research”. Therefore, more economic models have 
adopted a ‘social’ approach by extending the assumptions of the Basic Economic Model 
to incorporate taxpayers’ moral values and the role of their social environment.  
 
Researchers have indicated that tax morale can help to explain the high level of tax 
compliance (Schwartz and Orleans 1967). The most important indicators in the literature 
about tax morality and views on its payment stressed that tax evasion should not only be 
analysed from the Basic Economic Model point of view. 
 
In the literature, there are two curious theories that make it possible to incorporate tax 
morality in a Basic Economic Model. The first theory is a positive approach (Chung 
1976). Here, taxpayers are not only affected by their own welfare but are also interested 
with people’s general welfare. The decision to evade is restrained by their awareness that 
evasion will reduce the resources available for others’ welfare. The second is the 
“Kantian” morality approach by Laffont (1975) and Sugden (1984). This approach is 
related to Kant’s definition of morality and is based on the hypothesis that a fair tax is a 
tax that a taxpayer believes to be fair for all other taxpayers to pay. Evasion behaviour 
will create anxiety, guilt and decreasing taxpayer’s positive self-image.  
 
Several studies in developed countries examined the effect of morality on contribution 
evasion. The result supports a positive relationship between a high sense of morality and 
tax compliance (Erard and Feinstein 1994). In general, financial psychology looks mainly 
at the role of moral and social norms vis-à-vis taxpaying behaviour. Alm, et al (1999) 
report that public norms of tax compliance and the moral judgements of tax payers 
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through their association with the general system affect the way people behave towards 
tax systems in particular. 
 
A study conducted by Sigala (2000) noted that British taxpayers reported that ‘cash in 
hand’ is a norm among tradesmen in the UK construction industry. They explained this 
norm regarding the following variables: “opportunities for cash payments, low risk of 
detection, not being well paid, clients’ consensus, and frequency of such transactions 
among colleagues”. Sole traders in professional jobs reported avoiding asking for cash 
payments because they believed “that such payments put their professional reputation at 
risk and it was not worth asking for them”. In addition to these variables, moral beliefs on 
tax evasion and the penalty if detected evading has also been found to affect tax evasion 
decisions.  
 
Several studies have claimed that there is an impact on tax morale in an economy when 
there is a sizeable black economy. Kanniainen et al. (2004) offer evidence from twenty-
one developed OECD countries, suggesting a negative impact on tax morale when black 
economies are of a sufficient size that their existence becomes common knowledge.. This 
result is confirmed by Torgler and Schneider (2009) who also find a negative impact on 
tax morale in similar circumstances. The tax morale variable can explain up to one third 
of the deviation in the black economy variable.  
 
Furthermore, tax morale plays into the importance of political governance for tax payer 
compliance. Tax morale and levels of voluntary tax compliance may depend on the extent 
to which tax payers see the state as having a legitimacy, and the extent to which they 
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consider revenues to be well spent, e.g. on improving public services. (see Lieberman, 
2003, Brautigam et al., 2008, Everest-Phillips, 2008a). 
 
A number of previous findings have investigated the correlation between tax morale and 
the size of the black economy. Alm and Torgler (2006) focus on Europe and the United 
States. They discovered a muscular negative correlation (Pearson r=-0.460) significant at 
the 0.05 level. Analysing the simple linear relationship in a regression study demonstrates 
that the variable tax morale factor can explain more than 20%of the total variance in the 
size of a black economy. The level of tax morale has therefore, consequences for real 
behaviour, and indeed, might be itself responsible for the size of any such black 
economy. If tax morale is in decline, then the shadow the size of the black economy is 
expected to increase. Torgler and Schneider (2007) demonstrate how tax morale and 
countries’ institutional quality of service provision affects the black economy. They 
discovered strong support for the argument that higher tax morale and a higher 
institutional quality of service provision lead to a smaller black economy.  
 
Finally, the role of taxpayers’ collective sense of duty could be one the determinants of 
tax compliance. Scholz and Pinney (1995) suggested that the taxpayers’ sense of duty 
towards paying taxes significantly determines the perceived probability and risk of being 
caught when cheating, whereas, Schneider and Enste (2000) reported a "positive 
relationship between higher tax evasion and declining civic virtue and loyalty towards 
public institutions". Both involve a positive connection between this aspect and evasion. 
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To summarise: this section highlighted studies that focussed more on the area of social 
influence on tax evasion. These studies criticised the Basic Economic Model on the basis 
that there are a number of evasive decisions and enforcement policies that cannot be 
studied effectively within this model. Therefore, economists incorporated the idea of 
social norms and moral taxpayers to improve the strength of the model to predict the TE 
problem. This new economic assumption of the interdependence of taxpayers has been 
added to Basic Economic Model by variables such as perceptions of inequity and feelings 
of guilt and shame as additional costs of tax evasion to improve the model’s 
predictability.  
 
3.6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the issues involved in tax evasion to understand 
and explain the key determinants of the tax evasion problem. It also reviews the issues 
that arise in tax evasion at the firm level, where firms could also have a more independent 
role in tax evasion activities as evaders of taxes. Then, this chapter attempted to analyse 
the tax evasion literature starting with the Basic Economic Model, based on the EUT, that 
concentrated on traditional economic topics such as audits, penalties and tax rates. The 
standard economic model of tax compliance that views compliance as an example of the 
economics of crime, provides a useful starting point for thinking about tax evasion. But in 
recent years, many scholars have pointed to limitations of this framework. For example, 
the model under-predicts the number of honest taxpayers. It also does not provide strong 
predictions about the socioeconomic determinants of evasion.      
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The chapter goes on to show that there are a large number of contributions to the 
literature which have extended the original model in a number of directions, and which 
mainly fall into two approaches. One approach tried to incorporate findings into a more 
sophisticated EUT to improve the predictive power of the Basic Economic Model. The 
other approach moved beyond a traditional EUT into the direction of including non-
economic factors. 
 
In particular, the chapter introduce the extensions and modifications of the Basic 
Economic Model by including more economic factors.  Researchers argue that this 
economic extension introduces some more significant insights of the tax evasion 
problem, but also suffers from some important deficiencies. Namely, those deficiencies 
arise primarily because of a failure to incorporate other factors into the analytical 
framework. 
 
Consequently, the later section analyses the role of NEFs which considerably influence 
and determine the SSCE problem: namely, the impact of the effectiveness of a tax agency 
and its administration, the legal and regulatory structure, and ethical and social 
considerations. The argument exists that the factors mentioned above are important in all 
countries, but are crucial in developing countries. The ineffectiveness of tax agencies and 
their administration, as well as their possession of undeveloped legal systems, together 
contribute to black economic methods of regulating relations between citizens and the 
state. (Christie and Holzner, 2006) 
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In addition, reviews of other non-economic factors that derive from ethical and social 
factors and reject a strictly classical approach are demonstrated in the later section. From 
an orthodox point of view, it may be possible to allow the legitimacy of these models if 
there is an expansion of the variables that are used by the taxpayer’s utility function, e.g., 






























The objective of this chapter is to outline the methodology which has been used in this 
study by the researcher to generate empirical evidence of the attitudes of former 
contribution firms’ evader and thus attempt to determine and explain the factors that 
influence the contribution evasion for the JSSS.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: after the introduction, section two presents the 
methodology and data availability to be used in this study; section three presents the 
proposed model and variables which will offer a more complete explanation for the 
research problem; section four introduces several hypotheses that are to be tested; section 
five demonstrates the methodology of sampling techniques and choice to be used in this 
study; section six reveals the data-collection method and procedures and provides an 
extensive discussion of the main challenges involved in collecting data on tax evasion in 
developing countries in general, and Jordan in particular; section seven is a pilot study 
conducted to trial various aspects of the study and appropriate modifications to 
procedures made to the design; section eight presents the statistical techniques to be used 




4.2. Methodology and Data Availability 
 
Methodology is considered as a theory of ‘...How research does or should proceed.’ 
(Harding 1987). According to Selltiz et al (1959) “The purpose of research methodology 
is to discover answers to questions through the application of scientific procedures. These 
procedures have been developed in order to increase the likelihood that the information 
gathered will be relevant to the question asked, and will be reliable and unbiased” (Cited: 
Baker 2001).  
 
The intention of this study is to employ a variety of methodological tools to analyse the 
JSSCE, as each tool has advantages and deficiencies. Thus, this thesis aims to work with 
literature, questionnaire and semi-structured interviews so as to check the robustness of 
this research finding. As a result, “...The idea is that if multiple sources of information 
produce similar results, the credibility of the survey's findings is enhanced” (Fink, 2003) 
 
4.2.1 Research Philosophy 
 
Research philosophy refers to the way the researcher thinks about the development of 
knowledge (Saunders et al., 2000). Easterby-Smith et al (1997) identified three reasons 
which reflect the importance when exploring research philosophy: 
 
Firstly, it aims to persuade the researcher to identify and improve the methods to be 
employed in a report, so it makes the research strategy used much clearer. 
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Additionally, it allows the researcher to appraise different methodologies and techniques 
and avoids using them incorrectly as well as minimising preventable extra work by 
delineating the drawbacks of particular theories before moving on to any additional 
stages. 
 
Finally, such an approach can help the researcher select or modify methods that were 
previously beyond the parameters of consideration. 
 
In general, there are two research philosophies that dominate Western academic 
literature: positivism and phenomenology. Both of these should be examined and 
understood before any decision on research methods can be decided (Easterby-Smith et 
al. 2002; Collis and Hussey, 2003; and Saunders et al. 2000). These two methods have 
quite different hypotheses and methodological techniques as to how they understand the 
social world and how social science should be performed (Creswell, 1998). A research 
method that considers various approaches helps decide other elements of the overarching 
methodology, such as the research approach, the strategies employed the methods of data 
collection and even the analysis of the data itself.  
 
Positivism and phenomenology can be defined in different ways. Hussey and Hussey 
(1997) argue that positivism and phenomenological examples are sometimes explained 
using wholly different descriptors. The positivistic method could be considered a 
traditional, quantitative, or empirical science whereas phenomenology could equally be 
considered a post-positivistic, subjective, or qualitative type of system. 
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The approach of selection may rely on the context of the study and the nature of the 
questions being asked. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) add, “The researcher’s experience, 
understanding of philosophy and personal beliefs may also have some bearing on the 
method adopted”. Shih (1998) expanded this thought, naming four areas which should be 
taken into account when deciding on a research method: “The philosophical paradigm 
and goal of the research, the nature of the phenomenon of interest, the level and nature of 
the research questions, and practical considerations related to the research environment 
and the efficient use of resources”. 
 
When taken from a positivistic approach, the researcher develops a theory and hypothesis 
(or hypotheses) about the connection or effect between two or more variables, which is 
then tested in an empirical manner by gathering information on the relevant variables and 
then applying statistical tests so as to identify relationships of any significance. 
According to Smith (1998) "Positivist approaches to the social sciences assume things 
can be studied as hard facts and the relationship between these facts can be established as 
scientific laws. For positivists, such laws have the status of truth and social objects can be 
studied in much the same way as natural objects". As a consequence, relationships of 
cause and effect exist among certain variables and can be identified, proved, and 
explained. Therefore, the patterns of the social world are mostly predictable and can be 
potentially controlled. Moreover, the researcher is not part of the research itself; they 
present the results without any kind of intervention (Sharlene, et al. 2005).  
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On the other hand, phenomenology's philosophical aims are to study the phenomena, or 
appearance of human experience while trying to defer all consideration of their objective 
reality or subjective association (Grolier Encyclopedia, 2003). Therefore, the researcher 
is, in effect, part of the research itself. Blaikie (2000) added “patterns or correlations are 
not understandable on their own. It is necessary to find out what meaning (motives) 
people give to the actions that lead to such patterns.” The philosophy of phenomenology 
is exemplified by a focus on any meaning that subjects of research give to these social 
phenomena. The main worry of phenomenological researchers is to understand events 
and why they are happening. This kind of research is especially concerned with the 
context where these events take place. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001), 
qualitative data in the form of long interviews with a judicially selected group of 
participants is the best method for researchers who adopt the phenomenological 
approach. 
 
In recent years, an amalgamation of the two paths has been another alternative; the 
rationale behind this partnership is that each philosophy has particular strengths and 
weaknesses. Therefore, using a combination of philosophies maximises their strengths 
and minimises their weaknesses. 
 
4.2.2 Types of Research Methods  
 
There are three types of research method: quantitative, qualitative and mixed method. 
The methodological distinctions most commonly used focus on the differences between 
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two kinds of research methods whether it is a quantitative research, to investigate 
phenomena which have been adopted by positivism, or qualitative approach, which aims 
to describe and explore in-depth phenomena which have been allied with 
phenomenological philosophy (Polit et al 2001).  
 
 Quantitative Research  
 
Quantitative research is, “An empirical method of research in which the researcher 
explores relationships using numeric data” (Colorado State University, 2004). In 
addition, Arsham (2002) states that quantitative data is always numeric and indicates 
either how much something is or how many it is. The concern here is with number rather 
than the words used, as well as being concerned with the explanation of relationships 
between variables and the testing of specific hypotheses. Therefore, special statistical 
tools are in actuality used to analyse this kind of data. 
 
A particular type of survey strategy is usually thought to be the most common 
quantitative method used by researchers. . However, as in any other type of research, 
there are distinct advantages and disadvantages. Easterby-Smith (1991) mentions some of 
the advantages as follows: 
 
1. Quantitative methods can cover a wide range of potential situations. 
2. These methods are quick, clear and economical, dealing with statistics combined from 
possibly big samples which may be of notable relevance to decision and policy makers. 
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The main disadvantages are: 
1. Methods are prone to being somewhat inflexible and artificial. 
2. They are not very efficient in helping to understand processes or the import that people 
attach to such actions. 
3. They are not very useful in that they make it difficult for policy makers to deduce what 
adjustments and actions should take place in the future. 
 
Quantitative research is simply expected to be rigorous, and, accordingly, data resulting 
from their use takes on the presumption of validity because of their efficiency and ability 
to help generalise the data collected.  On the other hand, qualitative research is assumed 
to lack validity in the pursuit of depth and dependability. It is important to take into 
account that the concept of validity was developed as a consequence to positivist 
philosophy (Sharlene, et al. 2005). 
 
 Qualitative Research 
 
Qualitative research is defined as: “…A process of enquiry that draws data from the 
context in which events occur, in an attempt to describe these occurrences, as a means of 
determining the process in which events are embedded and the perspectives of those 
participating in the events, using induction to derive possible explanations based on 
observed phenomena” (Gorman and Clayton, 1997). In addition, qualitative research 
according to Spencer et al. (2003) “aims to provide an in-depth understanding of people’s 
experience, perspectives and histories in the context of their personal circumstances or 
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setting”. There is additionally much more importance levied on description and discovery 
and much less significance given to the testing of hypotheses and their verification. 
Weight is given to exploratory rather than explanatory concerns this is to enable a better 
consideration of the research problem. 
 
Concerning the form of qualitative data, these are usually in the form of words rather than 
numbers. Furthermore, according to Mason (2002) qualitative research should be: (1) 
systematically and rigorously conducted, (2) accountable for its quality and its claims, (3) 
involve critical self-scrutiny by the researcher, or active reflexivity, (4) produce 
explanations or arguments, rather than claiming to offer mere descriptions, and (5) 
produce explanations or arguments which are generalisable in some way, or have some 
wider resonance.  
 
In the case of methods such as case study, interviews, group discussion, participant 
observation, documents and records analysis, all of them could be applied to this 
particular approach. The main benefits of using a qualitative research method are to 
classify and simplify explicit responses that are related to the approaches and behaviours 
of the respondents and to obtain a more profound insight into their organisational system. 
Moreover, qualitative methods help researchers to have more of an understanding of the 
people and situations involved and assist the respondents in better understanding their 




 Mixed Research Method 
 
In practice, research rarely falls under one specific research philosophy like Positivism 
(quantitative) or Phenomenology (qualitative). Therefore, many researchers realise that 
they should use both types of approach in order to get most benefit from the two of them, 
in order to improve the quality of information which is required for conducting any 
accurate research.  
 
The combination of both methods in a single study was supported by Yin, (1994). He 
argued, in spite of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research that “there 
is a strong and essential common ground between the two”. With this in mind, Easterby–
Smith (1991) also argued that some of these methods could be used in both situations, for 
example, the interview, where a single piece of data such as the transcript of an interview, 
can be analysed in two ways. Additionally, there is no limitation on using a particular 
method in a particular situation and another method in another circumstance. 
 
There are many advantages to this way of operating. Mainly, researchers can use 
amalgamations of different methods in one particular study, either due to the design of 
the research or in order to confirm results from using different methods. The approach 
mentioned above is sustained in an approach known as ‘triangulation’, which is defined 
by Leedy and Ormrod (2001), as using two or more data source methods within one 
project so as to help make sure that any data produced by the competing methods are 
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consistent with what is expected. Thus the choice of various methods of data collection 
allows triangulation to occur. 
 
Also, as suggested by Saunders et al. (2000), semi-structured interviews can be an 
important way of triangulating data collected by other methods, such as in the use of a 
questionnaire. 
 
Validity is increased when it ensures that the variance in the variable is assigned to the 
trait of the subject examined rather than to the method that is used for the investigation. 
In brief, triangulation occurs when one crosschecks data for internal consistency and 
external validity. These are vital matters of concern for any study (Yin, 1994; and 
Saunders et al., 2000). 
 
In conclusion, the source of a multi-task approach is the fact that qualitative and 
quantitative methods complement each other rather than compete with each other 
(Saunders et al., 2000). Thus, it is very common for socio-economic researchers to 
integrate both methods for socio-economic survey work.  
 
4.2.3. Research Approaches  
 
There are two approaches to research we will cover here: deductive and inductive. A 
deductive approach is a scientific approach, where the researcher is independent of the 
research. This method entails the development of a conceptual and theoretical structure 
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before its testing through empirical observation (Gill and Johnson, 2002). A deductive 
approach works from the more general to the more specific, which is sometimes called a 
"top-down" approach (Trochim, 2000). In addition, a deductive approach is normally 
used for analysing the relationship between two factors. This approach is typically used 
in positivist quantitative research (University of Michigan, 1994). The figure below 
demonstrates the deductive approach. 
 
 
Figure (4.1): The deductive approach (Source: Trochim, 2000) 
 
The inductive approach works the opposite way, Trochim (2000) described it as: (1) 
moving from specific observations to broader generalisations and theories, (2) a "bottom-
up" approach, and (3) the researcher starts with specific observations and measures, 
detects patterns and regularities, formulates some tentative hypotheses that can be 
explored, and finally ends up developing some general conclusions or theories. 
 
This approach is used typically in phenomenology. Arguably, therefore, at least one 
approach should be followed by any researcher. The figure below demonstrates the 
inductive approach. 
 




4.2.4 Research Strategies 
 
In brief, there are number of strategies available for any researcher trying to conduct 
empirical data collection. The researcher can choose between a survey, an experiment, 
observation, history, an analysis of archival records and a case study; the researcher's 
choice depends on the nature of research questions to which extent the researcher has 
power over behavioural events, and to the degree of focus on current events (Yin, 1994).  
 
4.2.5 Research Methods Selection 
 
Due to the research problem and objectives of this thesis, the type, approach, philosophy, 
strategy and model for solving the problem needed to be determined.  
 
In this study, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods are used which 
reflect the nature of the research problem. The use of this combination is necessary to 
achieve the research objectives. After presenting a critical overview of the JSSC and its 
administration, this study will use quanitative methods to achieve the second objective 
which is to develop suitable models for the undertaking of empirical analysis to explain 
the main determinant of JSSCE. It will then move to qualtitative methods, to achieve the 
third objective by undertaking a series of interviews with which to assess the reasons for 
compliance of former contribution evaders. The last objective is to propose suitable 
strategies for the JSSC to adopt in reforming the scheme. As seen, this combination 
means moving from using a deductive approach to an inductive approach, and moving 
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from a positivistic philosophy to a phenomenological. The key point, therefore,  is to use 
these methods and philosophies to achieve the research aims. 
 
Generally, qualitative research will be conducted in this study with an eye to an in-depth 
understanding of respondents’ motivations and their attitudes towards contribution 
evasion. The results of the qualitative research should provide a valuable contribution to 
the support of the quantitative stage by the enhancement of the robustness of the research 
carried out and to improve the ability of a researcher to draw conclusions from a study. 
Further, recommendations to the JSSC could be made with greater clarity and confidence. 
 
Regarding, the strategy of this research, the survey is selected because it supports the 
previously-mentioned selection of methods and helps in collecting the required data. The 
type, design and management of the survey are clarified later in this chapter. In addition, 
the general research design is explanatory where the reason for carrying out the 
explanatory research is to discover cause/effect relationships between particular 
variables, (Saunders, et al, 2000) and due to the time horizon, data for this study is cross-
sectional, which means a set of observations on one or more variables is collected at the 
same point of time (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Two methods of data collection will be used: secondary data is going to be collected 
through a literature review, reports, statistics, census and previous surveys to achieve 
background information about the research problem, and primary data is to be collected 
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from semi-structured interviews and self-administrated questionnaires to undertake an 
empirical analysis to explain the main reasons for contribution evasion. 
 
The model will be developed mainly in line with previous tax evasion studies with 
particular attention in the direction of contribution evasion studies so as to solve the 
research problem.  
 
4.2.6 Data Availability 
 
The relationship between any research and its results can be established only to the extent 
that relevant data is available, so, methods which have been employed to collect data 
must be selected on the basis of the nature of the data required and the sources available.  
 
Generally, it is difficult for any researcher to obtain reliable information about tax 
evasion behaviour and to find data of adequate quality. Cowell (1991) confirmed: “Data 
from official investigations is hardly ever available and data from other sources may be 
suspect: if you could directly observe and measure a hidden activity, then presumably it 
could not really have been properly hidden in the first place”. Even if data about tax 
evaders could be obtained, tax evaders’ behaviour could be affected by specific 
circumstances, which are difficult to control. Lewis (1982) supported the view that tax 
payers might refuse to answer questions about evasion problems or moderate their views 
to reduce the likelihood that information is used non-confidentially. 
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Usually, there are two kinds of data, namely secondary and primary data. Secondary data 
is the data that already has been gathered by other researchers with different purposes in 
mind, while primary data is the data that a person gathers on their own with a specific 
purpose in mind. In addition, Yin (1994) mentioned that there are “six important sources 
of evidence, namely documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation, and physical artifacts. None of these sources of evidence has 
complete advantage over all of the other instead they complement each other”. 
 
The data will be gathered to meet these research objectives using both primary and 
secondary sources. The sources of evidence will be gathered from a structured 
questionnaire surveys that will be distributed to those who were former contribution 
evaders and now are compliant with the JSSC. In addition, ten face-to face interviews 
with former firm evaders and seven face-to-face interviews with managers at different 
levels of JSSC employees will also be carried out to elicit reliable information of 
relevance to the study. Moreover, literature and studies relating to tax evasion in general 
and to SSCE in particular will be scrutinised.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher has been granted accesses to the JSSC archives (library) and 
the reports published by the JSSC such as the Inspection Department, Auditing 





4.3 The Research Model and Variables 
 
The research model provided here offers a framework for the understanding of the 
influence of those socio-economic and psychological components on taxpayers’ 
compliance decision-making behaviour. It also shows the relationship between the 
variables that are related to the research problem as stated at the beginning of the work. 
The theoretical framework provides a deeper understanding of the research problem and 
plays a key role in defining it and its parameters. 
 
The main purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical framework model to ascertain 
and explain the main reasons for contribution evasion that influence Jordanian firms’ 
decisions on compliance or evasion. a number of models and theories were explored 
before developing the research model. At the beginning, the model tried to examine the 
relative importance of the reasonably well-formulated EUT, which was influenced by the 
model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Based on this theory, economists examined the 
level of change in tax compliance as a response to a diverse range of deterrence policies. 
However, most studies revealed a higher level of compliance than the EUT model might 
have predicted (Alm, 1999).  
 
As will later become obvious, deterrence and EFs are not the only factors that seem to 
affect the level of tax evasion. Then, the model started to revise and to analyse the 
importance of new economic and numerous non-economic factors and to incorporate 
these factors explicitly into the Basic Economic Model. The challenge is to incorporate 
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the basic themes of other social sciences in a sophisticated way without giving up the 
economic foundations because there is general agreement and overwhelming evidence 
that behavioural factors as well as economic factors influence tax evasion - Cowell 
(1990), Erard and Feinstein, (1994) and Andreoni et al, (1998).Indeed Alm (1998) states 
that tax evasion is not a single choice decision but is actually a range of multiple 
decisions. He adds that more analysis of the multidimensional nature of evasion is 
required. 
 
In the Basic Economic Model (discussed in details in chapter 3), an employer seeking to 
maximise his profits will decide not to comply with the social security contribution if the 
expected return from evasion is greater than the certain return from compliance, 
otherwise, the employer complies. In addition, an employer acts in disregard of laws and 
rules up to the point where the marginal profit of acting equals the expected marginal 
penalty augmented by the risk. Note that the taxpayer is risk averse.  
 
Relying on the literature, a paradigm of the economic analysis of tax evasion provides an 
inadequate explanation for the revenue collection process. An insufficient theoretical 
proposition may both distort empirical analyses and suggest useless policy procedures 
(Sutinen, and Kuperan 1999). Therefore, the extension of the basic economic model is 
modified to permit taxpayer’s behaviour to be determined by including intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. The resulting model integrates economic theory with theories from 
other disciplines such as psychology and sociology in addition to the conventional costs 
and revenues associated with illegal behaviour.  
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The study model introduces the Social Security Corporation as a strategic role player in a 
game-theoretic approach that grants the Social Security Corporation to place conditions 
upon its audit rules. “The behavioural framework of tax non-compliance makes it an 
especially appropriate case for a theoretical construct that explicitly takes into account the 
interactions and responses of the law enforcement agency” (Erard,  and  Feinstein, 1994). 
 
Taxpayer compliance literature sees two essential kinds of motivation or duty. The first is 
related to the taxpayer’s wish to act in terms of his personal morality. The other is related 
to the intrinsic obligation to follow the requirements of authority (Tyler, 1990). Social 
influence is extrinsic motivation that can be considered to force the taxpayer’s 
compliance. Concern for one’s social reputation, or in religious terms, one’s spiritual 
reputation and fear of a higher power, have long been seen as active motivation important 
to compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
 
Traditional economic analysis has paid scant attention to the moral and social values of 
taxpayers and how they influence evasion behaviour. Most current economic theory 
typically ignores this influence or, even at times, rejects the stance that moral and social 
factors can have an influence on economic behaviour (Hausman and McPherson, 1996). 
Conversely, tax evasion literature shows a greater inclination to stress moral 
considerations. Andreoni, et al, (1998) indicate in their tax compliance surveys that 
including moral and social factors into tax compliance models certainly improve 
researchers’ understanding of tax evasion.  
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Recently, it has been noted that the importance of societal socialisation processes do 
indeed affect taxpayer behaviour. This has particularly been a focal point in 
psychological and sociological studies (Levine and Tapp, 1977; Kohlberg, 1984). These 
studies argued that of taxpayers intrinsic characteristics and external environmental 
influences are intertwined and enhance compliance with rules and regulations. 
 
To make clear how socialisation processes work regarding compliance behaviour, there 
are two important psychological theories; cognitive and social learning. According to 
cognitive theory, the taxpayer’s personal morality and level of moral development are the 
key variables shaping compliance behaviour (Kohlberg, 1984), whereas social learning 
theory considers the key variables shaping compliance to include peers’ opinions, and the 
extent of social influence an individual experiences (Akers, 1985).          
                                                                                                           
On the other hand, sociological literature have two basic perspectives on taxpayer’s 
compliance behaviour: instrumental and normative (Tyler, 1990). From the instrumental 
perspective “the key variables determining compliance are the severity and certainty of 
sanctions” and from the normative perspective “the key variables determining 
compliance are individuals’ perceptions of the fairness and appropriateness of the law 
and its institutions” (Sutinen, and Kuperan 1999). 
 
While leaving out legal enforcement from the theoretical paradigm is possible, it is 
plausibly an error, as it then makes it straightforward to fail to notice vital legal and 
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institutional issues that can improve a revenue collection agency’s ability to enforce the 
law and, in others, restrain a company’s ability to apply what could otherwise seem to be 
hypothetically attractive remedies (Sutinen, and Kuperan 1999). 
 
In this model the variables will be classified as both dependent and independent variables 
demonstrating the causal relationships between a set of dependent and independent 
variables. In this relationship, contribution evasion is examined as a dependent variable 
influenced by four main independent categories of factors which may induce contribution 
evasion, the perceptions and experiences of respondents with EF, CME, LRS and ESC. In 
addition, the researcher aims to assess the perspective of the research participants about 
the influence of firm sector, size and ownership on the contribution evasion so as to get a 
more comprehensive picture about the research problem. 
 
Tax evasion as a dependent variable will be analysed with the following two indicators: 
whether it is a common problem, and whether it is an increasing problem. Commonly, 
taxpayer’s compliance behaviour is expected to be affected by the extent of the 
availability of evasion for game theoretical reasons. In fact taxpayers deal with an 
assurance problem, where complying could be influenced by the extent of assurance that 
others also will comply (Sutinen, and Kuperan 1999). 
 
We now turn to the construction of our major variables used to cause and explain the 
contribution evasion problem. As there are not many studies that thoroughly search for 
factors which influence contribution evasion in particular; most of the presented control 
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variables refer to the tax evasion literature in general and via the researcher’s own 
experience working with the JSSC for 23 years.  
 
The starting point is to analyse the effects of traditional variables of the Basic Economic 
Model on contribution evasion, considering variables such as: the penalty rate of 
contribution evasion, the probability of being inspected, the SS contribution rate, and the 
extension variables of Basic Economic Model such as:  the firm’s liquidity and cash 
issues, and the unemployment rate. From the perspective of the Basic Economic Model, 
the inclination of an employer to evade also depends on the employer’s appraisal of the 
risk of being caught and, should the employer be caught, the harshness of the subsequent 
financial penalty (Mcgillivary, 2001). 
 
Next, this study aims to extend the Basic Economic Model in the direction of non-
economic variables in the circumstances of paying the JSS contributions. As a 
multifaceted phenomenon, contribution evasion can be seen from a number of varying 
perspectives. The position of the contributor is influenced by a number of factors, 
including their outlook towards public institutions, the apparent fairness of the SSL, 
established social norms, and the chances of non-compliance being discovered and 
penalised.  
 
Tax agencies play very important roles in influencing behaviours toward tax compliance 
and the implementation of the law. Therefore, this thesis aims to move further forward in 
its analysis by evaluating the impact of CME on the subject of contribution evasion in the 
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JSSC. Mcgillivary (2001) stated that “A lot of attention is paid to the design, structure 
and administration performance of contributory social security scheme. However, unless 
an administrative operation is well implemented, all other aspects of the scheme are 
irrelevant”. This contribution will, it is hoped, be a useful addition to the tax compliance 
literature. Therefore, the attitude towards CME will be evaluated with a set of variables to 
examine how well the JSSC works, its perceived honesty and fairness, and how 
contributors observe its help and assistance. Whereas, though it appears more trust in the 
SS administration tends to reduce the contribution evasion problem. 
 
The fairness and the interaction between taxpayers and the JSSC will be analysed. Tax 
evasion literature has effectively verified that taxpayer’s perception of fairness has an 
influence on people in their payment of taxes. Moreover, taxpayers’ perception about 
JSSC performance depends on government spending, and the input-output relation 
between paid taxes and obtained benefits. As a result, an unfair SSS could enhance 
taxpayers' willingness to justify cheating. Alm, et al, (1992) argue that most previous 
studies pay no attention to the evidence that tax evasion depends partially on the misuse 
of tax revenue. Accordingly, additional variables such as corruption could be 
incorporated and analysed in the model. The commitment of paying contributions to the 
JSSC might not be accepted social norms in countries where corruption is common. 
 
Influenced by the theoretical analysis of this model, the study also analyses institutional 
uncertainty and thus the relevance of the information available. According to Andreoni et 
al. (1998), Basic Economic Model of tax evasion presumes that taxpayers' completely 
understand most aspects of tax law and regulations. However, this is not completely true. 
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This study analyses the impact of the level and quality of knowledge and information 
provided by JSSC on contribution evasion. 
 
In addition, recent research in psychology and sociology stresses the relevance of 
efficient rules and regulations as the main variables in determining evasion tax behavior. 
“Rules make up a part of any civilized society. When well designed they reflect the social 
norms of the society in which they are developed and they are used as a way to ensure 
that citizens do not unfairly disadvantage others” (Murphy, 2004). As a result of this 
investigation, it will be clearer how regulators might be able to more effectively enforce 
the law. This will also be discussed. 
 
The study explores to what extent firms are convinced by JSSS, whether it is suitable for 
the Jordanian economic situation, if the current JSSC benefits firm’s owners, employees, 
both of groups or even non of them, the extent of linkage between contribution and 
benefits as well as whether limited Social Security provision is one of the main reasons 
for non-compliance, and if the JSSS contains some design features which encourage 
evasion because the structure of social security systems sometimes invites evasion, 
though not always intentionally. In addition, many studies revealed that, tax law 
complexity is appreciably related to tax evasion (e.g. Richardson, 2006 and Alm et al., 
2004). Generally, the main reasons for the success of many countries’ tax system reforms 
are the result of a simplification of the tax collection system (Okada, 2002a). Essentially, 
assessing whether the social security system may contribute to contribution evasion or 
not.   
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As has already been outlined, over the last few years researchers in tax compliance 
literature have shown a tendency to stress the importance of social influence and moral 
considerations in the explanation of tax compliance behaviour (Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein, 1998). Several studies in developed countries examined the effect of morality 
on CE. The result supports a positive relationship between a high sense of morality and 
tax compliance (Erard and Feinstein 1994; Kanniainen et al. 2005 and Torgler and 
Schneider, 2009).  
 
It is obvious that, social influence plays a significant role in everyday social exchange. 
Combined, moral obligation and social influence potentially might generate significant 
levels of compliance even in the face of a weak deterrent effect. Therefore, the social 
influence and ethical considerations will be investigated in the model as well. The 
participants are asked if contribution evasion creates psychological costs. Thoughts of 
guilt and shame may minimise the perceived benefits of evasion. Other related variables 
which induce contribution evasion will be tested such as citizens’ sense of duty, which 
ostensibly could play a role in the analysis of contribution evasion. 
 
Additionally, the study intends to examine the influence of firms’ characteristics, namely; 
the occupational sector, the size of firms and the effects of ownership on the problem of 
contribution evasion. For example, Roth et al. (1989) state that "occupational grouping 
may be among the most influential on taxpayer compliance". It is believed that this is due 
to the fact that firms in the same sector are liable to divide up information and share 
beliefs about tax issue (Stalans et al., 1991) and have comparable educational 
qualifications and thus belong to the same social class. On the other hand, it is argued that 
 139 
small firms or the self-employed evade more because they have comparable opportunities 
to evade and are very likely to be in a similar financial situation (see e.g, Aitken and 
Bonneville, 1980, Groenland and Voldhoven, 1983; Hasseldine and Bebbington, 1991; 
and Houston and Tran, 2001).  
 
It may be said that in addition to the EF, a wide range of social, legal and administrative 
institutions has been found to have an impact on the problem of tax evasion. Therefore, 
improving revenue collection in developing countries requires careful design set up and 
implementation by these institutions (Fuest and Riedel, 2009). Figure 4.3 below 
illustrates the relationships between the research variables. 
 







































It should be noted that in the proposed model, the Basic Economic Model variables; the 
tax rate, the probability of detection, and the fine rate are based on Allingham and 
Sandmo’s (1972) study. The extensions and modifications of the Basic Economic Model 
by including more economic variables where drawn, are from Yaniv, (1994) and Awad, 
et al, (1998) unemployment rate labour-cost reduction is derived from Mcgillivary, 
(2001). Lack of money is taken from Ritsemaet al, (2003) and Strban (2007). The role of 
paid accountants is derived from Reinganum and Wilde, (1991), Beck et al, (1994) and 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001). 
 
The analyses of the role of  NEFs which considerably influence and determine the SSCE 
problem are namely: the impact of the effectiveness of tax agency and its administration, 
the legal and regulatory structure, and ethical and social considerations are taken from a 
range of factors as outlined and discussed in different studies such as: Cowell, 1990; 
Turner, 1991; Cowell 1992,  Alm, 1999 ; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Krause 2000; 
Shavell 2000; McGillivray 2001; Wenzel 2002; Gërxhani, 2003; Alm and Torgler 2006; 
Dreher and Schneider 2006; Kelchev 2006; Richardson, 2006; Torgler and Schneider 
2007; Bahl and Bird, 2008; Everest-Phillips 2008; Chris Georges, 2009.  The next section 
provides more details about each factor. 
 
4.4. Setting up the hypothesis: 
 
 
Guided by the results of the literature review, two groups of fundamental hypotheses 
were developed to examine the objective of this study so as to determine the degree and 
the direction of the relationship between the Jordanian Social Security contribution 
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evasion (SSCE) and the multiple variables which may induce contribution evasion. These 
include EF such as contribution rate and fine rate; CME in such areas as the lack of 
coordination between the JSSC and other governmental bodies and the level of 
knowledge and information provided by the JSSC. This is in addition to LRS such as the 
degree of scheme suitability to the Jordanian economic situation and the linkage level 
between SSS contributions and benefits. Also, there are the factors of ESC such as 
whether contribution evasion generates anxiety and guilt or whether perpetrators feel 
their actions are morally wrong. Secondly, there is an examination of the influence of 
some firm’s characteristics (firm’s sector, size and ownership) on the relationship 
between research independent factors and the contribution evasion problem. 
 
Therefore, the following two general hypotheses can be formulated and tested. 
 
Firstly: there is a significant relationship between independent factors and dependent 
variables   
 
Secondly: there are statistical differences in the level of importance placed on the 
ranking of independent factors among these firms’ characteristics with respect to the 
contribution evasion problem. 
 
4.4.1. Factors and variables which may induce contribution evasion –  
 
- Economic factors. 
 
Tax compliance literature stresses the importance of Basic Economic Model factors such 
as the tax rate, the audit probability and the fine rates as well as other economic factors 
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such as labour cost, lack of money and levels of unemployment rates on the contribution 
evasion problem (e.g. Slemrod et al. 2001; Alm et al., 2004; Sandmo, 2004; and 
Hasseldine et al, 2007).  
 
The analysis of empirical evidence on the basic economic model variables indicates that 
there is a strong positive relationship between higher audit rates and tax compliance. 
Allingham and Sandmo (19720, Witte and Woodbury (1985), Dubin and Wilde, (1988) 
Sheffrin and Triest (1992); and Blackwell, (2002) all found that evasion decreases with a 
greater (perceived) probability of audit. 
 
In relation to penalty rate changes, many studies such as Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
Alm, et al, (1992a, 1992b) and Blackwell, (2002) found that an increase in the fine rate 
leads to more tax compliance.  
 
Regarding the tax rate, most empirical evidence reports that a higher tax rate generally 
leads to more tax evasion. Johnson et al. (1998), Christie and Holzner, (2006); Schneider, 
(2007) and Kumarasingam, (2010) all found that high rates of tax on labour may 
discourage people from working and so result in lower tax revenue than there would be if 
the tax rate were lower. 
 
Presumably, an increase in the tax rate may raise contribution evasion, but the 
consequence of a change in the tax rate is however inconsistent (Kelchev, 2006).  
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However, other studies did not get the same result, meaning no significant critical impact 
of level of tax rates on tax evasion were found (Webley et al. (1991) and Feinstein, 
(1991). However, the theoretical economic model of compliance generally suggests that a 
higher tax rate will lead to higher tax evasion. 
 
In summary, empirical studies demonstrate that the direction of the change in tax evasion 
as a response to different deterrence variables is not always consistent. However, results 
have a tendency to suggest that higher audit rates and fine rates reduce tax evasion and 
tax compliance is decreasing function of the tax rate. 
 
Nevertheless, the likelihood of being detected as non-compliant within the social security 
tax scheme is also reliant upon factors other than traditional economic policy. One of the 
most important factors to an employee reporting employer non-compliance is the 
unemployment rate and the likelihood of the employee finding alternative employment if 
they lose their job as a result. Empirical results supported this, for example, Cowell, 
(1981), Yaniv, (1994) and Awad, et al, (1998) indicate that employees would decide to 
complain to the authorities about being paid as long as they have a chance to get another 
job. 
 
In addition, in social security schemes; there is an incentive for an employer not to 
contribute in order to reduce labour costs as well as the temporary financial hardship may 
cause contribution evasion (Mcgillivary, 2001). 
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Ritsema, et al, (2003) emphasised that lack of money often motivates the search for an 
opportunity to commit a crime and the lack of money at the time taxes were due was the 
main factor in the decision to evade. Therefore, the taxpayers’ tendency to evade will be 
greater in the case of economic strain where the taxpayer’s expenses are higher than their 
revenue.  
 
Although, the relationships between uses of accountants and influence of such usage on 
the tax evasion problem has been analysed. Relevant findings from the literature propose 
that many accountants display aggressive behaviour against the tax authorities, helping 
taxpayers in avoidance and non-compliance McGill (1988), Klepper and Nagin, (1989b), 
Scotchmer (1989), Reinganum and Wilde (1991) Erard (1993), Beck, (1994) and Sakurai 
and Braithwaite, (2001) all demonstrated that the average level of taxpayer evaders is 
higher for those who used paid assistance.  
 
In general, the following sub hypothesis would be tested regarding the factors and 
variables which may induce contribution evasion: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between economic factors and the contribution 
evasion problem. 
 
- The JSSC management effectiveness.   
One of the main contentions of this study is that the inefficiency of tax agency 
administrations’ performance is the main contributing factor to tax evasion. Therefore, 
satisfaction with social security administration performance can augment cooperation to 
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maintain the psychological contract between the SSS administration and contributors 
(Torgler; 2003). Consequently, satisfaction can only be created and sustained if the 
authority commitment corresponds with needs of its citizens and their hopes and desires. 
Hardin (1998) and Torgler (2003) found that a higher degree of trust in the administration 
to a markedly higher tax compliance figure. 
 
As discussed in the literature, several studies particularly in the USA and other developed 
countries revealed many examples about the influence of institutional and legal aspect on 
tax evasion. Friedman et al. (1999) found a positive relationship between the portion of 
the black economy and the ineffective institution is strong and consistent. Vogel (1974); 
and Kelchev, (2006) found significant relationship between inefficient tax 
administrations (particularly inefficient tax collection system) and inefficient tax policy 
in combating tax evasion. 
  
Many researchers emphasise the influence of the institutional environment on the control 
of positive and negative reciprocity is a most important issue. They revealed positive 
correlations between perceptions of fiscal inequity and evasion (Spicer 1974; Song and 
Yarbrough 1978; Walster, 1978; Cowell and Gordon, 1988; Smith and Stalans, 1991; 
Cowell, 1992). In addition, Smith (1992); and Feld and Frey (2002) found that positive 
motivational influence taxpayer’s behaviour towards tax compliance as a result of 
procedural fairness.   
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Some other economics researchers have taken into account the aspects of institutional 
corruption. Rose-Ackerman, (1997); Kasper and Streit, (1999); Levin and Satarov, 
(2000); Polinsky and Shavell; (2000) and Kelchev, (2006), reported that in order to 
control the tax evasion problem; strong institutional controls and accountability are 
required and the law and rules should be efficient and equally enforced by the tax 
authority. They found that high levels of corruption increases the taxpayer’s willingness 
to evade taxes.  
 
Additionally, lack of coordination between tax authority and other governmental bodies 
is going to increase tax evasion. Alm, et al, (1996) suggest that information sharing could 
thus decrease tax evasion so as to increase agency revenues. 
 
The literature indicated the significance of education and information in the process of 
opinion formation, a deeper knowledge of the benefits provided by SSC and of the 
technical reasons for SS laws and regulations is critical before assuming a positive and 
appropriate behaviour toward the SSC. 
 
Vogel, (1974); and Lewis (1982) revealed that, people generally require more efficient 
tax structure information than that provided by the existence tax system. They added that, 
educated taxpayers could also be more knowledgeable of possible government 
inefficiencies and may be less compliant because they more aware of the opportunities to 
evade. Their result showed that the level of education correlates negatively with attitudes 
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favourable to tax evasion. On the other hand, Witte and Woodbury (1985) found evasion 
is lower with those who are better educated taxpayers.  
 
Moreover,  it is important to examine to which extent the awareness of tax issues has an 
impact on tax evasion because it is very important for firms to be aware that their evasion 
might damage the welfare of the society (Spicer 1986). The decision to evade is 
constrained by their awareness that evasion will decrease the amount of resources 
available for social welfare. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between the 
extents of awareness of SS scheme and compliance.  
 
Furthermore, several studies attempted to analyse the influence of developing 
computerised SSS decision support systems to enhance taxpayer compliance behaviour. 
(Das-Gupta and Mookherjee, 1995; and Masselli et al, 2000) reported that taxpayers who 
are shown computerisation reported significantly more compliance than taxpayers 
without. They argue that taxpayer’s with minimum level of information will be probably 
confident more of decision assistance as a consequence of a lack of knowledge. In 
addition, their result shows that modern information systems could enhance tax 
compliance by identifying more potential taxpayers.  
 
In general, the following sub hypothesis would be tested regarding the factors and 
variables which may induce contribution evasion: 
H2: There is a significant relationship between firms’ satisfaction with the Corporation 
management effectiveness and contribution evasion. 
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- The JSSS legal and regulatory structure 
As mentioned in chapter three, inappropriate SS scheme and limited SS provision could 
enhance the incentives to rationalise cheating. Several studies reported positive and 
significant relationship between tax evasion and general perceived justice and inequities 
in tax systems such as a lack of linkage between contributions and benefits (Spicer 1974; 
Spicer and Becker 1980; Smith, 1992; Tyler and Smith 1998 and Kelchev, 2006).  
 
Regarding the Social Security tax evasion; Mcgillivary (2001) found significant 
correlation between unsuitable provisions of the social security pension schemes and SS 
tax evasion. Some of the schemes could be manipulated by the participants to acquire full 
advantages of the expected pensions and minimise contributions which may lead to 
increase SS contribution evasion. 
 
In the light of tax complexity (Smith, 1992; Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992; Alm et al, 
1993; 1999; and Krause, 2000) indicate that complexity considerably reduces the 
perceived procedural fairness and enhance tax evasion. Furthermore, taxpayers believe 
that simplifying the entire tax collection system is the most efficient way to enhance 
collecting tax revenue. Conversely, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) did not find a systematic 
relationship between perception of complexity and perception of injustice. 
 
Survey finding of Vogel (1974) described that the vast majority of taxpayer’s evaders 
demonstrated that the major force of tax evasion is a lack of the public feel of justice in 
the tax system. Similarly, survey findings of Yankelovich, (1984) indicated that the 
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Internal Revenue Service may face credibility and perceived faithfulness problems and 
tax evasion is a result of complicated and unfair tax system.  
 
Furthermore, Falkinger (1995) supported that if the socioeconomic scheme is considered 
to be fairly equal and in conformity with the rules or laws and without fraud or cheating 
fair, taxpayers reduce evasion.  
 
In general, firms may attempt to evade if they have lack of confidence in the SSS, for 
example if the sustainability, legitimacy and equity of the scheme are being challenged. 
Trust and satisfaction can only be produced if the authority’s commitment agrees to 
adjust the output of tax system services to people’s needs (Pommerehne, et al, 1994; 
Hardin, 1998; and Torgler, 2001; 2003). 
 
In this light, the following sub hypothesis is going to be tested regarding the factors and 
variables which may induce contribution evasion: 
H3: There is a significant relationship between contribution evasion and the 
assessment of the Jordanian Social Security Law and its consequent regulations. 
 
- Social variables and moral considerations: 
Since the commitment of paying taxes is an accepted social norm, it is reasonable that 
people who would not pay their taxes will feel guilty. 
Despite of that, researchers have found more than one possible meaning for the influence 
of social norms on tax evasion problem. Song and Yarbrough, (1978); Jackson and 
Milliron (1986); Alm, et al (1999); Sigala, (2000); and Wenzel, (2002) confirmed that 
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social norms of tax compliance affect the way people behave towards tax system. 
Generally, taxpayers' attitudes about tax evasion were significantly connected with their 
perceptions of the dominance of tax evasion among other taxpayers. Moreover, Scholz 
and Pinney (1995); and Knack and Keefer (1997) found a strong positive relationship 
between social capital variables and economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, Grasmick and Bursik’s (1990) reported that, feelings of guilt have 
influenced tax compliance but argued social disapproval does not because of the private 
nature of taxpaying. Conversely, Hasseldine and Kaplan’s (1992) findings specify that 
feelings of shame affect tax compliance decisions behaviour but feelings of guilt did not. 
Thus, more research and empirical evidence is needed regarding impact of social norms 
on contribution evasion.  
 
In addition, several studies in developed countries examined the effect of morality on 
contribution evasion. In general, research supports a positive relationship between a high 
sense of morality and tax compliance (Lewis, 1982; Kaplan and Reckers, 1985; and Erard 
and Feinstein 1994; Sigala, 2000). 
 
Taxpayer moral may or may not deal with the law and requirements of an authority, and 
which leads to resistance to the law and to legal authority instead of compliance (Tyler, 
1990). Different social norms and ethical values create different incentives for tax 
compliance. In fact, ethical values influenced by social norms may prevent taxpayers 
from engaging in tax evasion (Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008).  
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In general, the following sub hypothesis would be tested regarding the factors and 
variables which may induce contribution evasion: 
H4: There is a significant relationship between social influence, moral considerations 
and contribution evasion. 
 
4.4.2. How far some firms’ characteristics (firm industry type, size and ownership) 
influence the relationship between independent factors and contribution evasion. 
 
Several studies stress the relevance of some firms’ characteristics (firm sector, size and 
ownership) on tax evasion (Roth et al. 1989; Stalans et al., 1991; Hasseldine and 
Bebbington, 1991; and Gërxhani 2002). For example, Gërxhani (2002) find out that 
“people who work in their own business or who doing any other work without labour 
contract are hypothesised to evade more. Conversely, individuals who work in the state 
sector or in the private sector (with labour contract) will evade less”.  
 
Hart (1973) has argued hypothetically that self-employed taxpayer’s is the major cause of 
evasion due to their freedom in reporting their different kinds of income. Similarly, 
Feldman and Slemrod (2007) revealed the fact that “the propensity to make a 
contribution is higher out of self-employment income than out of wages and salaries”. 
 
Franicevic (1997); Johnson et al. (1999); and Kelchev, (2006) reported that smaller firms 
have the ability to evade more; because these firms are exposed to a lower probability of 
being monitored. In addition, Mironov (2006) confirmed that, small and medium firms 
evade about 40% more than large firms. Hence, the proportion of evasion will be higher 
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for small firms than for large ones. This is related to the financial problems characterising 
a small firm especially in developing country as well as other reasons mentioned above.         
Therefore, the following sub hypothesis regarding about the influence of these 
characteristics on Social Security contribution evasion will be tested.  
 
H5: There are no statistical differences in the level of importance placed on the 
ranking of independent factors among a firm’s occupational sector with respect to the 
contribution evasion problem.  
H6: There are no statistical differences in the level of importance placed on the 
ranking of independent factors among a firm’s ownership with respect to the 
contribution evasion problem. 
H7: There are no statistical differences in the levels of importance placed on the 
ranking of independent factors among firms’ size with respect to the contribution 
evasion problem. 
 
4.5 Methodology of Sampling Techniques and Choice 
 
Baker, (2002) stated that “The sample frame for the survey represents the population of 
eligible organisations. Where the sampling frame is a defined population from which the 
sample is to be drawn and so must be accurate, adequate, up to date and relevant to the 
purposes of the survey for which it is to be used”.  
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In this study, the sample frame list will be supplemented by asking Inspection 
Departments within JSSC to supply the names, sectors, locations and telephone numbers 
of firms who have evaded in the past. The list will be unified, edited and numbered and 
Excel software will be used to create a sampling table of 350 firms from the total list of 
2264 which covers Amman, the capital of Jordan. According to Marsland, et al (1998), 
this kind of process is found to be useful for three main reasons “First, it will serve as an 
initial ice-breaker, allowing the researcher to interact with members of the firms. 
Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, it will provide a very rapid and accurate way of 
generating a comprehensive sampling frame for selected firms. Finally, the existence of 
an accurate official list will help greatly in planning the actual enumeration”.  
 
The survey encompasses nine economic sectors such as financial institutions, industrial 
companies, real-estate and construction firms. The aim of the survey is to construct as 
extensive a sampling frame as possible.  
 
In addition, the researcher has to decide which sample unit is to be selected when 
conducting any survey. For that reason, there is a particular problem regarding whom to 
interview (Hoinville and Jowell, 1978). However, the selection of the appropriate unit of 
analysis will result from accurately specifying the primary research questions (Yin, 
1994). This varies according to different types of contribution evasion, the questions of 
this survey will be addressed to the head of firm, financial manager and personnel 
manager; this choice of those as the sampling unit is likely to be the preferred choice in 
the light of the researcher’s experience.  
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Given a sampling frame, and having defined the sampling unit, the next step is to 
determine the most cost-effective way of selecting specific sampling units from the 
sampling frame. Basically, the choice rests between probabilities and non-probability 
based research design and objectives. 
 
 




Source:  Saunders et al. (2000) 
 
In this study, a stratified random probability sample was chosen from the target 
population, which contains all firms in the city of Amman, from 2003 until 2008, and 
from those who were evaders and are currently participating in the JSSC project. Both 
private and certain areas of the public sector (2264firms) will then be organised into 
groups or strata according to the criteria characteristics (nine economic sectors).In 
addition, proportionate sampling will be taken, where the number of groups selected for 
the sample reflects the relative numbers in the population as a whole and after that a 
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simple random sample will be drawn from each stratum by using readily available 
computer programs. 
 
Generally, stratification is simply the process of dividing the population according to 
factors that are correlated with the area under study. The only requirement for 
stratification is that each item in the population must fall into one and only one stratum. 
Efficiency is acquired through stratification by creating relatively homogeneous strata. 
The greater the correlation between the stratifying variable and the factor under study, the 
more efficient stratified sampling will be (Baker, 2002).  
 
The advantage of choice stratified random sampling methods against simple random 
sampling is the ability to study large numbers, which leads to more precise results that are 
more likely to be free of bias, in particular when the conditions below are met. First, the 
sampling frame must be precise, detailed and deal with the full target population. 
Secondly, field workers must do well to contact and interview all those selected (Nichols, 
1991)  
 
The researcher will take great pains to take a careful look at two closely related factors. 
Firstly, the researcher will be certain that the sample range will be sufficiently large to 
provide adequate depiction of any subpopulations of interest. Secondly, the sample size 
should be informed by the level of saturation required to achieve targets in order to 
enhance the generalisability” (Baker, 2002). 
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Essentially, the sample size will be 350 firms or 13.5% of the former evader firms in 
Amman. This size is determined by using the table in Salant and Dillman (1994) which 
provides, “final sample sizes needed for various population sizes and characteristics, at 
three levels of precision”. According to Hair et al., (1998) “general requirement of 
multiple regressions, it is generally common to find that a minimum of 100 observations 
should be available to use this technique”. As such, the number of observations in this 
study is 350, so the number of observations in this study more than fulfils the requirement 
of the multiple regression technique. 
 
Limited time, lack of financial resources and the delivered method of the questionnaire 
conditioned the choice to that of only one city. The motivation behind the choice of 
Amman lies in the fact that Amman is the largest city in Jordan (where 66 % of former 
firm evaders in the whole of Jordan existed between 2003 and 2008, and it is the most 
important in terms of political, economic and cultural status.  
 
4.6 The choice of a survey methodology 
 
In light of the importance to its contribution to the evasion problem, choosing a suitable 
means of acquiring data will be a very thorny task. It is clear that the observation method 
is not applicable only because the study of contribution evasion does not necessarily 
require the observation of interaction between firms and the JSSC with respect to their 
behaviour. The interview may be fitting but its main deficit is a lack of secrecy, as 
ensuring anonymity is a vitally significant step for collecting consistent statistics on 
sensitive matters related to the study of contribution evasion.  
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Thus, the main instrument used in this study will be the survey which allows the study of 
contribution evasion as a dependent variable and to determine and explain the main 
reasons that shape the contribution evasion problem. Tull and Albaum (1973) stated that 
surveys are concerned with understanding or predicting behaviour and defined that: 
“Survey research is the systematic gathering of information from (a sample of) 
respondents for the purpose of understanding and/or predicting some aspect of the 
behaviour of the population of interest” Baker (2001). 
 
According to Gërxhani (2002), “empirical research has shown that if the goal of a study 
on tax evasion is to gain such insights, survey research is the best method available”. One 
of the advantages of a survey is its ability to provide detailed information (socio-
economic, demographic and attitudinal variables) on the dynamics behind contribution 
evasion (Andreoni et al. 1998; Schneider and Enste, 2003). 
 
In pre-industrial countries, surveys are typically the sole method of obtaining data about 
contribution evasion (Hanousek and Palda, 2003). According to Tindigarukayo (2001) 
sample surveys carried out in first world countries diverge significantly from those in less 
developed countries. In these less developed countries, most people prefer not to 
collaborate with researchers looking to them to complete a questionnaire especially on 
such sensitive matters such as contribution evasion (e.g. Schneider, 2007). In addition, 
these countries are often characterised by an amount of unreliable data (e.g., because of 
scarce national statistics), therefore, researchers have to look at the details of how the 
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data was collected and the precise wording and phrasing of questions and sample design 
(Filer and Hanousek, 2002).  
 
Surveys can be criticised by the fact that studies can be biased if they do not represent the 
population accurately. A high answer rate is consequently indispensable. In addition, a 
dependable survey tool is one that is moderately free of measurement inaccuracy. For that 
reason, lowering the chance of receiving deceitful answers is vital which means that more 
concentration should be given towards two particular emphases on research design: 
consistency and validity (Saunders et al., 2000).   
 
Consequently, most of the potential deficiencies in the design of a survey tool should be 
avoided by “careful proof-reading followed by a full pilot study” (Gorard, 2001). 
 
The most difficult task for any researcher who would like to investigate the contribution 
evasion problem is to persuade evaders to admit to their actual contributing behaviour. 
Kazemier and van Eck, (1992) showed two approaches that overcame this difficulty: the 
direct approach and the gradual approach. The direct approach requires taxpayers to be 
asked in a straight line about their behaviour toward evading. The main difficulty is latent 
deceitfulness and for this reason low levels of responses or fraudulent responses. On the 
other hand, the gradual approach set up sensitive questions by surrounding them with 
related non-sensitive questions. This data is often judged as an indirect signal of the 
respondents’ contributing conduct. In addition, the manner of formulating the questions 
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to amass information on such a sensitive topic can play a central role (Kazemier and van 
Eck, 1992; Schneider and Enste, 2000).  
 
In this thesis the gradual approach will be chosen for its ability to provide a possible 
solution to prevail over the problem of contribution evasion through the collecting of data 
by asking questions from which the respondent’s input towards evasion can be judged. 
By adding together a diversity of indirect questions in the study and encouraging 
contributors to declare their beliefs as those of someone who is in one line of work, 
participants are encouraged to announce open and truthful answers about the contribution 
evasion problem so as to develop the reliability of the information collected. 
 
The main determinant which is likely to affect the likelihood of truthfulness in the 
response rate, speed, cost, sample size and length of a questionnaire is how the researcher 
aims to deliver it to the research sample. There are many choices, but the most common 
choices are between face-to-face, self-administered, and technology-based.  
 
Based on the nature of the problem and the context of Jordanian culture, the self-
administered questionnaire would be the most suitable method to capture the contribution 
evasion in this study. 
 
The main advantages of the ‘self-administered questionnaire’ include: “a high response 
rate, hence a minimised self-selection bias; a minimisation of the interviewer’s bias; a 
higher quality of data” (Oppenheim, 1992). This can help by building an atmosphere of 
trust so as to obtain more truthful answers. This kind of method is also easier if the 
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questions come in the form of an ordinal scale response. The main disadvantage for this 
form of delivery is the length of time it takes (Gorard 2001). 
 
In this study, the questionnaires were designed mainly on the basis of key variables 
identified from the existing literature (a standardised questionnaire) and a few questions 
developed by the researcher (See appendix 4.1). The main advantage in using 
standardised questionnaires is its reliability (McClelland 1994). 
 
With regard to the dependability of the questionnaire participants, it is essential that the 
right people are invited to participate. This means, that the participants who will be 
questioned are those most knowledgeable within the firms selected. On the other hand, 
the researcher will ask questions that are do not lead the participants into taking part and 
do not influence the person who is questioned as much as it is possible to ensure.  
 
The questionnaire has an official cover letter addressed to the respondents by the 
Associated Dean (Postgraduate) of the Faculty of Business, Environment, and Society 
/Coventry University. Such an introduction letter increases the probability of the 
questionnaire being taken seriously by those targeted. It is also there to explain the 
purpose and importance of the study and to express that the main object of the study is 
purely scientific and respects the privacy and confidentiality of its participants. The 
meaning of contribution evasion is also explained, as well as the approximate time it 
takes to answer and to collect, and why their help is needed, how to return the completed 
form (even if incomplete), and finally, a phone number in case the respondents have any 
questions. 
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A question is addressed at the head of the first page of the questionnaire about the 
respondent’s role in the firm in order to ensure the researcher is addressing the right 
person. Information is given by respondents in response to two different sets of questions 
which are to be used to reflect the respondents' attitude toward the contribution evasion 
problem.  
 
The researcher constructed a survey designed to understand, firstly, the influence of the 
four factors previously hypothesised to be the main reasons for contribution evasion. 
Based on the literature review, the researcher identified (1) EF, (2) CME, (3) LRS, and, 
(4) ESC as the four key dimensions of CE. The analysis is dependent on asking questions 
aimed at accessing data about each of these four dimensions. Secondly, examine the 
relationship between contribution evasion and some of the firms’ background 
information. The questionnaires have been created using 39 questions that have been 
deemed valid. The scale will be closed-ended and reliant upon a Likert-type scale where 
participants have five response choices. Gorard, (2001) stated that, “I recommend a 
questionnaire of eight pages maximum, or preferably less for self-administered 
instruments. Or looked at another way, do not go much above 100 separate questions”. 
 
A total of 350 questionnaires will personally be distributed by the researcher and 
completed questionnaires will be collected at a later date at an agreed time. This ensures a 
higher response rate than a postal survey; Babbie (1998) states that “a response rate of 
50% is adequate for analysis and reporting, 60% is good and 70% is very good”. The 
researcher will be able to respond personally to any questions, comments and concerns of 
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participants at the time of collection. In general, there is more sensitivity around methods 
of contact in Jordan and they do not have enough experience in responding to sensitive 
questions. Therefore, the selection of a suitable research instrument is a very important 
issue and thus the distribution was done on a personal level.  
 
It is worth noting that, the questionnaire for this study has a two-stage pre-testing 
procedure. First:  the questionnaire was read carefully by experts and peers in face-to-
face interviews with them. The researcher then asked for comments and criticisms.  More 
consideration was given towards respondents’ questions that were hesitant or did not 
understand. Moving ahead, the full pilot study was carried out testing the draft 
questionnaire with a small number of participants before conducting the main study. This 
helped to secure suitable and reliable responses. 
 
Finally, the technique of back-translation was used because the researcher was working 
in one language (English) and translating the questionnaire into another language 
(Arabic). Then, the translated questionnaire is translated back into the original language 
by a third person so as to test out the preservation of the original meaning (Gorard, 2001). 
 
4.7 Pilot study 
 
The main aspect of this study was concerned with collecting information and attitudes 
towards developing a fuller understanding of the main determinants of SSCE within the 
Kingdom of Jordan. Therefore, the multifaceted design approach needs first a preliminary 
pilot study to be undertaken to enable a better questionnaire to be prepared and tested that 
 163 
includes the most important factors and variables to determine and explain  the 
contribution evasion problem and avoid any loaded questions.  
 
The development of this questionnaire relied on an extensive review of tax evasion 
literature in general and on SSCE in particular, preliminary interviews and via the 
researcher’ own experience of working with the JSSC. 
 
The following sections describe the pilot study’s purposes, the participants, the 
procedures followed, the results, and the limitations. 
 
4.7.1 Rationale for the Pilot study 
 
Conducting a pilot study is considered to be an important procedure because "following 
responses given can identify any misunderstandings, vague or incomprehensible 
questions" (De Vaus, 1991).    
 
According to Yin (1994), the pilot study, “Helps investigators to refine their data 
collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be 
followed”. Therefore, this kind of study provides information about the clarity of 
questions, response rate, identifies any specific methodological problems; uncovers 
specific variable techniques and procedures for coping with them.  This helps get better 
questions and instructions that may be constructed as confusing before delivering the 
final survey to the sample participants. Gërxhani (2002) confirmed that "the ultimate goal 
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of the pilot study is to validate the questions and to check that respondents understood 
what was being asked in order to give reliable answers".  
 
Without paying enough attention at this stage, the researcher is likely to either collect too 
much information or to discover later that key pieces of information are missing. Hence, 
a questionnaire that has not been appropriately pre-tested often turns out to have severe 
problems when used in the field. As a result, the design of the study needs to be modified 
in many aspects. 
 
4.7.2 Selection of Pilot Study Participants  
 
There is no general agreement upon sample size for a pilot test, although between 12 and 
30 subject is generally recommended (Hunt et al, 1982). Hence, the sample for this pilot 
study consisted of fifteen firms allocated in Amman (the capital of Jordan) selected 
through purposive sampling (A purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method 
used to choose a sample element for a specific purpose). This helped in the selection of 
the more qualified experts so as to give the best feedback about the contents of the 
questionnaires and research procedures.  
 
The pilot test questionnaire was distributed to three general director managers, six 
company financial managers, four companies’ human resource managers, and two chief 
personnel officers. They all had good qualifications and most of them have many years of 
experience of working in the JSSC. In addition, it was ensured that the key economic 
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sectors are encompassed. The pilot study sample included: seven firms in construction; 
three firms in services; four firms in manufacturing and one firm in the ‘other’ category, 
which represents to some extent, the proportion of these firms amongst sector research 
samples.  
 
Pilot study firms were selected from listings, supplemented by asking the Inspection 
Department at JSSC to supply names of firms who were former evaders and currently 
participating in JSSC. 
 
4.7.3 Method of delivery (Pilot Study Procedures) 
 
A pilot study was conducted by the researcher from mid December 2005 to mid February 
2006 with a small number of evaded firms, to test a five-page questionnaire which had 
been developed and tested with a pilot sample before conducting the main study. The 
researcher tested the survey on the same kind of firms who will be included in the main 
study. 
 
The pilot questionnaire contains several statements aimed to simulate the same 
experience a survey respondent had when they evaded their contributions. These 
statements cover various issues are expected to be correlated with contribution evasion.  
 
Close-ended questions have been used, where each question permits for all possible 
responses, but without overlap (Gorard, 2001). Although, ordinal scales such as 'strongly 
agree' to 'strongly disagree’, have been used.   
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The questionnaires were delivered to each respondent personally, together with the 
covering letter which emphasizes that each questionnaire should be adequately completed 
and would be collected again by the researcher. 
 
The method has been chosen was the ‘self-administered questionnaire’, which seemed to 
be the most appropriate method in terms of culture context, logistic, financial and 
methodological aspects.   
 
The main challenge for the researcher trying to investigate the contribution evasion 
problem is to convince evaders to admit to their real evasive behaviour. Therefore, the 
researcher attempted to explore ways to combat this problem by conducting the pilot 
study (as discussed in more details in data collection method and procedures).  The 
present study will assure people of confidentiality and anonymity. Both questionnaires 
were in English and Arabic to help respondents who might not be proficient in English. 
 
4.7.4 Result Interpretation and modifications 
 
The questionnaire contained statements to identify factors and variables which may 
induce contribution evasion and general information about the firms being investigated. 
Furthermore, respondents were instructed to write their comments at the end of each 
questionnaire. The result provided the researcher with a preliminary indication of the 
importance of EF, LRS, CME, and ESC pertinent in determining JSSCE behaviour.  
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The pilot studies were conducted before the selection of the final data collection-and 
prior to the final study’s theoretical propositions. Thus the pilot data provided 
considerable insight into the basic issues being studied. This information was used 
simultaneously with an ongoing revision of related literature, so that the ultimate study 
design was informed both by prevailing theories and by a fresh set of empirical 
observations. The dual sources of information helped to ensure that the study to be made 
reflected important theoretical or policy issues as well as questions related to the current 
study (Yin, 1994). 
 
The valuable comments and feedback of returned questionnaires proved to be very 
useful. Some of the improvements and the amendments entailed: four questions being 
redesigned in a way that made them more applicable to Jordan; minor reworking to 
clarify three other questions; the exclusion of a thirteen questions as it was deemed to 
repeat a previous question or proved to be inappropriate; another question was 
reallocated; two questions were added referring to the overall experience, but especially 
with regard to personal contacts. 
 
The pilot study gave some indications of the amount of time needed to complete the 
sample, which was around 20 minutes per questionnaire and the response rate was 80 %, 
which means that 12 out of 15 firms returned their completed questionnaires. This high 
response rate is an indication that, distributing the questionnaire by the researcher 
personally may overcome response rate problem. 
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4.7.5 Pilot study limitations 
 
In developing countries like Jordan, people have a tendency not to cooperate with 
someone asking them to fill out a questionnaire, especially, when it based on their 
personal experiences. It is linked to a social environment with a general lack of trust in 
others, especially government representatives. Generally, Jordanians have no experience 
in responding to sensitive issues such as contribution evasion. Therefore, careful 
selection of an appropriate research instrument and making a personal contact are very 
important factors.  
 
The pilot study concluded that in order to conduct a successful field survey on sensitive 
issues like contribution evasion in such countries similar to Jordan, country specific 
institutional and cultural features must be taken into account. 
 
4.8 Statistical Techniques  
 
The main objective of statistical analysis is to identify empirical relationships that related 
to the original questions. Statistics assist the evaluator to determine 1) whether a 
relationship between two variables exists, 2) whether other variables are also involved in 
the observed relationship between two variables, and 3) the relative “strength” of the 
observed relationship (Alexander & Austin (1992). 
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In this study the variables will be classified into both dependent and independent 
variables demonstrating causal relationships between them. In this relationship, 
contribution evasion is examined as a dependent variables influenced by four main 
independent factors which may explain the JSSCE problem. 
 
Before commencing with the analysis of statistics, it is essential to present the research 
requirements of the data analysis. This covers the determination of the statistical tools, as 
well as their reliability and validity, and the level of confidence (95%) (Alexander and 
Austin, 1992).  
 
One of the statistical techniques to be used in this study is PCA. This analysis aims to 
classify underlying factors that explain the pattern of correlation within a set of observed 
variables. This is called the data reduction procedure, which means identifying a small 
number of factors that explain most of the variance observed in a larger number of 
existing variables (Nie et al., 1975). As a result, our PCA will reduce the selected 
attitudinal variables in the number of main groupings. By carefully considering the 
statements combined in the same factor, the researcher will be able to interpret the 
underlying common attitude. 
 
In addition, the main statistical method to be used in this thesis is a standard multiple 
regression because the dependent variable is an interval measurement and the 
independent variables are not interrelated with each other (as it was proved later). The 
purpose of multiple regression analysis is to inform the researcher how much of the 
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variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables. It also 
offers a suggestion of the qualified input of each independent variable. Tests allow the 
determination of the statistical importance of the results both in terms of the model itself, 
and the individual independent variables (Pallant, 2005). Generally, in selecting suitable 
applications of multiple regression, the researcher must consider three primary issues: (1) 
the appropriateness of the research problem, (2) specification of a statistical relationship, 
and (3) selection of the dependent and independent variables (Hair et al 2003). 
 
Two frequent multivariate regression statistics are used.  They are the base regression 
model and a supplementary regression model. (As will be shown in more details later in 
chapter 7) They seek empirical evidence between dependent and independent variables. 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) indicate that compliance variables appear to be highly 
correlated. This means multivariate rather than univariate testing will be appropriate. 
Multivariate analysis refers to all statistical methods that simultaneously analyse multiple 
measurements on each individual or object under investigation.  
 
All the multivariate methods, except for cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling, 
are formed on the statistical supposition of a population's values or relationships between 
variables from a randomly picked section of that population. The purpose of multivariate 
analysis is to calculate, explain, and predict the level of relationship among variates (a 
linear combination of variables with empirically determined weights) (Hair, et al, 2003). 
 
The variables (statements) will be grouped in factors and subjected to reliability analysis. 
The model applied was Alpha (Cronbach), which provides a coefficient between 0 and 1, 
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estimating the internal consistency among the variables in each group. The closer the 
alpha to 1.0, the better the internal consistency of items tested (Shelton 2002). 
 
The primary worry when validating the results is to make certain that the results are 
generalisable to the population and not particular to the sample used in evaluation. The 
most direct method in validation is to get hold of another example from the population 
and calculate the connection of the results from the two samples. In the deficiency of an 
additional sample, the researcher can assess the soundness of the results through several 
approaches. For the intention of this thesis, the researcher examined the adjusted R
2
 
value. In this situation, the adjusted R
2
 value is comparable with an R
2
 value (the adjusted 
R2 value is .733 as compared with an R
2
 value of .741 (see chapter seven). This indicates 
that the estimated model maintains an adequate ratio of observation to variable in the 
variate (Hair et al 2003). 
 
When assessing the reality of a relationship, statisticians have worked out standards that 
are frequently referred to as confidence levels. This means that the relationship is very 
unlikely to have happened by chance or error. Should the assessor repeat the study 100 
times, one should observe the same occurrence 95 times. This standard of significance 
also shares the acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis allows 
that there is no relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In this 
thesis, statistical importance is 95% under an error rate of 5%. If the Sig is less than 5%, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. 95% is often 






This chapter demonstrated the research philosophy, methods, approaches, strategies, 
research method selection and data availability used in this study. Initially, research 
design is explanatory where the reason for carrying out the explanatory research is to 
discover cause/effect relationships between particular variables, (Saunderset al, 2000) 
and due to the time horizon, data for this study is cross-sectional, which means a set of 
observations on one or more variables is collected at the same point of time (Gujarati, 
2003). 
 
Due to the research problem and objectives of this thesis, a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods was used to enhance the research quality and research 
generalability. Two methods of data collection have been used: secondary data collected 
through websites, internet, literature review, reports, statistics, census and previous 
surveys to achieve background information about the research problem, and primary data 
collected from semi-structured interviews and self-administrated questionnaires 
 
A theoretical model to undertake empirical analysis to explain the main determinant of 
CE is displayed. The developed model offers a framework for the understanding of the 
influence of those socio-economic and psychological components on taxpayers’ 
compliance decision-making behaviour. It also shows the relationship between the 
variables that are related to the research problem as stated at the literature review chapter.   
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The model takes into consideration the factors that leading to SSCE which involves 
economic and non-economic factors. Economic factors include: contribution evasion 
penalty rate, inspection probability, SS contribution rate, and Basic Economic Model 
extension variables, such as:  a firm’s financial hardship, and the rate of unemployment. 
Non-economic factors can be seen through the prism of the position of contributors and 
how they are influenced by a number of factors that include: outlook towards public 
institutions, perceived SSL fairness, established social norms, and chances of discovery 
and penalty for non-compliance. All these factors are examined and assessed through a 
data analysis methodology.   
 
Furthermore, prepared hypotheses were tendered with respect to the determining factors 
of contribution evasion and expanded into testable plans to examine if the researcher 
could ascertain a suitable explanation, and to then clarify the association between 
contribution evasion and the issues which appear to be connected with them. Generally, 
each hypothesis is introduced by an attached paragraph connecting the hypothesis back to 
the theories that it is based on. 
 
Also, the chapter moved ahead towards a sample survey and identified and explained the 
data collection methods and procedures and assessed their validity and reliability. 
Furthermore, details of the pilot study, the statistical technique which is to be used in 









5.1 Introduction   
 
This chapter aims to examine the underlying dimensions of the scale measuring the views 
of evading Jordanian firms about the contribution evasion problem and to develop a 
simple solution against which the hypotheses could be tested. The research survey was 
designed and developed mostly on the basis of key variables identified from the available 
literature and pilot study to discover the factors that are known to have an influence on 
respondent attitudes towards contribution evasion. Generally, the tax evasion literature 
suggests that SSCE consists of more than one underlying factor. 
 
The study lists thirty-nine statements that describe a number of opinions with regard to 
the research problem. If these variables can be represented in a smaller number of 
collectived variables, then the other multivariate techniques can be given more rational 
results (Hair, et al, 1998). Therefore, the survey statements will be subjected to PCA 
which is a type of factor analysis (FA) that is generally used to analyse data arising from 
survey based collection methods (Pallant, 2005).  
 
5.2 Scale Reliability 
 
As essential part requirement of the preparation of the analysis of the data, the researcher 
undertook a test of reliability regarding all the factors before using them in the 
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subsequent analyses. The justification behind the reliability test is that each item or 
statement of the survey is required to be measured to make sure that all items on the scale 
are amply interrelated (Hair et al, 1998). 
 
Reliability is “an assessment of the degree of consistency between multiple 
measurements of a variable” (Hair et al., 1998). Moreover, it is the average of all the 
correlations between every item and the total score that determines the internal 
consistency
12
 among the variables.  
 
In reality, we can apply a number of models to gauge reliability such as: Alpha 
(Cronbach), Split-half, Guttman, Parallel, and Strict Parallel. In this study; a Cronbach 
Alpha test was employed as it is thought to be one of the best ways of measuring the 
stability and consistency of the instrument (Coakes and Steed 1997; Sekaran, 2003). 
Generally, Cronbach's Alpha is an index of reliability related to the variation accounted 
for by the true score of the "underlying construct." The construct is the hypothetical 
variable that is being measured in this particular case (Hatcher, 1994). 
 
The closer the alpha to 1.0, the greater the internal consistency of items tested (Shelton 
(2002). Hatcher, (1994) and Reynaldo and Santos (1999) have suggested 0.7 to be an 
adequate reliability coefficient but occasionally lower than that is used in the literature as 
an acceptable reliability coefficient. 
 
                                                 
12 Internal consistency refers to the data collection methods, what it was intended to measure and indicated the stability 
and consistency of the surveys. 
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Cronbach’s Alpha test was performed on 229 occasions to evaluate the reliability of the 
instrument and to find out items that lower the consistency of the whole scale. The results 
are presented in table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 
Case Processing Summary 
 
 N % 















Cronbach Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items  
 
N of Items 
780 Alpha =    0.797 34 
 
The coefficient alpha is equal to 0.797 for the thirty four items of the JSSCE after moving 
five items. 70 is the cut-off value for a satisfactory result.  Furthermore, the results 
indicate some potential improvement in the scale by the elimination of items that, once 
removed, improve the alpha coefficient for the entire scale. It indicates that if the five 
items were to be deleted then the value of alpha will increase from the current .678 to 
.797. Therefore, the removal of these items from the scale will make the construct more 
reliable for use as a predictor variable. The remaining statements were subject to PCA. 
 
5.3 Factor analysis 
 
FA is a general name given to a group of multivariate statistical methods whose primary 
purpose is to identify the underlying structure in a data matrix. It addresses the problem 
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of analysing the structure of the interrelationships among a large number of variables by 
defining a set of common underlying dimensions known as factors (Hair et al, 1998). 
Specifically, FA techniques can satisfy either of two objectives: (1) the identification of 
structure through data summarisation or (2) data reduction.   
 
Exploratory and Confirmatory FA (EFA & CFA) are the two major types of FA. The 
purpose of EFA is to identify the factor structure or model for a set of variables. This 
often involves determining how many factors exist, as well as the pattern of the factor 
loadings.  EFA provides an opportunity for consolidating variables and for generating 
hypotheses about underlying processes. CFA is, on the other hand, used in the advanced 
stages of the research process to test a theory about latent processes (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). A table below 5.2 illustrates the difference of the above definitions. 
Table 5.3 the difference of the above definitions 
Table 5.1 Definition of Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses  Stevens (1996)  
 
Generally, the most frequently used methods presented in the EFA package, are Principal 
Component analysis (PCA) and Principal Factors analysis (PFA). 
 
The preference of either PCA or PFA depends on a researcher’s assessment of the fit 
between the two models, the data set, and the goals of the research (Tabachnick and 
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Fidell, 2007). Both techniques often produce similar results and processes are also similar 
except in the preparation of the observed correlation matrix for extraction, and in the 
underlying theory mathematically. The main difference between PCA and PFA is in the 
variance that is analysed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Stevens (1996) gives a number 
of reasons for the preference of PCA. He proposes that it is simpler to use 
mathematically, and it avoids some of the potential factor quality problems of vagueness 
and poor definition regarding the PFA.   
 
5.4 Assumptions of Principal-Component Analysis 
 
Generally speaking, the most important assumptions that underlie the PCA are more 
conceptual than statistical. From a statistical point of view, the hypotheses of normality, 
homoscedasticity, and linearity must be considered only as far as that they could 
negatively affect the observed correlations. In fact, some degree of multicollinearity is 
necessary because the objective is to identify interrelated sets of variables. Tabachnick 
and Fidell, (2007) suggest a spot check of some combination of variables. Unless there is 
an obvious indication of a curvilinear relationship, researchers are probably safe to 
proceed, since they have an adequate sample size and ratio of cases to variables. The data 
was checked through various SPSS programs against the statistical assumptions of 
multivariate analysis and was found to be satisfactory (see chapter 7).  
 
In addition to the statistical bases for the correlations of the data matrix, the researcher 
must also guarantee that the data matrix has adequate correlations to justify the 
application of PCA. If visual inspection reveals no substantial number of correlations 
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greater than .30, then PCA is probably inappropriate (Hair et al, 1998). Inspection of the 
correlation matrix reveals that 13 of the 32 correlations (41 percent) are significant at the 
.01 levels. This provides a decent basis for proceeding to the next stage (Hair et al, 
1998).   
 
Another method of determining the suitability of PCA is to examine the entire correlation 
matrix. The Bartlett test of sphericity, a statistical test for the presence of correlations 
among the variables, is one such measure. It provides the statistical probability that the 
correlation matrix has significant correlations among at least some of the variables (Hair 
et al, 1998). In this study, the correlations, when taken overall, are significant at the .0001 
levels, see Table 5.3.  
Table 5.4 
Table 5.3 KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .672 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 




An additional step when performing a PCA is to calculate the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. The KMO index range is from 0 to 1, with 0.6 
suggested as an appropriate value for a good PCA (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). In this 
study, the KMO value is .672 which is more than the recommended value mentioned 
above as shown in table (5.3).   
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Furthermore, adequate sample size is an important issue to be considered in determining 
whether a particular data set is suitable for PCA. Correlation coefficients tend to be less 
reliable when estimated from small samples. Therefore, it is critical that sample size be 
large enough that correlations are reliably estimated. The researcher generally would not 
PCA a sample of fewer than 50 observations, and preferably the sample size should be 
100 or larger because the sample size of 100 provides an adequate basis for the 
calculation of the correlations between variables (Sapnas and Zeller, 2002). As a general 
rule, the minimum is to have at least five times as many observations as there are 
variables to be analysed (Hair, et al, 1998). The sample size in this research is 229 and it 
has a 7.2:1 ratio of observations to factors which is more than sufficient.  
 
5.5 Results of Principal-Component Analysis 
 
As explained in chapter four, the results of the initial phase revealed thirty nine variables 
might affect respondent attitudes towards the JSSCE. The purpose of that phase was to 
determine a comprehensive list of variables which included every possible variable.  The 
main concern, at this stage, according to Stapleton (1997) is whether a smaller number of 
factors can give an explanation for the covariation among the original, larger set of 
variables.   
 
In general, there are two steps, which are the interpretation of the factors and the 




5.5.1 Extracting the factors 
 
The first stage in the design of PCA concentrates on the choice of factors to be entered in 
the correlation matrix. This requires the determination of the factors that best equate the 
interrelations between items (Pallant 2005). Although there are many types of extraction 
technique that are available for use (e.g. Principal Component, Factor Component, Alpha 
Factors), the most commonly used of these is Principal Components (Pallant, 2005). 
Principal-Component was employed in order to remove the preliminary factors, which 
look at the alternative of reducing possible data-reduction by creating a new set of 
variables that are associated with the data interrelation (Gërxhani, 2002).  
 
- Number of Factors to Extract  
 
There are numerous methods that can be used in deciding how many factors can be 
retained (Gorsuch, 1983). The most commonly used technique is the latent root criterion 
(Hair et al, 1998).  
 
By using the latent root criterion to find out how many factors (or components) to extract, 
researchers need to take into account a few pieces of information which would be 
provided in the output. Researchers are concerned only in factors that have an Eigenvalue 
of 1 or more because only the factors having latent roots or Eigenvalues greater than l are 
considered significant. Generally, using the Eigenvalue to establish a cut-off point is most 
reliable when the number of variables is between 20 and 50 (Pallant. 2005). A total 
Variance Explained Table was produced to determine how many components meet this 
criterion. Eleven factors were found with Eigenvalues greater than 1.00 (See Table 5.4). 
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These eleven factors explain a total of 75.07 percent of the variance (see Cumulative % 
column). 














Thus, using the latent root criterion extracted too many factors; so, multiple decision 
criteria are required to determine the number of factors to be retained. Accordingly, it is 
important to consider another criterion - the scree plot test- so as to decide the number of 
factors.  The rule is to look for a change (or elbow) in the shape of the plot. Only factors 
above this point are retained. A scrutiny of the scree plot revealed quite a clear break 






Component Initial Eigenvalues 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.007 20.750 20.874 
2 3.416 10.046 30.920 
3 2.688 7.908 35.828 
4 2.190 0.442 45.267 
5 2.153 6.237 51.599 
6 1.806 5.312 56.912 
7 1.430 4.333 61.144 
8 1.290 3.795 51.939 
9 1.259 3.703 68.642 
10 1.133 3.331 71.973 
11 1.053 3.097 75.070 
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Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain much more of the variance than the remaining factors. Also, 
there is another break after the sixth factor, which is worth investigating, since PCA is 
used as a data exploration technique rather than any hard and fast statistical rule, 
however, this is at a researcher’s discretion (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Therefore, six 
and four factor solutions were tested. Table 5.5 contains the information regarding the six 











Component Extraction Sums of Squared Loading  
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.097 20.750 20.874 
2 3.416 10.046 30.920 
3 2.688 7.908 35.828 
4 2.190 0.442 45.267 
5 2.153 6.237 51.599 
6 1.806 5.312 56.912 
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After defining the various elements of the unrotated factor matrix, the factor loading 
patterns should be examined.  This shows the loadings of each of the items on the six 
components. The first factor accounts for the largest amount of variance and is a general 
factor, with almost every variable having a high loading above .5. Those on the second 
factor show four variables (q16, q5, q18 and q26), which also have high loadings. Very 
few items load on factors 3 and 4 (table 5.6).  
 
Given the above result, it was decided to keep the four factor solution. These results, 
sustained by the scree plot results, were used as these factors account for a high 
percentage of the total variance (45.267 %.) as seen in Table 5.5. This was also supported 
by the literature review and the results of the interviews; therefore, the researcher 
proceeded to rotate the factor matrix before redistributing the variance from the earlier 










































Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation  
a. Rotation converged in 14 interactions 
 
 Component   
1 2 3 4 
Q12 .700    
Q23 .656  .355  
Q1 .641    
Q21 .627 .388   
Q19 .624 .331   
Q39 .616  .301  
Q17 .612    
Q20 .606    
Q2 .546  .403  
Q31 .510  .385  
Q10 .507 .327 .468 .388 
Q14 .505   .434 
Q37 .503   .496 
Q25 .500    
Q27 .480    
Q11 .480    
Q30 .430    
Q6 .430    
Q24 .358 .346  .307 
Q38 .321    
Q32 .306  311  
Q29  .730   
Q16  .547   
Q5  .544   
Q18  .542 .325  
Q26  .487   
Q15  .452 .361  
Q35 .334 .442 .412 .407 
Q3 .341  .627  
Q4 .521 .305 .547  
Q13    .597 
Q36 .360 .423  .438 
Q7    .411 
     
  1.806 5.312 56.912 
 186 
5.5.2 Rotation  
 
A rotational method has been followed as a second stage so as to achieve simpler and 
potentially more meaningful factor results. In most situations, rotation of the factors 
improves the results by reducing some of the ambiguities that often go along with initial 
unrotated factor solutions. Factor rotation is a process by which the solution is made 
more interpretable without changing its underlying mathematical properties (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007). 
  
According to Tabachnick and Fidell, (2007) a decision has to be made between 
orthogonal and oblique rotation. In orthogonal rotation, the factors are uncorrelated and a 
loading matrix is produced, which is interpreted by looking at which observed variables 
correlate with which factor. Orthogonal solutions offer ease of interpretation, description, 
and analysis of results. If rotation is oblique, several additional matrices are produced, 
namely: a structure matrix of correlations between factors and variables and a pattern 
matrix of unique relationships between each factor and each observed variable.   
 
Varimax, quartimax, and equamax are three orthogonal techniques available, but the most 
commonly used is varimax, which is a variance maximising procedure. The goal of 
varimax rotation is to maximise the variance of factor loadings by making high loadings 
higher and low ones lower for each factor (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  
 
By Applying an Orthogonal Varimax rotated factor solution, the first factor accounts for 
13.484 percent of the variance, compared to 20.874 percent in the unrotated solution. 
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Likewise, the second factor accounts for 11.720 percent versus 10.046 percent in the 
unrotated solution, the third factor accounts for 10.259 percent versus 7.906 percent in 
the unrotated solution and finally, the fourth factor accounts for 9.804 percent versus 
6.442 percent in the unrotated solution. The total variance explained (45.267 percent) 
does not change after rotation, just the way that it is distributed between the four 
components.  Thus, the explanatory power has shifted slightly to a more even distribution 
because of the rotation as well as the interpretation of the factor matrix, which has been 










Once the number of factors is determined, it is important to look at the rotated matrix to 
determine the number of variables that load on each factor. Generally speaking, if only 
one variable loads highly on a factor, the factor is poorly defined (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007).  
 
5.5.3 Interpreting the Factors 
 
Following the preliminary extraction and rotation of factors, an interpretation of these 
factors is necessary.  
Rotation Sums of Squared Loading  
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
4.585 13.484 13.484 
3.985 11.720 25.205 
3.488 10.259 35.463 
3.333 9.804 45.267 
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Interpretation of factors is supposed to provide better understanding of the underlying 
dimensions that unify the group of variables loading on those factors.  Generally, 
literature provides good guidelines for interpretation of the meaning of each factor; for 
instance Hair et al. (1998) suggested guidelines by assigning meanings to the outlines of 
factors, and choosing a label or name for each factor. Firstly, the higher loadings are 
thought to be more important and have a stronger influence on the factor name. Secondly, 
the factor name is not assigned by the factor analysis computer program; instead, it is 
intuitively developed by the researcher based on its suitability for the representation of 
the underlying dimensions of a particular factor.  
 
According to Stapleton, (1997), Kim and Meuller (1978) pointed out that “factor analysis 
does not tell the researcher what substantive labels or meaning to attach to the factors. 
The researcher must make this decision. Factor analysis is purely a statistical technique 
indicating, which, and to what degree, variables relate to an underlying and undefined 
factor. The substantive meaning given to a factor is typically based on the researcher's 
careful examination of what the high loading variables measure”. 
 
- Naming the Factors  
 
A minimum acceptable level of significance for factor loadings must be selected before 
any moves towards the interpretation stage; all significant factor loadings are typically 
employed in the interpretation process. However, as mentioned above variables with 
higher loadings tend to influence, to a greater extent, the name which will be selected to 
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represent a factor. The researcher should identify several key variables, which closely 
reflect the hypothesised underlying factors. This will help in validating the derived 
factors and assessing whether the results have practical significance (Hair, et al, 1998). 
Generally, key (marker) variables which are preferred are highly correlated with one, and 
only one, factor and load on it regardless of extraction or rotation technique (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007).  
 
As a rule, only variables with loading of .30 and above are interpreted (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). The greater the loading, the more the variable is a pure measure of the 
factor. Comrey and Lee (1992) recommended that loading in excess of .71 are considered 
excellent, .63 very good, .55 good, .45 fair, and .30 poor. On the other hand, George and 
Mallery, (2006) suggested the loading factor is acceptable if its above 0.5.  
 
As the choice of cut-off point is the researcher’s decision (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), 
the cut-off point for interpretation purposes in this study is all loadings .50 or above. This 
is a conservatively high cut-off. But in this thesis, the majority of the variables are 
loading above this threshold, which makes interpretation quite rational.  
 
It is worth noting, that where variables do not load on any factor, two options are 
available to: (1) interpret the solution as it is and simply ignore those variables, or (2) 
evaluate each of those variables for possible deletion. Ignoring the variables may be 
suitable if the objective is solely data reduction. Consideration for deletion should depend 
on the variable's overall contribution to the research objectives (Hair, et al, 1998).  
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Results in the Rotated Component Matrix Table (5.8) revealed the loading of every 
variable on the four factors by examining the highest loading variables; the researcher 
can identify the nature of the underlying latent variable represented by each factor. 
Therefore, substantive interpretation is based on the significant higher loadings. The 
weighted loadings provide a clear distribution of statements across factors above the cut-
off point, with one slight exemption, namely statement 23 "the JSSC has an efficient 























































 Component   
1 2 3 4 
Q21 .691    
Q1 .657    
Q20 .633    
Q17 .574 .423   
Q30 .560    
Q23 .552 .528   
Q7 .520    
Q27 .477    
Q24 .442    
Q10  .696   
Q38  .625   
Q37  .594 .367  
Q39 .376 .585   
Q5  .554   
Q31 .375 .550   
Q32  ..449   
Q6  .367   
Q3   .759  
Q4 .330  .727  
Q25  .355 .627  
Q19 .489  .570  
Q2 .330  .523  
Q14  .417 .469  
Q12 .364 .422 .433  
Q11 .367  .367  
Q16    .698 
Q36 .333   .670 
Q35    .667 
Q15    .569 
Q34   .306 .545 
Q18 .333   .541 
Q26  .317  .528 
Q13  .319 .394 .428 
Q29    .304 
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- Corporation management effectiveness factor 
The first factor has been named “management effectiveness (ME) of the JSSC” because 
most of these variables are related to corporation ME items except items 1 and 7. This 
factor consists of seven variables above the cut-off point; (items 21, 1, 20, 17, 30, 23, and 
7). The first three ME variables (21, 20, and 17) are concerned with identifying whether 
the JSSC employees are very approachable, the JSSC employees are highly trained and 
professional and whether the administration handles the JSSC in an appropriate way or 
not.   
The fourth ME variable (30) is concerned with a lack of knowledge and information 
provided by the JSSC while fifth ME variable (23) is concerned with the efficiency of the 
JSSC contribution recording and collection system. By a critical examination of this 
variable, which has loadings significant to two factors, a decision was made to consider 
this variable as a representative of a particular dimension which is CME.  
This decision was determined by the researcher's a priori knowledge of the theory that 
one variable more than the others would logically be representative of the dimension. In 
addition, the variable loading is slightly higher in factor 1 than its loading in factor 2. In 
such cases, the researcher may choose the variable that is loading slightly higher as the 
best variable to represent a particular factor. 
Variables 1 and 7 are representative of the JSSS, and are appropriate to the particular 
Jordanian economic situation. Moreover, the JSSS contains design features that support 
evasion that should be reallocated within legal and regulatory (LRS) variables instead of 
under ME variables despite the loading in factor 1.  This conclusion has been made based 
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on the researcher's a priori knowledge of the literature review, which confirmed that 
these variables represent LRS variables. 
 
- Ethical and social considerations factor 
 
In the case of the second factor, six variables (10, 38, 37, 39, 5, and 31) loaded highly 
after item 23 (as mentioned in more details in factor 1 above) was excluded; four out of 
six variables (38, 37, 39, 31) are related to respondents’ ethical and social considerations 
(ESC): namely most firms are honest through fear of getting caught.  A high level of a 
sense of duty in a firm plays a vital role in combating contribution evasion, and firms 
who do evade contributions do not feel their actions are morally wrong. Firms are aware 
that contribution evasion could cause serious financial problems for the JSSS in the 
future.  Thus, this is referred to as the ESC factor. 
 
The fifth and six variables (10 and 5) loaded to this factor are concerned with the 
statement that Social Security Contribution rates are relatively high and there is a lack of 
linkage between JSSS contribution and benefits, which can be classified as economic and 
legal variables respectively. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to claim that both of 
them should be relabelled as economic and legal factors because of their overall 
contribution to the research objectives through economic and legal influences, which are 




- legal and regulatory structure factor 
The third factor has been labelled the “legal and regulatory structure (LRS)” factor as it is 
made up of three variables (3, 4, and 2) which are highly loaded and concerned with LRS 
settings.  These are; the current JSSS benefit only a firm’s owners; the current JSSS 
benefits only employees, and the current JSSS benefit both employers and employees 
equally. The fourth and fifth variables (25 and 19) are where there are easy opportunities 
to collude with SSC inspectors and the JSSC acts as a service institution treating 
taxpayers as partners; and are reallocated within ME variables as a result of their overall 
contribution to the research objectives through the influence of corporation ME, and are 
supported by strong evidence within the literature review. 
  
- Economic factor 
 
Finally, there are eight variables loaded to the fourth factor; three of which demonstrate 
the attitude toward economic factors (EF) (16, 15, and 13), namely the high cost to firms 
of employing their own accountants to calculate their employees contributions that could 
result in contribution evasion; high unemployment rates prevent employees complaining 
about firms not paying their contributions and, financial hardship of firms result in firms 
who avoid paying contributions. Therefore, it seems reasonable to make this factor 
represent the economic aspect especially as the highest variable loaded in this factor 
(marker variable) is an economic one.  
 
The fourth and fifth variables loaded on this factor are concerned with ESC (36, 35), 
namely contribution evasion does not put a firm’s professional reputation at risk and 
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contribution evasion does not generate anxiety and guilt.  Furthermore, variables (34, 18, 
and 26) are related to ME, namely computerised systems used by the JSSC which are 
quite efficient, and there is a lack of coordination between JSSC and other government 
bodies as well as with the implementation of JSSC compliance procedures which are 
themselves complicated.  
 
Despite the fact that few variables have been loaded below the cut-off point, the decision 
was made to keep variables (27, 24 and 6) which loaded moderately on the first factor 
and second factor as LRS variables; namely laws and rules are complicated and are very 
difficult to understand, laws and rules are equally enforced by JSSC, and limited SS 
provision is one of the main reasons for non-compliance. Variables (14, 12, 11) on the 
third factor were also kept as economic variables, where firms avoid contributions to 
minimise labour costs, the fines for employers not making statutory contributions is 
relatively low, and the probability of being inspected is relatively low based on the 
researcher's a priori knowledge and overall contribution to the research objectives.   
 
As for variable 29, there is no supervisory authority responsible for measuring the 
honesty of the SSC inspectorate and is loaded too low at 304 on the fourth factor and so 
was not significantly correlated with any of their views on contribution evasion; this item 
will be excluded from any further analysis since it does not also seem to measure the 
same dimensions as the other items.  
 
Another statement (32) ‘firms with better knowledge about SSS benefits are more 
compliant’ was also dropped in order to keep the analysis comprehensible.  
 196 
As a result, the factor analysis reduced the 32 selected attitudinal variables to four main 
groupings. This exercise yields the following interpretation and grouping:  
 
I. Attitudes towards the JSSC management effectiveness 
 
1 - The administration handles the JSSC in an appropriate way 
2 - The JSSC acts as a service institution and treats taxpayers as partners 
3 - JSSC employees are highly trained and professional 
4 - JSSC employees are very approachable 
5 - The implementation of JSSC compliance procedures is complicated 
6 - The JSSC has an efficient contribution recording and collection system 
7 - Laws and rules are equally enforced by the JSSC 
8 - There are easy opportunities to collude with JSSC inspectors 
9 - There is a lack of coordination between the JSSC and other government bodies 
10- There is a lack of knowledge and information provided by the JSSC 
11- Computerised systems used by the JSSC are quite efficient. 
 
II. Attitudes towards ethical and social considerations  
 
12- Most firms are honest through fear of being caught 
13- The contribution evasion does not put a firm’s professional reputation at risk 
14- The contribution evasion does not generate anxiety and guilt 
15- High levels of firms’ sense of duty play a vital role in combating contribution evasion 
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16- Firms are aware that contribution evasion could cause serious financial problems for 
the JSSS in the future 
17- Firms who do evade contributions don’t feel their actions are morally wrong 
 
III. Attitudes towards JSSS legal and regulatory structure 
 
18- The JSSS is quite well-suited to the Jordanian economic situation 
19- The JSSS contains some design features which encourage evasion 
20- The current JSSS benefits only a firm’s owners 
21-The current JSSS benefits only employees 
22- The current JSSS benefits both employers and employees equally 
23- There is a lack of linkage between JSSS contributions and benefits 
24- Limited SS provision is one of the main reasons for non-compliance 
25-laws and rules are complicated and are very difficult to understand 
 
IV. Attitudes towards the experience of financial and economic factors  
 
26- JSS contribution rates are relatively high considering the benefits returned 
27- The probability of being inspected is relatively low 
28- The fines for employers not making statutory contributions is relatively low  
29- Financial hardship results in firms who avoid paying contributions 
30- Firms avoid contributions to minimise labour costs 
31- The high cost to firms of employing their own accountants to calculate their 
employees’ contributions could result in contribution evasion. 
 198 
32- High unemployment rates prevent employees complaining about firms not paying 
their contributions 
 
5.6. Summary  
 
The chapter starts by testing scale reliability where the coefficient alpha was found equal 
0.797 for the thirty four items of the JSSCE after moving five items which is more than 
satisfactory. Then, the factor analysis where discussed in term of its definitions, types and 
the assumptions of Principal-Component analysis. 
 
A rationale of PCA is to identify the factor structure or model for a set of variables. This 
often involves determining how many factors exist, as well as the pattern of the factor 
loadings.  PCA provides an opportunity for consolidating variables and for generating 
hypotheses about underlying processes. 
 
An exploratory PCA was used to examine the structure of the JSSCE problem from the 
perspective of the Jordanian firm evaders. The common reasons were extracted and 
rotated during PCA and were interpreted and empirically summarised by four main 
factors to represent the attitudes about the influence of EF, ME, LRS and ESC on the 
research problem.  
 
By revealed the loading of every variable on the factors through examining the highest 
loading variables; the researcher can identify the nature of the underlying latent variable 
represented by each factor. Therefore, substantive interpretation is based on the 
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significant higher loadings. The weighted loadings provide a clear distribution of 
statements across factors above the cut-off point. 
 
The first factor has been named “management effectiveness (ME) of the JSSC” because 
most of these variables are related to corporation ME items. This factor consists of eleven 
variables above the cut-off point.  
 
In the case of the second factor, six variables loaded highly related to respondents’ ethical 
and social considerations (ESC Thus, this is referred to as the ESC factor. The third 
factor has been labelled the “legal and regulatory structure (LRS)” factor as it is made up 
of variables which are highly loaded and concerned with LRS settings. This factor consist 
of  eight variables above the cut-off point.   
 
Finally, there are seven variables loaded to the fourth factor; which demonstrate the 
attitude toward economic factors (EF). Therefore, it seems reasonable to make this factor 
represent the economic aspect especially as the highest variable loaded in this factor 
(marker variable) is an economic one.  
 
As a result, the factor analysis reduced the 32 selected attitudinal variables to four main 
groupings. By carefully taking into consideration the statements combined in the same 










Descriptive analysis aims at the transformation of data obtained in a survey or some other 
collection form into something that presents it in a way that it makes it clear of its 
meaning in a particular context.  In this particular case, descriptive analysis was used to 
establish respondents’ profiles and general characteristics and then, to summarise the 
respondent’s answers to the statements in each factor. The discussion of respondents’ 
answers offers a tool that demonstrates a clear perspective of the multiple factors at work, 
and that influences the extent of contribution evasion in the JSSC investigated in this 
study. Generally, data analysis involves examining, categorising, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the data in an appropriate form. 
 
This chapter includes several sections. After the introduction, section 6.2 provides 
descriptive data on the firm characteristics of the sample firms. Section 6.3 shows the 
results of descriptive analysis and subsequently analyses responses (or attitudes) towards 
the dependent variable (in this case, contribution evasion). It also analyses firms’ 
responses and the results of the independent factors (EF, LRS, ME, and ESC). 
 
In addition, section 6.4 introduces the sample categorisation in firms’ views towards the 
JSSCE by examining the size, ownership and sector categories. This analysis required the 
classification of the sample according to the firm sector, firm ownership and firm size. 
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Samples were placed in one of four categories based on firm sector. These were 
construction, manufacturing, services and other firms. Firm size was classified as either: 
small, medium or large, according to the number of employees. Firm ownership was 
classified as either self-employed, limited liability or limited partnership in share; these 
classifications provide relevant information on how firm characteristics affect the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Finally, section 6.5 
presented the summary of the chapter.  
 
6.2 Firms' descriptive characteristics 
 
With regard to the firm' size, the great majority of respondents were small (66.82 percent) 
while the medium and large firms represented 27.94% and 5.24% respectively. In term of 
firms’ ownership, the average between self-employed (limited partnership), limited 
liability and limited partnerships was approximately 58.1%, 19.2% and 22.7% 
respectively. It is worth mentioning here that the proportion of small and self-employed 
evader's firms is much higher than those for other types of evader's firm because SS 
Corporation’s facing troubles in monitoring of them as well as it is very difficult and 
costly to gather information about firms in this category. Many firms, remain, therefore 
undetected, (Burges and Stern 1993).  
 
Based on industry type, over one third of the firms (39.3 percent) were construction, and 
approximately 24.5 percent were services and 24.9 percent were industrial. The 
remaining firms (11.4 percent) were classified as 'other'. Table 6.1 provides descriptive 
information for the full sample of firms. 
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Table 6.1Descriptive statistics based on size, ownership, sectors of the research 
firms' sample, and the frequency and percentage of firm’ classification 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Sector   
Construction  90 39.3 
Services 56 24.5 
Industrial 57 24.9 
Other 26 11.4 
Total  229 100.0 
Ownership   
Limited partnership 133 58.1 
Limited liability 44 19.2 
Limited partnership in 
share 
52 22.7 
Total  229 100.0 
Size   
Small 153 66.8 
Medium   64 27.9 
Large 12 5.2 
Total  229 100.0 
 
6.3 Results of Descriptive Analysis 
 
A field survey of former firm evaders was conducted in Amman, Jordan in mid-2008 (see 
also chapter four). 350 questionnaires were distributed, containing several statements 
which aimed to assess the respondents’ attitudes towards JSSCE. These statements 
covered various issues, which were expected to be correlated with contribution evasion. 
The response rate was 65.4%, and yielded 229 valid questionnaires.  
 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the frequency, percentage, mean average and the 
standard deviation were employed. As well as this, they helped determine the sample 
characteristics of the study and helped to develop primary insights into the data 
distribution. More specifically, these methodologies were used to analyse and interpret 
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the findings of the descriptive analysis statistics for research variables. 
 
Appendix (6.2) presents the percentage distribution of the responses to each statement. It 
also contains the mean values, standard deviations and relative importance for the key 
variables used in the study. 
 
6.3.1 Attitudes towards the Jordanian Social Security Contribution Evasion 
Problem 
 
The study set out to ask two questions to demonstrate the attitudes of firms towards the 
dependent variable (the contribution evasion problem). 59.4% of the respondents agreed 
that contribution evasion is common and extensive while those respondents who had no 
opinion or disagreed were 12.7% and 27.9% respectively. 51.1% of them believed that 
contribution evasion is a decreasing problem while 19.2% and 29.7 of the respondents 
disagreed or were neutral towards this question. The two results, when considered 
together, act as an indicator of the JSS contribution evasion problem. Thus, the results 
indicate clearly that the majority of respondents felt contribution evasion was a common 
but decreasing problem in Jordan. The percentage, mean average and standard deviation 
for the dependent measures are summarised in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 
The percents, means and standard deviations for the dependent variable 
 Strongly 
agree 







SSTE is common and 
extensive. 
10.5% 48.9% 12.7% 27.9% - 3.4192 1.00820 
SSTE is a decreasing 
problem. 
19.2% 31.9% 29.7% 19.2% - 3.5109 1.01139 
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6.3.2 Attitudes towards Economics and Deterrence Variables  
 
This thesis stresses the relevance of seven basic variables with regard to the attitude and 
experiences of traditional variables in an economic approach to contribution evasion. The 
results of the present sample indicate that 47.6% versus 47.2% of the respondents 
perceived that social security contribution rates are relatively high considering the 
benefits returned. Also, 52.4% versus 42.4% agreed that the probability of being 
inspected is relatively low and 36.7% versus 5.2% of the survey respondents believed 
that fines for employers not making statutory contributions was also relatively low. The 
remainder or 58.1% were neutral. Many studies argue that tax rate, audit probability, and 
fine rate are very important policy variables to combat the tax evasion problem. 
Blackwell, (2002) for example found an increase of audit and fine rates lead to more tax 
compliance. There was an inclination for higher tax rates to increase tax evasion, but it 
was not statistically significant.  
 
On the other hand, 73.8% agree that the financial hardship of firms results in firms 
avoiding the paying of contributions. Other studies also support the survey findings about 
this point, Ritsema et al, (2003) and Strban (2007) provided evidence that lack of money 
at the time taxes were due was the main factor in the decision to evade. 75.5% versus 
14.0% of the survey respondents estimated that the purpose of firms avoiding 
contributions is for the minimization of labour costs. This result is supported by 
Mcgillivary (2001) who confirmed that ‘in social security schemes where employers pay 
on behalf of their employees, there is an incentive for an employer not to contribute in 
order to reduce labour costs.’ 55.5% of the participants declared that the high cost to 
firms of employing their own accountants to calculate their employees’ taxes could result 
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in contribution evasion. This was especially seen to be the case for small firms, as they 
are well-covered in the present research sample (66.82% was small firms). This may be 
because small firms have a relatively small numbers of employees with a limited budget, 
and therefore, it might be prohibitively expensive for them to employ accountants. 
 
Finally, regarding a high unemployment rate, 79% of the respondents believed high 
unemployment rates prevent employees complaining about firms not paying their taxes. 
This result supported Yaniv’s view (1994) who indicated that employees would decide to 
complain to the authorities about not being paid as long as they had a chance to get 
another job. He considers that taxpayers’ decisions to complain about evasion are 
dependent on employment level and regulation as they both promote compliance. In 
addition, Awad, et al, (1998) concluded that “A higher unemployment rate apparently 
decreases employers’ fears of workers complaining about being paid, and therefore 













The percentages, means and relative importance of the attitudes towards economic 








Social Security contribution 
rates are relatively high. 
8.7 38.9 5.2 47.2 - 3.0917 .61834 
The probability of being 
inspected is relatively low. 
5.2 47.2 5.2 42.4 - 3.1528 .63056 
The fines for employers not 
making statutory contributions 
is relatively low.  
10.5 26.2 58.1 5.2 - 2.4192 .48384 
Financial hardship of firms 
results in firms who avoid 
paying contributions. 
10.5 63.3 12.2 12.2 1.7 3.6856 .73712 
Firms avoid contributions to 
minimise labour costs. 
12.2 63.3 10.5 14.0 - 3.7380 .7476 
The high cost to firms of 
employing their own 
accountants to calculate their 
employees’ contributions could 
result in CE. 
9.2 46.3 5.2 35.5 3.5 3.2183 .64366 
High unemployment rates 
prevent employees complaining 
about firms not paying their 
contributions. 
22.7 56.3 8.7 12.2 - 3.8952 .77904 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the sample demonstrated a negative opinion towards the efficiency 
of the SSC audit programme and penalty structure. In addition, it shows that the most 
important variables within this area to an employer reporting social security evasion are 
high levels of unemployment, the likelihood of an employer wanting to minimise labour 
costs, and the presence of financial hardship of firms at the time taxes were due. The 
relative importance
13
 of these variables is the highest among this factor with (0.779%, 
0.747% and 0.737%) respectively. 
 
                                                 
13
 Relative Importance: represents percentage for each variable that provides a measure of how important 
the variable was to overall result. Variables with highest percentage play a more significant role than those 
with smaller percentage. 
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6.3.3 Attitudes towards the Corporation Management Effectiveness  
 
The perception of respondents’ attitudes towards the JSSC administration and its 
performance was measured with eleven variables that were split into three indicator areas 
namely;  
1) An indicator which evaluates how effective the JSSC works 
2) An indicator which measures the perceived honesty and fairness of the JSSC  
3) An indicator that shows how taxpayers perceive help and information they get from 
the JSSC. All three indicators presumably have an influence on social security 
contribution compliance. 
 
Concerning effectiveness of the administration to sustain the scheme and to improve the 
quality of services introduced to insured persons and pensioners, 42.4% versus 27.9% of 
respondents agreed that the administration handles the JSSC in an appropriate way; 
40.2% versus 35.3% believe that JSSC employees are highly trained and professional; 
70.3% respondents agree that there is a lack of coordination between the JSSC and other 
government bodies.  But the vast majority of the respondents, 80.8%, disagree that the 
implementation of JSSC compliance procedures is complicated. As a result, the 
participants confirmed that a lack of linkage between the SSC and other government 
bodies ranked as the most important variable regarding the effectiveness of JSSC. This 
had the highest mean (3.74) and highest relative importance (0.748).  
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Regarding the perceived fairness and honesty of the JSSC, 15.7% versus 66.8% agreed 
that the JSSC acts as a service institution and treats taxpayers as partners, but 50.7% 
versus 20.9% agreed that the JSSC employees are very approachable. In relation to non-
preferability towards the JSSC employees' honesty, 43.7% agree that laws and rules are 
equally enforced by JSSC while 12.2% have the opposite opinion. This indicated that 
large percentages of respondents were moderately satisfied with the level of the sense of 
public justice in this area.  
 
On the other hand, 36.7% of the respondents believed it is easy to collude with JSSC 
inspectors. This means that those of the respondents who estimated their chances of 
evading contributions successfully were those who thought they would do better than 
average if they colluded with SSC employees. Only 24.4% of participants disagreed and 
38.8% had no opinion with regards to this statement. Vogel (1974) found that among a 
sample of Swedish taxpayers, 36% of participants reported their chances of evading taxes 
were higher than average. These findings of perceived fairness and honesty indicate that 
participants think the way that the JSSC treats taxpayers has a significant influence on 
social security contribution compliance as well as making them believe corruption to be a 
problem in Jordan. Generally, the presence of corruption weakens the tax commitment 
values of taxpayers towards tax compliance.  
 
Regarding taxpayers’ perception of the help and information they get from the JSSC, a 
majority of the survey respondents (55.9%) accepted the efficiency of the fiscal control 
system. Yet, only 14% disagreed. 72.1% versus 19.2% agreed that there is a lack of 
knowledge and information provided by the JSSC whereas, 52.8% versus 33.2% think 
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that the computerised system used by the JSSC is quite efficient. As shown in Table 6.5 
below, the low quality and level of knowledge and information provided by the JSSC is 
considered to be the most important variable within this group, having a high relative 
importance of 0.737%. 
Table 6.4 










handles the JSSC in an 
appropriate way. 
3.5 38.9 29.7 27.9 - 3.1790 .6358 
The JSSC acts as a 
service institution and 
treats taxpayers as 
partners 
- 15.7 17.5 63.3 3.5 2.4541 .49082 
The JSSC employees are 
highly trained and 
professional.  
3.5 36.7 24.5 33.6 1.7 3.0655 .6131 
The JSSC employees are 
very approachable. 
- 50.7 28.4 19.2 1.7 3.2795 .6559 




- 10.5 8.7 37.1 43.7 1.8603 .37206 
The JSSC has an 
efficient contribution 
recording and collection 
system. 
3.5 52.4 30.1 14.0 - 3.4541 .69082 
Laws and rules are 
equally enforced by 
JSSC. 
14.0 29.7 44.1 12.2 - 3.4541 .69082 
There are easy 
opportunities to collude 
with SSC inspectors.  
- 36.7 38.8 23.1 1.4 3.1004 .62008 
There is a lack of 
coordination between 
JSSC and other 
government bodies. 




There is a lack of 
knowledge and 
information provided by 
the JSSC  
17.5 54.6 8.7 17.5 1.7 3.6856 .73712 
Computerised systems 
used by the JSSC are 
quite efficient. 
8.7 44.1 14.0 33.2 - 3.2838 .65676 
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Generally, survey findings suggest that these firms believe there is moderate satisfaction 
with the JSSC’s performance. This problem appears to stem from the lack of quality and 
level of the JSSC’s information, the way the corporation treats the firms and the relative 
satisfaction with the way that the administration handles corporate affairs. Added to this 
is the presence of a lack of coordination between the corporation and other parties. In 
addition, a number of these firms believe there are opportunities to collude with SSC 
employees. Yankelovich, Skelly and White (1984) found similar results which indicated 
credibility problems with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
 
Generally, credibility and trustworthiness have a strong impact on contribution evasion 
and such characteristics about formal institutions might make a firm comply more. 
Therefore, the expected effect on the extent of contribution evasion is going to be 
positive. Many studies can be found in the literature to support the relationship between 
the extent of tax evasion and some of the statements underlying this factor. For example, 
Friedman et al (1999) report a positive relationship between the share of the unofficial 
economy and the ineffectiveness of institutions (including corruption). Schneider and 
Enste (2000) attribute higher tax evasion to a long-term decline in civic virtue and loyalty 
towards public institutions. Both imply a positive correlation between this factor and 
evasion. In addition, Kelchev (2006) concluded that the aims of reducing the hidden 
economy should be included more in tax administration than in tax policy. He 
emphasised that, without the development of a modern, efficient administration oriented 
towards better quality of services, can only reduce the level of evasion of taxes and social 
security contributions to a limited extent. 
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6.3.4 Attitudes towards the Legal and Regulatory Structure of the Jordanian Social 
Security Scheme  
 
As a part of the chapter objectives, trust in LRS was analysed in order to capture firms’ 
attitudes towards LRS. 
 
The respondents were asked to agree or disagree with eight statements about their 
attitudes to JSSS law and regulation. 54.2 % of the respondents felt strongly that the JSSS 
is suitable for the Jordanian economic situation. Moreover, 68.1% agreed that the JSSS 
currently benefits only employees, while 43.6% agree that the JSSS currently benefits 
only firms' owners. At the same time only 31.4% agree that the JSSS currently benefits 
both employers and employees equally. Although, 54.6 versus 27.9 % of participants 
seem to agree that there is a lack of linkage between JSSS contributions and benefits. The 
studies conducted by several researchers revealed that a stronger link between 
contributions paid and benefits resulting form SSS like pensions and compensations may 
increase effectiveness of the contribution collection (e.g. Strban, 2007).  
 
In general, taxpayers are sensitive regarding input-output relations between what a firm 
pays with its contributions and what comes back from the JSSC. Thus, firms’ 
contributions compliance might be influenced by the benefits received from the scheme 
in form of pension or other benefits compared to the price they paid for them. In addition, 
77.3% of the respondents strongly agree that limited social security provision is one of 
the main reasons for contribution evasion, and this might be because only two main types 
of insurance (Insurance against work injuries and occupational diseases, as well as 
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insurance against old age, disability and death) out of five
14
 of the Jordanian Social 
Security provisions are currently implemented. 51.1% agree that the JSSS has design 
features which encourage evasion (e.g. the early retirement equation and the coverage 
policy). Finally, only 28.3% believed that laws and rules are complicated and very 
difficult to understand. The percentage, means and relative importance for the attitudes 
towards laws and regulations of the JSS scheme measures are summarised in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
The percents, means and relative importance for the attitudes towards laws and 








The JSSS is quite 
suitable to the 
Jordanian economic 
situation. 
10.5 43.7 14.4 27.9 3.5 3.2969 .65938 
The JSSS contains 
some design features 
which encourage 
evasion. 
3.5 47.6 26.2 22.7 - 3.3188 .66376 
The current JSSS 
benefits only firm’s 
owners. 
5.2 38.4 10.5 35.4 10.5 2.9258 .58516 
The current JSSS 
benefits only 
employees. 
10.5 57.6 21.4 10.5 - 3.6812 .73624 




5.2 26.2 8.7 59.8 - 2.7686 .55372 
There is a lack of 
linkage between JSSS 
contribution and 
benefits. 
12.2 42.4 17.5 26.2 1.7 3.3712 .67424 
Limited SS provision 
is one of the main 
reasons for 
noncompliance. 
43.7 33.6 8.7 14.0 - 4.0699 .81398 
Laws and rules are 
complicated and are 
very difficult to 
understand 
5.2 23.1 15.7 41.9 14.0 2.6376 .52752 
                                                 
14 According to the provision of SSC; five social insurance categories should be provided: 1-Old age, disability and death;.2-Work 
injury and occupational diseases.; 3-Temporary disability due to sickness or maternity; 4-Unemployment; .5-Health insurance for the 
worker and the beneficiaries. 
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Table 6.5 above shows that means are rounding from 2.64 - 4.07 along with relative 
importance between 0.528 – 0.814. The answers indicate the agreement of the sample 
regarding the statements that measure this factor, except statements number 20, 22 and 
25. Furthermore, the table shows that the statements of limited social security provision 
are one of the main reasons for contribution evasion, current JSSS benefit only 
employees and there is a lack of linkage between the JSSS contributions and benefits 
ranked the most important variables with high relative importance .814, .736 and .674 
respectively. 
 
6.3.5 Attitude towards Firms' Ethical and Social Considerations  
 
Six questions were asked to measure the attitude of a firm's ESC. In some of these 
questions when the score value increases, firms demonstrate lower tax immorality and 
social norms towards the JSSCE problem. 72.1% of the respondents agree that firms who 
do evade social security contributions do not feel their actions are morally wrong. 
Generally, many studies, such as the study conducted by Schneider and Enste (2000), 
support this view that higher tax evasion is due to a decline in moral values with regards 
to taxpayer evasion behaviour. This means that if a high rate of tax immorality evasion is 
reported; more evasion is subsequently anticipated by these firms. 
 
In addition, respondents were asked whether most firms are honest mainly because of a 
fear of getting caught. The result demonstrated that 41.9% of respondents agreed with the 
statement, while 48.9% of the respondents demonstrated the opposite opinion. 
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Participants were asked if SSCE does not generate anxiety and guilt as well as it does not 
put a firm’s professional reputation at risk. The results indicated the respondents’ 
agreement with the two statements by 64.6% and 61.5 respectively.  
 
Moreover, 79% of the respondents believe that high level of a firm’s sense of duty plays 
an important role in combating SSCE whereas only 59.8% declare that firms are aware 
that SS tax evasion could cause serious financial problems for the JSSS in the future. 
They suggest that respondents believed they were unlikely to undertake the same action if 
firms had a higher level of sense of duty and awareness. The percentages, means, 
standard deviations and relative importance of the attitudes towards ESC are summarised 
in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 
The percents, means and relative importance for the attitudes towards SS tax ethics 








Most firms are honest 
through fear of getting 
caught. 
1.7 40.2 9.2 40.2 8.7 2.8603 .57206 
CE does not put a 
firm’s professional 
reputation at risk. 
5.2 56.3 7.0 31.4 - 3.3537 .67074 
CE does not generate 
anxiety and guilt. 
3.5 61.1 12.7 19.2 3.5 3.4192 .68384 
High level of firm 
sense of duty play a 
vital role in combating 
contribution evasion. 
12.2 66.8 19.2 1.7 - 3.8952 .77904 
Firms are aware that 
contribution evasion 
could cause serious 
financial problems for 
the JSSS in the future. 
10.5 49.3 8.7 31.4 - 3.3886 .67772 
Firms who do evade 
contributions don’t feel 
their actions are 
morally wrong. 
3.5 68.6 12.2 15.7 - 3.5983 .71966 
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The mean ESC ranged approximately from 2.86-3.90 with relative importance rounding 
from .572 - .780. The results revealed the agreement of the sample regarding all 
statements that measure this factor, except for one namely:  most firms are honest only 
through fear of being caught. The absence of firms’ sense of duty and firms’ evasive 
attitudes towards SSCE can be considered to be the most important reason for the 
problem of the JSSCE within this area,  having a high relative importance .78 and .72 
respectively. It can be expected that a high intrinsic motivation for firm not to pay their 
contributions goes in line with their desire to lie and cheat. Generally, the respondents' 
results indicate that the former firms’ behaviour was unethical and socially irresponsible 
with regard to the problem of the JSSCE.  
 
6.4 The sample categorisation in Firms’ Views towards Jordanian Social Security 
Contribution Evasion 
 
As a part of the research descriptive analysis, this study has attempted to discover 
whether there were any important  differences between firms’ views and the research 
sample made regarding responses to the thirty-two statements in the questionnaire.  
 
6.4.1 Firm’s Views towards Jordanian Social Security Contribution Evasion among 
Sectors Categories 
 
Generally speaking, there were no differences in firm’s views between the construction 
sector and the research sample regarding the attitudes towards research statements except 
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that 50.0 % of construction participants responded that current JSSS benefits only firm 
owners compared with 43.6 % for the research sample. Whereas, in the services sector, 
39.2 % of the participants considered that contribution rates are relatively high 
considering the benefits returned. This compares with 47.6 %, for the general sample, 
which was greater than it was in the other sectors. In addition, only 34.0 % of this sector 
estimated that the JSSC employees are highly trained and professional as opposed to 
40.2% of the research sample. 
 
Moreover, 35.1 % of industrial participants were less likely to perceive that JSSC 
employees are highly trained and professional as opposed to 40.2% of the sample 
research. Fewer of those who considered themselves an industrial company believed that 
most firms are honest and also feared getting caught, with 36.8 % versus 48.9 % for the 
research sample. 
 
With respect to final classification sector (other firm sectors), this sector and the services 
sector also tended to perceive that the administration handles the JSSC in an appropriate 
way with fewer acceptable attitudes at only 34.6 % and 34.0 % respectively compared 
with 42.4 % of the research sample. Comparing with the other sectors, this sector 
believed more strongly than the sample research with reference to their views about the 





6.4.2 Firms’ Views towards Jordanian Social Security Contribution Evasion among 
Ownership Firms Characteristics 
 
There were six kinds of firms in the research survey (limited partnership, joint venture, 
limited liability, limited partnership in shares, public shareholding companies and any 
other company). As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter the SSCE exclusively 
presented in limited partnership, limited liability and limited partnership in shares. 
 
Regarding limited partnership and limited liability firms, which accounted for a majority 
of the research sample, 58.1% and 19.2% respectively, there was total agreement between 
the respondents' attitudes in these firms and the research sample as well as the other 
firm's ownership category responses, regarding the research statements which measure 
different variables. But in relation to limited partnership in shared firms (which represent 
22.7 %), there was general significant agreement between the respondents' attitudes of 
limited partnership in shared firms to the research sample, except in one area where their 
opinions of JSSC employees with regards to being highly trained and professional, where 
only 34.6 % agreed against 40.2 % for the research sample.   
 
6.4.3 Firms’ Views towards Jordanian Social Security Contribution among 
Different Firm Size Categories 
 
Regarding firms' size categories, there were no differences between small firm 
participants which represented approximately two thirds of the research sample (66.82 
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percent) and the research sample towards the research statements except a small 
difference about the statement that the current JSSS benefits only firm's owners with 44.5 
% of the small firms respondents compared to 43.6 for the research sample. Moreover, 
medium firms' size respondents which represented 19.2 %, showed complete agreement 
with the research target sample. 
 
In contrast, large firm categories which represent only a small percentage, 5.24% 
confirmed some important differences with research target sample towards two research 
statements: Firstly, large firms underestimated attitude towards the level of contribution 
rates by 41.7% compared with 47.6% for the research sample. Secondly, large firms 
underestimated the easy existence of opportunities to collude with JSSC inspectors at 
33.3% compared to 24.8% for the research sample that disagree with the statement above.   
 
6.5 Summary  
 
 
This chapter introduced a descriptive data analysis for the general characteristics of the 
sample firms and summarised information about the main variables of the study. The 
discussion of the respondents’ attitudes towards the dependent variable (contribution 
evasion) and the independent factors (EF, LRS, ME, and ESC) offers a clear perspective 
of the economic and non-economic factors that influence SSCE which were investigated 
in this study. 
 
In addition, the sample categorisation in firms’ views towards the JSSCE by examining 
the size, ownership and sector categories were introduced. The analysis shows that there 
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are only a few differences between these sample categorisation and research target 
sample particularly in the case of large firm categories which confirmed some 
considerable differences with research target. 
 
Frequencies and percentage, mean average and the standard deviation were employed by 
using SPSS 15 to achieve the objectives of this study. More specifically, they were used 
to analyse and interpret the findings of the descriptive statistics analysis for research 
variables. 
 
Participants demonstrated negative opinions towards the efficiency of JSSC’s audit 
program and penalty structure. In addition, they demonstrated that the most important 
economic variables that caused an employee to report CE are the high levels of 
unemployment within the country, the likelihood of an employer attempting to minimise 
labour costs, and the presence of financial hardship at the time contributions were due. 
 
Generally, survey findings suggest that there is moderate satisfaction with JSSC’s 
performance across the firms approached for this study. The problems highlighted, 
appear to stem from the lack of quality of information provided by JSSC, as well as the 
way in which the corporation treats firms, the relative satisfaction in the way that the 
administration handles its corporate affairs, and the lack of coordination between the 
corporation and outside parties. In addition, some firms believe there are real 
opportunities to collude with JSSC inspectors. 
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The result also show that limited JSS provision and a lack of linkage between JSSS 
contributions and benefits ranked as the most important variables within LRS. In 
addition, the absence of a firm’s sense of duty and variable levels of morality towards 
JSSCE policy were considered as the most important reasons for the problem of 
contribution evasion within ESC. The respondents' results indicated that the former firm 
evaders’ behaviour was unethical and socially irresponsible towards the problem of 






































7.1 Introduction  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the problem of contribution evasion in 
Jordan from the former firm evaders' perspective. Therefore, this chapter aims to 
undertake an empirical analysis to determine why this should be so and to explain the 
impact of independent factors regarding the dependent variable (in this case, contribution 
evasion). These independent factors were derived from the Principal-Component 
Analysis PCA described previously in Chapter 5. There were four main factors which 
emerged. These were: The attitude and experiences of the respondents with reference to 
1.EF 2.CME 3.LRS and 4. ESC of the Jordanian firms in their relation to Social Security 
contribution. All these factors have been examined and are supported by literature in 
chapter three as the main factors that influence contribution evasion problem.  
 
Standard multiple regressions were performed in SPSS 15 in order to test the research 
hypotheses. Multiple regression considers the effect upon the dependent variable as 
measured by several simultaneous independent factors. Additionally, it provides the 
collective impact of all independent factors on the dependent variable, and also 
determines the coefficient of each variable as a predictor of a particular outcome. 
Furthermore, multiple regression provides a stable point of reference regarding the joint 
contribution made by a number of separate variables. These go some way to explain the 
key determinants of firms’ potential evasion in social security contribution.  
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The empirical analysis in this chapter displays the results of multiple regression analysis 
which was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, we used the base regression model 
(aggregated stage). Here, an attempt was made to investigate the full collective 
relationship between all the independent factors and the contribution evasion. 
Additionally, we examined whether a particular factor predicted an outcome when the 
effects of other factors were controlled. The best explanatory factor of the contribution 
evasion among these factors was detected through this method. In the second stage, a 
supplementary regression model (disaggregated stage) was conducted to answer how far 
some of the firms’ characteristics (firm industry type, size and ownership) influenced the 
relationship between independent factors and the contribution evasion.  
 
Generally, the best way to demonstrate a survey’s representativeness is by comparing the 
results to existing survey research data (Gërxhani, 2003). Thus, to investigate how much 
the data in this study was representative, a comparison with previous studies was made. 
 
7.2 Assumption of Multiple Regressions 
 
Multiple regression makes several assumptions about the information. These assumptions 
are required to be examined in order to ascertain whether errors of prediction are created 
by data characteristics not accounted for by the regression model or by the absence of an 
exact relationship amongst the variables (Hair et al. 1998). In this context three basic 
assumptions were tested: the normality of the data; the linearity of the phenomenon 




It is quite important to know if the data is distributed normally or not. Normality refers to 
the shape of the data distribution for an individual metric variable and its correspondence 
to the normal distribution (Hair et al. 1998). If the variation from the normal distribution 
is sufficiently large, the resulting statistical tests are likely to be invalid. Coakes and 
Steed (1997) presented ways of measuring the normality of data such as the histogram, 
Boxplot, Normal Probability Plot, Detrended Normal Plot and Skewness and Kurtosis. 
The simplest diagnostic test for ordinariness is a visual check of the histogram that 
contrasts the observed data values with a distribution that approximates regular 
distribution. But a more reliable approach is the normal probability plot which contrasts 
the collective distribution of real data values with the collective distribution of a regular 
distribution. The regular distribution forms a straight diagonal line, and the plotted data 
values can be compared with the diagonal (Hair et al, 2003). 













Figure 7.2  The normal probability plot 
 
 
To gain insight as to the magnitude of this problem with respect to the current regression 
model, normality probability plots and histograms were constructed for both the 
dependent and independent variables (See figure 7.1 and 7.2 above) so that the 
distribution pattern of these variables could be assessed. The results of the normality of 




The concept of linearity is concerned with the nature of the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable. The change in the dependent variable is 
associated with the change in an independent variable with a straight-line relationship 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). According to Hair et al (2003) the change should be 
constant across the range of values of the independent variables. The presence of non-
linear effects may decrease the strength of the relationship (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
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The most general method to consider linearity is to study the scatter plots of variables to 
recognise any non-linear patterns in the data. As an essential part of the regression 
analysis, scatter plots were used in this study to calculate by visual inspection the degree 
of linearity and to perceive any non-linear pattern in the data. As a result, examination of 
the scatterplots does not reveal any apparent nonlinear relationships (see Figure 7.3, 
below). 






























Homoscedasticity is required because the discrepancy between the dependent variables is 
explained in the dependence relationship, and should not be concentrated in only an 
imperfect range of the independent values (Hair et al., 1998). According to Tabachnick 
and Fidell (1996) the homoscedasticity assumption is related to the normality assumption 
because when the assumption of normality is met, the relationships between variables are 
homoscedastic. Many of the problems with imbalanced variances come from one of two 
sources. The first is the type of variable included in the model. The second results from a 
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tilted distribution that creates heteroscedasticity. This causes predictions to be enhanced 
at some levels of the independent variable than at others. Going against this assumption 
frequently makes hypothesis tests either too conservative or too sensitive (Hair et al. 
1998).  
 
The test of homoscedasticity is best examined graphically. The graphical plot of residuals 
is used to disclose the existence of homoscedasticity (Hair et al., 1998). In this study, 
SPSS was used to test graphically for the degree of heteroscedasticity by plotting the 
standardised residuals against the standardised predicted value. The model shows no 
strong existence of heteroscedasticity as shown in table 7.1. Therefore, those statistical 
graphical plots suggested that heteroscedasticity was not a major problem.  
 
Table 7.1 Residuals Statistics (a) 
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.0626 3.7343 3.0000 .29082 229 
Std. Predicted Value -3.223 2.525 .000 1.000 229 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.056 .241 .122 .033 229 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.1213 3.7196 3.0004 .28926 229 
Residual -1.46854 1.65862 .00000 .77436 229 
Std. Residual -1.876 2.118 .000 .989 229 
Stud. Residual -1.908 2.139 .000 1.001 229 
Deleted Residual -1.51970 1.69134 -.00040 .79342 229 
Stud. Deleted Residual -1.919 2.157 .000 1.004 229 
Mahal. Distance .186 20.556 4.978 3.220 229 
Cook's Distance .000 .021 .004 .005 229 
Centered Leverage Value .001 .090 .022 .014 229 








Multicollinearity refers to the correlation among three or more independent variables. An 
acute case of multicollinearity is singularity, in which an independent variable is 
completely predicted by another independent variable. As multicollinearity grows, it 
limits the size of the coefficient of determination and forces it to be increasingly more 
complex and so difficult to add a unique explanatory prediction from the additional 
variables. And just as importantly, it makes the determination of the contribution of each 
independent variable more thorny because the effects of the independent variables are 
"mixed" or confounded (Hair et al., 1998). The perfect state of affairs for a researcher 
would be to have a number of independent variables highly correlated with the dependent 
variable, but with little correlation amongst them. 
 
Two of the more common measures for assessing collinearity problems are (1) the 
tolerance value and (2) its inverse-the variance. These measures tell us the degree to 
which each independent variable becomes a dependent variable and is regressed against 
the remaining independent variables. Tolerance is the amount of variability of the 
selected independent variables not explained by the other independent variables.  
 
The Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Value (TV) are the favoured 
techniques of measuring multicollinearity. The satisfactory value of TV is ≥ 0.1 and the 
VIF value below 10 (Kolacz, 2002). As shown in appendix 7-1, the tolerance values for 
each independent variable suggestion that multicollinearity is unlikely. 
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Furthermore, there are four important outputs in multiple regressions. The first is the 
value of the F-statistic, which indicates whether or not the model overall is significant. 
This value is important since an insignificant model provides no basis for further analysis 
(Kennedy, 1998). The second useful statistic produced by the regression analysis is the R 
square. It measures the proportion of the variance of the dependent variable about its 
mean that is explained by the independent variables (Hair et al 2003). 
 
The coefficient can vary between 0 and 1. The higher the value of R2, the greater the 
explanatory power of the regression equation, and therefore the better the predictor of the 
dependent variable (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). The third is the t coefficient which is 
used to determine whether or not an independent variable contributes significantly in 
explaining variation in the dependent variable at a selected level (here at the 5% 
significance level). The fourth important output is the Beta (the standardised regression 
coefficient) that reflects the relative importance of the independent variables in predicting 
the dependent variable (Hair et al. 2003). 
 
Moreover, Buglear (2005) added that the correlation coefficient should be calculated to 
assess how closely the variables are related. In fact, correlation coefficients vary between 
–1.00 and +1.00; any relation close to 0.00 means there is no relationship between 
variables. A negative correlation coefficient indicates, therefore, that the two variables 
co-vary in an opposite direction while a positive correlation coefficient suggests that the 
two variables co-vary in the same direction. 
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As we can see, the previous section discussed the assumptions of multiple regression 
analysis and indicated that these assumptions were met. Therefore, the data in general 
complies with the requirements of multiple regression analysis. The data is ready for 
testing the hypotheses by estimating the regression model. 
 
7.3 Results of regression analysis  
 
The four independent factors included here namely: EF, CME, LRS and ESC cover 32 
independent sub-factors (due to the fact that the purposive factors include a number of 
sub-factors) consisting of a combined set of variables. These variables derived from 
extensive review of TE literature in general and on SSCE in particular, pilot study and via 
the researcher’ own experience of working with the JSSC. 
 
7.3.1 Aggregated Stage 
 
This section considers the empirical insights derived from the SPSS data analysis of the 
Social Security contribution context questions. It also examines how well the model can 
contribute to the issues under examination. Generally, the basic hypotheses are concerned 
with the influence of independent factors as mentioned above and as discussed in more 
detail in chapter five. A series of regression analyses were employed to analyse the 




7.3.1.1 Evaluating the model 
 
This section explains the overall multiple regression model and explains whether the 
proposed model successfully explains the factors of contribution evasion within the 
Jordanian firms’ sample. A standard Multiple Regression for the group of factors was 
conducted so as to accept or reject the following basic hypothesis: that there is a 
significant relationship between the independent factors and the dependent variable. The 
results of the regression model for the full sample of firms are provided in Tables 7.2.A 
and B. 
 
As can be seen from in Tables (7.2.A and B) the regression model is highly significant at 
the 0.01 significant level (F=132.981) with the power to explain 73.3 % (R square = 
0.733) of the variation in the contribution evasion. Thus, approximately 0.73 of the 
variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the four factors adopted for the 
model. The result of R square explains a large proportion of the variation under 
examination. As a result, the null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with the four 
independent factors are equal to zero can be rejected at the 1% significance level and the 
basic hypothesis is supported. This result is consistent with what the researcher's own 
assumptions were as to the general factors determining contribution evasion.  
Table (7.2.A) 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of 
the estimate 










1 Regression 109.773 4 27.443 132.981 .000 
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A further standardised Coefficient (Beta) was performed to investigate the individual 
contribution of each of the independent factors in explaining contribution evasion in 
order to examine whether each factor alone was able to predict an outcome allowing for 
the other variables to be controlled. It is worth noting that the higher the correlation 
coefficient, the stronger the relationship and hence the greater the predictive accuracy 
(Hair, 1998).  
 
As can be seen from in Table (7.3) significant results were obtained for all independent 
factor relationships with contribution evasion; the largest beta coefficient was 0.361 at 
the 1% significant level which was for LRS factor. This means that this factor has the 
strongest unique contribution to the explanation of the dependent variable, allowing for 
the control of all other factors. The regression results of the aggregate sample also show 
that there is a strong positive relationship between the contribution evasion and the EF, 
the coefficient for the EF being found to be positive and highly significant (beta = .347, P 
= .000) and this factor represents the next most important determinant of the contribution 
evasion problem.  
 
The coefficient of the CME was also found to be positive and significant (beta = .208, P 
= .000). Finally, the empirical findings indicate that the ESC factor has a significant 
positive effect on contribution evasion (beta = .176, P = .000), even if other determinants, 
such as when the reliability of the LRS, CME, and EF are controlled. Accordingly, it can 
be argued that each of these factors is key determinants in the understanding of the 










Based on the results obtained from the research methodology chapter (section 4.4.1), four 
sub-hypotheses were developed to obtain a better understanding of the relationships 
between the SSCE and the independent factors. The hypotheses were tested together with 
the‘t coefficient’ which indicates whether or not independent sub-factors contribute 
significantly in explaining variation in the dependent variable at a chosen significance 
level.   
In the following section, the relationships between the independent factors and the 
contribution evasion are investigated separately using multiple regression analysis. 
 
7.3.1.2 Economic Factors 
 
The empirical part in this section investigates the effects of the economic context on 
contribution evasion. We used seven independent sub-factors namely: the contribution 
rate; the probability of detection; the financial penalty for avoiding payment; a firm's 
financial hardship; labour cost; labour supply (unemployment level), and the impact of 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std Error Beta 
1 ( Constant) -2.978 .279  -10.672 .000 
ethics and 
social  
.369 .087 .176 4.222 .000 
economic .700 .087 .347 8.079 .000 
law .609 .077 .361 7.950 .000 
corpperfor .433 .094 .208 4.610 .000 
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explaining the contribution evasion problem. Multiple regression analysis was used to 
examine (the alternative hypothesis) if there was a significant coefficient relationship 
between the EF and contribution evasion problem. 
 
Tables 7.4.A, B and C show a model summary as produced by SPSS which display R 
square for regression, the F-statistic, the standardised regression coefficient (Beta) and 





As seen in Tables (7.4.A and 7.4.B) the regression results of an aggregate EF show 
significant and considerable effects on the contribution evasion and differ significantly 
from zero, F = (6,834). Therefore, the researcher rejects the null hypothesis and accepts 
the alternative hypothesis mentioned above. This regression was significant and 
explained approximately (0.440) percent of the variation in the dependent variable in the 
view of respondents. The R square value indicates that (0.440) of the variability in the 
contribution evasion problem is predicted by the EF.   
 
However, each of these sub-factors has been checked in order to know the value of the t 
Table 7.4.A 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the estimate 










1 Regression 27.760 7 3.966 6.834 .000 
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coefficient and Sig t (see Table 7.4.C) indicating whether these sub-factors contribute a 
statistically significant and/or unique contribution to the prediction of the research 
problem or not. Generally, if the Sig value is less than 0.05, then the variable contributes 
a significant unique contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. If it is 
between 0.05 and 0.10, it indicates a weak significant relationship. When the Sig value is 
more than 0.10, then it can be concluded that variable is not making a significant unique 
contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable (Pallant, 2005).  
 
Regarding the economic approach, only two of the estimations were significant at the 
0.05 confidence level namely: contribution rate and the level of unemployment. The 
contribution rate has a positive coefficient relationship (t=3.616, Sig=.000). Thus, it is 
observed that the higher the contribution rate, the larger the relative size of the 
contribution evasion. The result for the overall sample is consistent with the findings in 
most prior studies, such as Crane and Nourzad, 1992; Blackwell, 2002 and Ralph, 2006. 
All of these studies found that a higher tax rate generally leads to more tax evasion. This 
is though not consistent with other studies such as Feinstein (1991) and Webley et al. 
(1991) who did not find a significant impact of marginal tax rates on the tax evasion 
problem. However, the theoretical economic model of tax compliance generally suggests 
that a higher tax rate will lead to a higher tax evasion problem.  
 
The coefficient for the level of unemployment was found to be positive and highly 
significant (t= 3.123, Sig=.002). Empirical results supported this. For example, 
McGillivray (2001) confirms this when he mentions that the likelihood of being 
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detected as a non-compliant firm is mainly a result of labour market conditions and if 
there is a likelihood or not of the employee finding alternative employment if they lose 
their job. 
 
In addition, the regression results also show one significant result in data set at 0.10 
confidence levels. The research data indicates a positive and significant coefficient 
regarding the influence of a firm's ability to employ their own accountants for Jordanian 
firms’ evasion behaviour (t = 1.858, Sig=.065). The results suggest that the fact that there 
are a higher proportion of evader firms amongst small firms (66.82%) as they have a 
relatively small numbers of employees and a limited budget. 
 
On the other hand, four of the estimations were insignificant with neither a positive or 
negative coefficient relationship. The correlation between the likelihood of an audit and 
the degree of the contribution evasion was found to be negative and statistically 
insignificant (t=1.095, Sig= 0.275). The results demonstrate that expecting a higher 
probability of auditing considerably reduces the level of contribution evasion but not at 
significant levels. Generally, this result is consistent with the tax evasion theory 
predicted by Pestieau, et al. (1994), who reported that the higher the tax authority audit 
rate, the smaller the relative degree of tax evasion. Whereas, the low penalty rate has a 
positive but insignificant coefficient relationship with contribution evasion (t= 1.284, 
Sig=.200). Generally, in spite of the findings, it was statistically insignificant, but the 
direction of relationship is comparable with the empirical findings of the influence of 
probability of detection and penalty rate variables obtained by Cebula (1997), Blackwell 
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(2002) and Feld and Frey (2002) who confirmed that an increasing probability of audit 
and fines leads to lower tax evasion. 
 
The coefficient of the financial dissatisfaction by the respondents is also found to be 
positive but insignificant (t = .755, Sig = .451). Moreover, a negative and highly 
insignificant coefficient was revealed for the statements that firms avoid contributions to 
minimise labour costs (t= -341, Sig=.734).  
 
7.3.1.3 The Corporation Management Efficiency  
 
It is reasonable that a positive assessment of JSSC management efficiency helps with a 
significant reduction of the contribution evasion problem. In a further step the researcher 










Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std Error Beta 
1 ( Constant) 2.612 .368  7.092 .000 
q10 .172 .047 .233 3.616 .000 
q11 -.204 .049 -.256 -1.095 .275 
q12 -.029 .052 -.034 1.284 .200 
q13 .049 .064 .050 .755 .451 
q14 -.022 .063 -.023 -.341 .734 
q15 -.107 .057 -.116 1.858 .065 
q16 -.014 .044 -.019 3.123 .002 
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The results of the regression model of the CME revealed a significant effect on the 
contribution evasion problem (R square = .384 and F statistic = 12.475) as summarised in 
Tables (7.5 A and B). The value of the F statistic = 12.475 indicates the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients associated the impact of CME factor are equal to zero can be rejected 
at the 0.1% significant level. 
 
The CME includes seven out of eleven sub-factors which were significant at the 0.05 
level whereas only two significant results have been found in data set at 0.10 confidence 
levels. 
 
Table 7.5.C summarised the regression results of the CME sub-factors. The results 
indicated that both statements; the impact upon the ways the corporation management 
handles the corporation affairs and whether the implementation of the compliance 
procedures is complicated have a negative coefficient relationship with contribution 
evasion (t = - 3.308 and – 2.009 respectively). Both coefficients are significant at the 0.05 
significant levels. Generally, these results are consistent with the result of McGillivary 
Table 7.5.A  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of 
the estimate 










1 Regression 60.435 11 5.494 12.475 .000 
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(2001) in the sense that more attention should be paid to the organizational management 
of SSS, its performance and its administrative operation.  
 
He revealed that taxpayers may evade paying social security contributions because of the 
administrative complexity of compliance procedures. In addition, Kelchev (2006) 
concluded that the aims of reducing the hidden economy should be included more in tax 
administration than in tax policy. He emphasised that a decrease merely in tax rates, 
without the development of a modern, efficient administration oriented towards better 
quality of services, can only reduce the level of evasion of taxes and social security 
contributions to a limited extent.  
 
In addition, the approachability of corporation employees and the extent to which laws 
and rules are equally enforced by the corporation’s association with the contribution 
evasion are negative and significant (t = -2.341 and -3.461 respectively) at 0.05 
significance level.  Generally, the previous results confirmed that fairness and honesty 
have a significant positive effect on tax compliance behaviour (Smith 1992; Falkinger 
1995; Tyler 1997; Feld and Frey 2002). 
 
For those who have a good understanding of different aspects of the SSS, this might be a 
major contributor in raising negative feelings towards SSCE. Therefore, appropriateness 
of the information provided by the corporation is vitally important. The result revealed 
that lack of knowledge and information provided by the corporation has a negative 
impact on the contribution evasion with significant positive correlation (t = 2.156) at the 
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0.05 significant level. This finding is consistent with the finding reported by De Oliveira 
(1997) who found that lack of information and awareness about different aspects of the 
tax system can increase the incidence of tax evasion problem. 
 
The result concerning the significance of the regression coefficient correlation regarding 
the efficiency of the JSSC computerised system indicated that it was the most important 
determinant of the contribution evasion among these variables. The association between 
the corporation’s efficient use of a computerised system and contribution evasion is 
positive and significant (t= 8.004) at the .01 significant level. These findings are 
comparable to that obtained by Gary and Mitchell 1995; Masselli et al, 2000) who found 
that a lack of an efficient computerised tax system was likely to increase the level of tax 
evasion. 
 
Furthermore, a significant strong positive correlation was discovered between the lack of 
coordination between the corporation and other governmental bodies and contribution 
evasion (t = 2.165, Sig = .031). This result is consistent with the result of Alm et al 
(1996) who found that information sharing between the SSPS and other official agencies 
could reduce the level of contribution evasion problem. 
 
On the other hand, the results indicated that there was a weak significant but negative 
correlation between corruption and contribution evasion (t = -1.943, sig = .053). 
Generally, where taxpayers recognise corporation employees are corrupt; this can 
increase the level of contribution evasion. The results are consistent with the findings in 
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prior studies, particularly with the results of, Friedman et al. 2000, Jain 2001, Dreher and 
Schneider 2006).  All of these studies found that countries with more corruption have a 
higher tax evasion problem. Whereas, there is also a negative weak significant correlation 
between the professionalism of the corporation employees and the contribution evasion at 
only .10 confidence level (t = -1.756, Sig =.080).  
 
On the other hand, the regression model shows an insignificant relationship between only 
two sub-factors and with contribution evasion problem within that group. Negative 
correlation has been found between efficient contribution recording in the collection 
system and the contribution evasion (t = -1.535, Sig = .126). The findings of this study 
indicate that this variable has the inclination to reduce contribution evasion since the 
result demonstrated that the corporation has an efficient contribution recording and 
collection system. However, the coefficient is not significant. Whereas the way the 
corporation treats taxpayers as partners, its association with the contribution evasion is 
positive but insignificant (t = .233, Sig = .816). 
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std Error Beta 
1 ( Constant) 1.708 .405       4.216    .000         
q17 -.219 .066 -.236 -3.308 .001 
q18 .144 .067  .137  2.165 .031 
q19 .052 .076 .050    .233 .816 
q20 -.177 .072 -.204 -1.756 .080 
q21 .188 .080 .189 -2.341 .020 
q23 -.114 .074 -.107 -1.535 .126 
q24 .192 .056 .205 3.461- .001 
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7.3.1.4 The Impact of the Legal and Regulation Structure 
 
This section presents the role of LRS in influencing a firm's behaviour toward the 
contribution evasion problem. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that firms with higher 
confidence in JSSL and regulations have higher social security contribution compliance. 
 The hypothesis in this context proposes that efficient LRS is related to lower 
contribution evasion levels. Multiple regression results shows that the proposed 
hypothesis cannot be rejected because the Jordanian Social Security legislation and 
regulation coefficient is found to be positive and significant (F = 5.86, Sig = .000) 
showing a statistically significant effect on the contribution evasion with the power to 
explain .482 (R square = .482)) of the variance in the evasion problem (see Tables 7.6.A 
and B). Accordingly, the regression result supports the hypothesis and one can decide 








q25 -.147 .076 -.144 -1.943 .053 
q26 -.167 .047 -.195 90..2-  .046 
q30 .117 .054 .143   2.156   .032 
q34 .393 .049 .488  8.004 .000 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of 
the estimate 









1 Regression 27.401 8 3.425 5.860 .000 
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Regression analyses were used to investigate the size and direction of the relationships 
between the independent sub-factors and the contribution evasion (see Table 7.6.C). 
 
The data analysis revealed three positive significant relationships among these sub-
factors and contribution evasion at the .05 significant levels. Concerning the significance 
of the regression coefficient correlation of both sub-factors, there is a lack of linkage 
between JSSS contribution and benefits; limited SS provision is arguably one of the main 
reasons for contribution evasion. The results are highly positive and significantly related 
to the contribution evasion problem (t = 4.763, 3.242) respectively. These findings are 
comparable to that obtained by (Smith 1992; Pommerehne et al, 1994, Peter and van 
Dijke, 2007) who found positive correlations between perceptions of fiscal inequity and 
evasion behaviour, where there appears to be a need to adjust the output of scheme 
provision to people’s needs. 
 
Additionally, the statement that the Jordanian Social Security Scheme (JSSS) contains 
some design features which encourage evasion is found to be positive and significantly 
related to the evasion problem, (2.938). This result is consistent with McGillivary (2001) 




Furthermore, the researcher went on to analyse whether Social Security legislation and its 
implementation were too complicated and difficult to understand. The regression results 
demonstrate that there is negative relationship (-2.211 at the .05 significant level) 
                                                 
15 For example, an employer may arrange to keep the number of employees lower than specific number needed to be 
covered by the SS law. 
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between the contribution evasion and this sub-factor. This means the research 
respondents disagree with the view that social security law and regulation are 
complicated and difficult to understand and this sub-factor has no tendency to increase 
the contribution evasion problem. This result is consistent with the finding of 
(Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992; Smith, 1992 and Richardson, 2006) who found that 
complexity extensively reduces the perceived procedural fairness and simplifying the tax 
law and its regulation is the most effective way to achieve better compliance. Their 
findings are inconsistent with those found by Forest and Sheffrin (2002) though, who did 
not find a regular relationship between perception of complexity and perception of 
unfairness.  
 
The implications whether the current JSSS benefits only firm’s owners, employees, or 
both were investigated by using regression analyses. Examining whether the current JSSS 
benefits only employees yielded weak significant negative effects on the contribution 
evasion problem (t = -.497, Sig= .62) whereas the argument that the current JSSS benefits 
only employers was insignificantly but positively related to the contribution evasion (t = 
1.389, sig = .166). Moreover, the hypothesis that the current JSSS benefits both 
employers and employees equally yielded insignificant negative effects (-1.258, Sig= 
.210). Regarding the sub-factors mentioned above, a negative JSSL attitude by firms 
towards Jordanian Social Security contribution compliance by companies, seems to 
derive partly from the employer's’ belief that the JSSS benefits employees more than it 
benefits employers and they might be less concerned about the collective welfare of the 
Jordanian society.  
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Finally, the results discovered a positive but insignificant relationship between a firm's 
compliance with the JSS contribution and their opinion about the appropriateness of the 






7.3.1.5 Ethical and Social Considerations  
 
This section demonstrates the influences of ESC upon the decision of the firm to evade or 
not. Tables 7.7.A and B summarise the results of the multiple regression analysis of this 
factor on contribution evasion. The results show that lack of ESC is significant and 
positively related with the contribution evasion problem (F = 8.143, Sig = .000), while 
the R square for this regression model is .287. The results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that there is a significantly positive correlation between a lack of ESC and the 
contribution evasion problem. Generally, the regression results of the ESC demonstrated 








Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 ( Constant) .3.011 .350  8.594 .000 
q1  .030 .055  .040 .546 .585 
q2  .072 .052  .102 1.389 .166 
q3 -.040 .080 -.038 -.497 .62 
q4 -.098 .077 -.119 -1.258 .210 
q5  .242 .051  .309 4.763 .000 
q6  .171 .053  .216 3.242 .001 
q7  .185 .063  .193 2.938 .004 









Concerning the significance of the regression coefficients for the independent sub-factors 
of ESC, Table 7.7 C summarised the results which incorporate six independent sub-
factors to determine possible effects on the research problem.  
 
Feelings of shame and guilt in the regression analysis revealed positive and significant 
coefficient correlations with contribution evasion (t = 4.206, Sig = .000). This means the 
research sample shows a lack of feeling shame and guilt regarding contribution 
behaviour. Actually, this corresponds with the results of descriptive analysis and 
interviews where the respondents showed that contribution evasion does not generate 
anxiety and guilt towards contribution evasion behaviour and the result is consistent with 
the findings reported by Grasmick et al. (1991) who confirmed that feelings of shame and 
guilt are determinants of tax evasion and may influence tax evasion behaviour by 
reducing the perceived benefits of cheating.  
 
Additionally, the regression model indicates positive significant correlation (t = 1.702) at 
the 0.10 significant level between the absence of influence of evasion upon the firm's 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of 
the estimate 









1 Regression 28.141 6 4.690 8.143 .000 
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professional reputation. This finding is inconsistent with the finding that obtained by 
Sigala (2000) who found that British sole traders in their professional jobs avoid tax 
evasion because they believe that such actions put their professional reputation at risk.   
 
Furthermore, the researcher went on to analyse whether firms who do evade the JSSS feel 
that their actions are morally wrong. The regression result indicates a positive and 
significant correlation between the respondent’s morality towards social security 
contribution and contribution evasion (t = 2.764, Sig = .006). The results confirmed that 
evader firms have high levels of immorality towards the paying of contribution to the 
JSSS. Most of them do not believe their evasion is morally wrong.  The finding for this 
variable is consistent with the findings in prior studies particularly with the results in 
(Schneider and Enste 2000; Gёrxhani, 2004; Frey and Torgler 2007). All of these studies 
support this view that if a high level of tax immorality is reported by group of firms more 
evasion is anticipated by these firms. 
 
Dissimilar results were found for the effect of sense of duty on contribution evasion. The 
result indicates negative and significant correlation between high levels of a firm’s sense 
of duty and the contribution evasion (t = - 3.621, Sig = .000). The results indicated that 
high level of a firm’s sense of duty might play a vital role in combating the contribution 
evasion problem.  
 
Regarding Jordanian firms' awareness that contribution evasion could cause serious 
financial problems which may influence the sustainability of the scheme in the future is 
statistically found to be insignificant with a negative sign (t = - 1.42, Sig = .299). This 
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finding is inconsistent with the finding that obtained by McGillivary (2001) who found 
that SSCE may produce psychological costs regarding taxpayers’ awareness that their 
action might cause serious financial problems to the sustainability of the SSS in the 
future. On the other hand, the result shows that the contribution evasion is positively 
influenced by the sub-factor mentioned that most firms are honest through fear of being 
caught and a high perceived risk of being caught has an impact on contribution evasion, 
showing a positive sign (t = 1.171, Sig = .243). Generally, Scholz and Pinney (1995) 
proposed that, the taxpayers’ sense of duty towards paying taxes significantly determines 





Generally, the results of the analyses presented above allow one to consider these factors 
as key determinants in explaining the contribution evasion problem. Of these four factors, 
the LRS and EF make the largest unique contribution (beta = 0.482, 0.440) when the 
regression analysis has been conducted for each factor separately. On the other hand, the 
SPSS analysis indicates that the CME factor remain highly significant (.384), but with a 
lower significance level and with lower coefficient and marginal effect values comparing 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 ( Constant) 3.458 .486  7.114 .000 
q31 -.054 .052 -.068 -1.042 .299 
q35 .272 .065 .314 4.206 .000 
q36 -.119 .070 -.142 -1.702 .090 
q37 -.336 .093 -.249 -3.621 .000 
q38 .058 .049 .077 1.171 .243 
q39 .201 .073 .193 2.764 .006 
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smaller and made less of a contribution towards explaining the contribution evasion 
problem than did the other factors (0.287).  
 
7.3.2 Disaggregated stage 
 
One of the underlying purposes of this study is to examine the influence of company 
characteristics on the relationship between the independent research factors and the 
dependent variable. As noted in more detail in Chapter 4, the segmentation procedures 
are based on information sourced from the JSSC inspection department. Therefore a 
better test of this view can be obtained by studying sub-samples according to industry 
type, ownership and size. The results for the full sample were consistent with the view 
that there are difficulties with some of the Jordanian firms in complying with the Social 
Security contribution and these are reflected in the strong positive relationship between 
the research independent factors and the contribution evasion problem.  
 
In general, this part of multiple regression analysis aims to discover whether there was 
any statistical difference on the level of importance placed on ranking of these factors 
among these firm's characteristics based on their significant and standardised coefficient. 
The differences in the observed coefficients for independent factors across the sub-
samples should provide relevant information on how firm industry type, size and 





7.3.2.1 Industry type 
 
The segmentation of the sample according to industry type is classified into four groups, 
(90 construction firms, 56 services firms, 57 industrial firms and 26 other firms' 
categories). For more information, please see Chapter 6. 
  
Tables 7.8.A and B summarise the results of supplementary regression models, which 
incorporate several sector classifications. The results show that these models are all 
significant at the 0.01 significant levels (F statistics ranging from 28.653 to 69.169), 
while the R square for those regression models are.765, .787, 688 and .894 for the 
construction, services, industrial and others sector categories respectively. These are 







Sector  Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of the 
estimate 
Construction  1 .875 .765 .754 .36892 
Services 1 .887 .877 .771 .39813 
Industrial 1 .829 .688 .664 .56167 
Others 1 .946 .894 .874 .23480 
Table 7.8.B 
ANOVA 







construction     1      Regression 37.656 4 9.414 69.169 .000 
Services     1      Regression 29.916 4 7.479 47.185 .000 
Industrial     1      Regression 36.157 4 9.039 28.653 .000 
Others     1      Regression 9.813 4 2.453 44.500 .000 
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The results for construction firms show that, both the LRS and CME factors have the 
strongest positive relationship upon the contribution evasion. The coefficients for the 
LRS and CME factors are .426 and .268 respectively and highly significant. Additionally, 
the results confirm the importance of the LRS and CME factors in services and other 
sector categories as well as confirming the importance of the EF in services, industrial 
and others sector ranging from .307 to .447.  
 
For the ESC factor, its coefficient was extremely low even insignificant in the service, 
industrial and other sector categories at .05 levels. But there was significance for the 
construction and industrial sectors at .01 with (Sig = .000 and .062) respectively but not 
for services and other sectors with (Sig = .382 and .604) respectively (see Table 7.8.C).  
 
These findings are generally consistent with the findings reported by base regression 
analysis which found that the LRS, EF and CME have the strongest statistically 
significant and positive relationship upon the contribution evasion (.482, .440 and .384 
respectively). Therefore, the additional hypothesis regarding the positive relationship 
between the four independent factors and the contribution evasion as a dependent 
variable of the sub-sample industry type was also confirmed with the exception that the 
hypothesis regarding ESC is not fully supported by the multiple regression results. Table 
(7.8.C) contains details of supplementary evasion regression for classification industry 








7.3.2.2. Firm’s Ownership 
 
The segmentation of the sample according to firm's ownership is classified into three 
various types namely: limited partnership (self employed) (58.1%), limited liability 







Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
Construction 
1 ( Constant) 
-2.940 .441  -6.659 .000 
economic  .365 .112 .208 3.246 .002 
law .583 .096 .426 6.061 .000 
adperfor .611 .153 .268 3.999 .000 
social  .494 .110 .255 4.492 .000 
Services 
 
1 ( Constant) -3.804 .523  -7.272 .000 
economic  .879 .162 .377 5.415 .000 
law .478 .166 .261 2.881 .006 
adperfor .997 .214 .430 4.658 .000 
social  .146 .165 .074 .883 .382 
Industrial 
 
1 ( Constant) 
-3.513 .650  -5.401 .000 
economic  1.010 .208 .447 4.844 .000 
law .805 .184 .392 4.368 .000 
adperfor .067 .193 .031 .346 .731 
social  .425 .223 .182 1.909 1.062 
Others 
1 ( Constant) 
-2.845 .513  -5.548 .000 
economic  .475 .188 .307 2.532 .019 
law .729 .181 .379 4.036 .001 
adperfor .676 .181 .405 3.735 .001 









As seen in Tables (7.9.A and B) the regression model is highly significant for all firm's 
ownership categories; limited partnership, limited liability and limited partnership, in 
share (F =89.819, 34.373 and 21.852) respectively, with the power to explain 
approximately .737, .779 and .650 in the variation in the firms' SSCE. Those explanatory 
powers are higher than those obtained by the base regression model (.733) except with 
that in limited partnership in share has less explanatory power at .65 than that obtained by 
the base regression model. 
 
In the supplementary regression models of firm’s ownership as shown in Table 7.9.C the 
LRS and EF remain the most important determinants of the contribution evasion as in the 
base regression model, and their regression coefficient is relatively stable across limited 
partnership and limited partnership in share with standardised coefficients ranging from 
.306 to .326 at the .05 significant level for LRS and ranging from .338 to .359 at the .05 
Model Summary 
Ownership  Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of the 
estimate 
limited partnership  1 .859 .737 .729 .37622 
limited liability  1 .883 .779 .756 .34419 
limited partnership 
in share 
1 .806 .650 .621 .61459 
Table 7.9.B 
ANOVA 







limited partnership     1      Regression 50.853 4 12.713 89.819 .000 
limited liability      1      Regression 16.289 4 4.072 34.373 .000 
limited partnership 
in share 
   1     Regression 33.016 4 8.254 21.852 .000 
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significant level for EF. On the other hand, the CME factor has low coefficient and 
insignificant contribution to the determinant of contribution evasion for limited 
partnership in share (.062, sig = .528) and have reasonably stable regression coefficients 
among limited partnership, limited liability ranging from (.304 to .536) at the .05 
significant level. 
 
Concerning the significance of the regression coefficients of ESC for firms’ ownership 
classification, the results are found to be less useful to the determinant of contribution 
evasion than the other factors in limited partnership with significant positive coefficient 
.156 at 5% level of confidence. 
 
In summary, the supplementary regression results show higher coefficient of EF and LRS 
to the contribution evasion obtained in limited partnership firms which is the same result 
as with the base regression model. This relationship is though not found in limited 
liability firms. Whereas the regression results shows that there is a strong positive 
relationship between the CME and the ESC factors and the contribution evasion in 
limited liability firms, Table 7.9.C contains details of supplementary evasion regression 
for firms’ ownership classification based on information has been quoted from the results 















7.3.2.3 Firm Size 
 
 
The classification of firm size is segmented into three groups (small, medium and large 
firms) based on the number of employees
16
. Small firms are defined as having less than 
or equal to 50 employees, while medium firms have greater than 50 and less than or equal 
to 200 and finally, large firms have greater than 200 employees. The total number of 
firms in the small firm size group (153) is equal to the 66.8% of the total sample. 
Whereas the total number of firms in the medium firm size group (64) accounts for 
27.9%, only 12 firms (5.2%) represent the large firm size group. For this sub-sample 
                                                 















-2.640 .311  -8.494 .000 
economic  .658 .103 .338 6.417 .000 
law .495 .088 .326 5.636 .000 
adperfor .561 .108 .304 5.210 .000 
social  .281 .096 .156 2.937 .004 
limited liability  
1 ( 
Constant) 
-2.912 .480  -6.061 .000 
economic  .282 .153 .168 1.844 .073 
law .308 .153 .175 2.006 .052 
adperfor 1.044 .214 .536 4.869 .000 





-3.613 .915  -3.948 .000 
economic  .759 .254 .359 2.984 .005 
law .600 .250 .306 2.405 .020 
adperfor .141 .221 .062 .636 .528 
social  .854 .314 .270 2.724 .009 
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classification, more evasion is observed for small firms (66.82%) than for medium size or 
large size groups.  
 
Tables 7.10 A and B present the supplementary evasion regression for the classification 
of firm size measured as firms’ number of employees. The regression model for small 
firms is highly significant (F=110.183, Sig=.000) with the power to explain 
approximately 75% (R
2
 = .749) in variation in the dependent variable. Whereas the 
regression model for large firms is significant (F =10.706, Sig = .004) with the power to 
explain approximately 86% (R
2
 = .860) in the variation in the contribution evasion. Both 
results are found to be an improvement on the base regression model (. 733). The 
regression model for medium firms was highly significant (F =31.46, Sig = .000) with the 
power to explain approximately 66% (R
2
 = .659) of the variation in the dependent 
variable, although lower than the explanatory power obtained by the base regression 





employees  Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of the 
estimate 
Small  1 .865 .749 .742 .39739 
Medium 1 .825 .681 .659 .57418 










Small     1      
Regression 
69.601 4 17.400 110.183 .000 
Medium     1     
Regression 
41.486 4 10.372 31.460 
.000 
large    1     Regression .573 4 .143 10.706 ,000 
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Concerning firms' size classifications, there were no significant differences between the 
sub-samples regressions based on small firm classifications (represented by 
approximately two thirds of the research sample) and the base regression. The LRS factor 
(Beta =.389, Sig = .000) and the EF (Beta = .291, Sig = .000) have higher positive 
coefficients and are significant at the 1% level. The CME has a positive coefficient and is 
found to be significant (Beta = 263, Sig = .000), whereas, the ESC factor has a lower 
positive coefficient and is significant at the 5% level (Beta = 147, Sig = .002).  
 
Multiple regression of the medium firms' size classifications showed slight disagreement 
with the base regression research sample. EF and ESC factors were considered to be the 
most important determinants of contribution evasion with the standardised coefficient 
at.382 and .295, respectively at 1% level. The LRS coefficient were found to be positive 
and significant for the medium firm size group as the next important contributor to the 
evasion problem (.251) at 5% level, while the CME factor found to be the least 
coefficient and significant factor among medium firms size sub-sample classifications 
(.202) at 5% level (see Table 7.10.C). 
 
In contrast, large firms, which represent only a small proportion (5.24%), showed the 
largest differences with the base regression model. Table7.3.C shows a larger significant 
ESC coefficient (.666) at .5% level in the large firm as compared to the small firm and 
medium size group. This finding confirmed the fact that large firms have more 
commitment than small ones towards the ESC.  
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The regression results also show higher coefficients but are insignificant for the EF 
regarding the evasion problem in this classification (.330, sig = .151). This implies that 
large firms consider the above factor is more important in explaining the dependent 
variable over the other two factors. At the same time, the results revealed lower 
standardised regression coefficients (.153 and .302) and insignificant ones (.529% and 
.231%) for the LRS and CME respectively. This result indicates the smaller relative 







7.4 Conclusion  
 
It is essential for the running of any social security system that dues are, in fact, paid. If 
they are not, the correct functioning of that social security system may well be weakened. 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
Small 
 
1 ( Constant) -.2.591 .287  -9.025 .000 
economic  .562 .101 .291 5.585 .000 
law .608 .082 .389 7.436 .000 
adperfor .527 .112 .263 4.724 .000 
social  .269 .087 .147 3.107 .002 
Medium 
 
1 ( Constant) -4.810 .792  -6.073 .000 
economic  .828 .182 .382 4.558 .000 
law .521 .198 .251 2.632 .011 
adperfor .520 .209 .202 2.485 .016 
social  .887 .262 .295 3.383 .001 
Large 
1 ( Constant) -.688 .882  -.781 .460 
economic  .396 .246 .330 1.613 .151 
law .095 .143 .153 .663 .529 
adperfor .211 .161 .302 1.313 .231 
social     .546 .171 .666 3.191 .015 
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insurance contributions should be paid. If it becomes apparent that companies or their 
employees do not have to pay contributions for any reasons, this may undermine the 
credibility of social solidarity. 
 
The JSSC is in urgent need of reform; that much is clear. And, if reform is not embraced, 
the financial burden on its budget in the middle and long term will mean that the pension 
system will lose its financial sustainability. JSSC reform must aim at re-arranging 
pension parameters—such as the conditions for early retirement, and the correlation 
between contribution input and pension level. Additionally, the JSSC must also aim to 
overcome administrative difficulties that lie at the door of JSSC’s own management, 
which is still at the heart of much of what ails the Jordanian social security system. 
 
This reform is essential and urgent. Jordan is in dire need of a full and comprehensive 
overhaul of its systems in terms of social security dues and pension hand-outs. It is not 
enough that there is a reform of just the parameters of the pension system; there is a 
requirement to fully re-imagine the current model for public pension dispersal; for coping 
with black economy work where earnings are not declared, and what is more, a 
terminally low collection rate, which again points at inefficiencies and illegalities within 
the current system. Pension reform should provide both the correct level of financial 
resources and increase the quantity and quality of insured nationals to a satisfactory level. 
Following the regression findings of this chapter, it is vital that the JSSC should re-
engineer pension system parameters, including the contribution rate, which is in urgent 
need of reconstruction, in addition to remedying systemic design deficiencies which 
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actively encourage evasion because the legislation as it exists gives support for active 
payment evasion, rather than not discouraging evasion. There should also be a close 
correlation between contribution and benefit that currently does not exist. This should be 
done as the relationship between payment of contribution levels and consequent 
entitlement to benefits will certainly increase the effectiveness of the whole contribution 
and collection system.  
 
Additionally, it is clear that there is a distinct lack of cooperation between taxpayers, 
employers, and within the management structure of the JSSC itself. This is one of the 
most important obstacles in the fight against ineffective contribution collection. 
Information flow is vital in this regard, with increased emphasis on communication 
between all parties; all concerned agencies and institutions must share relevant 
information for a centralization of information that would improve collection and reduce 
the potential for successful evasion and loss of revenue. For example, the tax agency, 
social security institutions and the customs service must be required to share information 
that would facilitate comparison of records and lead to identification of criminal 
employers and others who are required to pay contributions, but either do not pay at all, 
or do not pay what they are required. This could easily be achieved with more extensive 
use of information technology and could improve not only contribution collection and 
enforcement but also tax collection and follow-up as well.   
 
Finally, it is essential to raise public awareness on the importance of paying social 
security contributions as a vital step towards more effective contribution collection and 
 260 
enforcement. Agencies therefore, should as a matter of priority, introduce more measures 
and incentives that are compulsory and regulated and enforced by the legal system. 
Contribution evasion should be made a preeminent social issue, where the public are 
regularly and accurately informed on the importance of the social security system and 
how it is financed. The JSSC must adopt a simple, clear and easily understandable policy 
that must be effectively communicated to the public with the message that evasion will 
not be tolerated at any level of society. This will also involve a change in the mindset and 

























The main focus of this thesis is the JSSCE problem. A qualitative method using semi-
structured interviews was used to support the results of the quantitative research. The 
method employed comprised two kinds of interviews: the first one with representatives of 
former evader firms or employers and the other with employees at different levels in the 
JSSC. Specifically, JSSC employees are also involved in the process that could lead to 
the contribution evasion problem. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the second section 8.2 presents the purpose of the 
interview; Section 8.3 identifies participants' descriptions; Section 8.4 introduces 
interview procedures; Section 8.5 discusses reasons that encourage non-compliance firms 
or employers to evade JSSC. Section 8.6 analyses, reports and comments upon the 
perceptions and attitudes of Social Security employees about reasons that discourage firm 
compliance. Section 8.7 presents a summary.  
 
8.2 Purpose of the Interview 
 
The interview is considered a very important part of the data collection process because it 
permits the interviewer to obtain information that may not be acquired through some 
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other data collection methods. In this study, interviews are used to complement 
questionnaires so as to explore or explain in depth any further details and information that 
relate to a participant’s responses. That is to say, it aims to enhance and validate the 
questionnaire’s findings. 
 
Interviews have a number of advantages such as: there are no missing answers; 
respondents are able to express and clarify themselves better, and the interviewer can be 
sure of the identity of the interviewee. In addition, interviews are more flexible; the 
interviewer can adapt the situation to each subject (Gay, 1992). On the other hand, 
interviews have some serious drawbacks such as the fact that it can be difficult to identify 
a large group of qualified experts in the subject area. Also, there can be problems in 
obtaining the agreement of the interested parties on the choice of expert (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). Finally, as with any verbal scaling, the validity of the measurement can be 
put into question. For these reasons, interviews are not used as the sole source of data 
collection but are supported by other sources. 
 
According to Bums (2000) and Bryman, (2001), there are three major types of interview: 
the structured interview; the semi-structured interviews and the unstructured interview. 
Structured interviews are employed in descriptive studies to obtain quantitative data. To 
use this method a predetermined list of questions is prepared and the interviewee is 
required to provide a forced-choice response (McClelland, 1994).  
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The unstructured interview is used to discover a general area in which the researcher is 
interested, such as explanatory studies (McDaniel and Gates, 1999). In an unstructured 
interview there is no predetermined list of questions to work through (Babbie, 1998). The 
interviewee is given the opportunity to speak freely in relation to the topic area (Bums, 
2000), this kind of approach allows a degree of flexibility so that the researcher can omit 
or add questions in order to explore topics in more depth (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
The final type of interview is semi-structured. This is the most common method of 
interviewing and is usually employed in the social sciences. This method is used to 
collect qualitative data, where the researcher has a list of questions or a specific subject to 
be discussed, but the interviewee has flexibility on how to answer. Moreover, the order of 
questioning or time spent may differ from interview to interview (Healey and Rawlinson, 
1994).  
 
Generally, researchers have two options in asking questions: they may ask open-ended or 
closed-ended questions (Jolliffe, 1986). A closed-ended question is one in which 
respondents are offered a choice of alternative answers. They may be used to acquiring 
specific information or to confirming a fact or opinion. These are more generally used in 
questionnaires. The open-ended question is not followed by any kind of choice, and the 
respondent is asked to give their own answer (Oppenheim, 1994). It is designed to 
encourage the interviewee to provide extensive and useful answers, and it is widely used 
in unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews (Cooper and Schindler, 1998).  
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As this thesis relies on multiple sources of evidence, a semi-structured interview with 
open-ended questions was used to investigate and supplement the available quantitative 
data. The interviews were conducted for the purpose of gathering information about the 
sources of the contribution evasion problem from the perspective of non-compliance 
firms’ representatives, as well as from the perspective of the JSSC employees’. This can 
be done by considering the major determinants of contribution evasion previously 
identified in the literature and in the phase of questionnaires stage. The interviewees 
provide subjective views on this topic. 
 
8.3 Interview Participants 
 
This thesis concentrates on the importance of understanding evading firms’ behaviour in 
view of the overall contribution evasion problem. As well as this it also targets members 
of the JSSC as it is vitally important to understand the factors that both cause the problem 
and to avoid any misunderstanding. However, both employers and the JSSC tended to 
investigate more about their own specific role in contribution evasion problems rather 
than look at the larger picture, which is the focus here. 
 
As it takes a significant amount of time, cost and effort to conduct an interview, the 
interview chapter was limited to a small number of participants. In total, seven employees 
from the JSSC and 10 representatives of evader firms’ were interviewed between 14 July 
and 28 August, 2008. 
 
The sampling technique used in the case of interviewees from firms was that of 
convenience sampling (available subjects). A convenience sample is a non-probability 
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sampling method that includes the choosing of subjects who can provide the necessary 
information and who are easier to reach for participation in the study. The interview 
sample included: four firms in construction; two firms in services; three firms in 
manufacturing, and one firm in the ‘other’ category which represent to some extent the 
proportionate of these firms amongst sector research sample. There were: (a) seven small 
firms; (b) two medium firms, and (c) one large firm. Each firm’s representative had a 
major position of responsibility in their firms (see Table 81).  
 
Table 8.1 presents: the respective position; the firm’s sector, and size. C, S, M and O 
stand for Construction, Services, Manufacturing and Other respectively. 
Number Position Size Date 
C1 Financial Manager Small 14/07/08 
C2 Owner Small 15/07/08 
C3 Financial Manager Medium 18/07/08 
C4 Financial Manager Large 21/07/08 
S1 Owner Small 23/07/08 
S2 General Manager Small 24/07/08 
M1 Financial Manager Small 25/07/08 
M2 Financial Manager Small 28/07/08 
M3 Administrative Manager Medium 29/07/08 
O1 Owner Small 01/08/08 
 
The selection of the JSSC employees was purposive. A purposive sampling is a non-
probability sampling method used to choose a sample element for a specific purpose. The 
choice is of those people who are most knowledgeable about a particular problem and 
who can be selected as sample element (Hair et. al., 2003). The interviewees’ job 
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positions were: Financial Manager; Auditing Manager; Administrative Manager; 
Information Technology Manager; Inspection Manager, and Inspector. They all had high 
levels of education, as most interviewees had at least a Bachelor’s Degree. Most of them 
have many years of experience of working in the JSSC (See Table 8.2 for more detail). 
Table 8.2 
The JSSC employees interviewed for the study 
Number Position Education Experience Date 
1 Financial Manager Master Degree 25 years 11/08/08 
2 Auditing Manager Professional Degree 23 years 13/08/08 
3 Administrative Manager Bachelor Degree 27 years 18/08/08 
4 Information Technology Manager Master Degree 14 years 19/08/08 
5 Inspection Manager Bachelor Degree 21 years 23/08/08 
6 Inspector Bachelor Degree 11 years 25/08/08 
7 Inspector Bachelor Degree 8 years 28/08/08 
 
8.4 Interview Methodology 
 
The cooperation of potential interviewees is essential to the success of any interview. 
Therefore, preparation for the conduct of an interview should be carried out well in 
advance, should be scheduled within a time-frame and located somewhere suitable to the 
interviewees (McGivern, 2006). 
 
In this thesis, potential interviewees from the research sample were approached by 
telephone to clarify the purpose of the study and the duration of the interview. They were 
also told that a telephone call would follow in a few days to verify their intention to 
participate and to arrange an appropriate place and time for the interview to take place. 
All interviewees were guaranteed complete confidentiality. 
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The interview was started with the thanking the interviewee, introducing the researcher 
and reminding them that the aim of the thesis was to find factors that determine 
contribution evasion in the JSSC. In addition, they were told that their points of view 
were very important to the thesis. The researcher interviewed each participant 
individually. Each interview consisted of a group of questions and lasted approximately 
one hour per interviewee. These questions cover various issues are expected to be 
correlated with contribution evasion which is included economic factor (e.g. - probability 
of detection and penalties) (ii) ESC (e.g. social influence and moral obligation), (iii) 
attitudes and perceptions CME (e.g. fairness of the tax system) and (iv) LRS (e.g. 
complexity of the tax system,) and finally, firms’ characteristics (e.g. firms' sector and 
size). The core questions were based on the questionnaire used in the survey, but at the 
same time they were permitted to elaborate on their own views and perceptions about 
paying contributions. At the end of each interview, interviewees were given the 
opportunity to ask questions or comments. 
  
All of the interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s office in the Jordanian capital, 
Amman, where the research sample and the headquarters of the JSSC are located. 
Interviews were conducted in Arabic according to the requests of the interviewees and 
then translated to English. None of the interviewees allowed their interviews to be 
recorded (they were cautious about having their words recorded even in a confidential 
interview). In addition, voice recorders were not used on the understanding that people, 
especially those in the Arab world, tend to feel suspicious about such devices. Therefore, 
 268 
notes were taken by the researcher during the interviews. In the next sections, interviews 
will be presented to show factors that encouraged the contribution evasion problem. 
 
8.5 Interviews with Representatives of Former Evader Firms  
 
As mentioned earlier, ten interviews were conducted with evader firms. All the firms' 
representatives declared knowledge to some extent of contribution evasion. They also 
believed that contribution evasion was a widespread phenomenon and continues to be a 
problem for many sectors even now. The vast majority of interviewees (9/10) reported a 
reduction in the level of contribution evasion at the time of writing as a result of an 
efficient auditing campaign carried out by the JSSC, and an increasing awareness level 
towards SSS benefits and advantages by contributors. 
 
For example, a Financial Manger of one of the small construction firms who said he 
knew quite a lot about contribution evasion in the construction sector, answered when 
asked how much he knew about the SSS in general answered:  
 
 'I know as much as I need for my purposes; 1 normally coordinate with my 
accountant to get maximum benefits from the SSS with minimum contributions'.  
 
Another interviewee who owned a small transportation firm gave a different reply: 
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 'As an owner of  a small firm, I don’t really have to know very much about SSS 
because the accountant calculates how much social security contribution the firm 
has to pay and they just deduct it from salaries’. 
 
When the same interviewee was asked if contribution evasion is common and whether 
many firms evade contributions, he said: 
 
'It is common, and I know that many firms manipulate the scheme and pay a 
lower amount of contribution to the JSSC than they should do'. 
 
Thus, the next step was to find out why contribution evasion is more common in certain 
sectors.  
 
Most of the interviewees (8/10) reported that the contribution evasion problem is more 
common among small firms and self-employed workers. They confessed that this was so 
because they had many more chances to evade; perceived a low probability of auditing; 
regarded evasion as financially and socially tolerated, and perceived incidence of such 
transactions among co-workers therefore making it normative. They argued that their 
colleagues predictably showed similar contribution evasion behaviour since their 




They added that, occasionally, evasion required collusion between employers and 
employees (Sometimes, the employees were content to pay a lower amount towards their 
contribution so as to increase their disposable income, and in exchange, employers would 
pay less in order to reduce labour cost). A General Manager who works in small hotel 
stated that:  
 
'To be honest with you we are sometimes encouraged by the employees not to pay 
their Social Security contributions in order to maintain their disposable income. 
In fact, within the industry that I'm in, they tolerate contribution evasion. It is 
accepted in the small hotel. 
 
The following question:’ How would you describe the role of your organizational and 
institutional culture toward SSCE?’ was a useful one. Most of the interviewees (8/10) 
agreed that their attitude about contribution evasion was significantly influenced by their 
perceptions of the dominance of contribution evasion amongst their colleagues. Only a 
few interviewees (2/10) thought that their attitude was influenced by ESC. Therefore, we 
have the instance of those working in construction or small hotels that are predicted to 
evade, are often detected more regularly. Whereas, those contributors in other specific 
occupational groups where their work requires more integrity and honesty often do are 
not. 
 
Generally, a contributor’s occupation determines their chances for reducing their 
contributions or not, which in turn influences their contributing behaviour. In an 
interview with the Financial Manager of one of the large construction firms, the 
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interviewee described the contribution evasion norm of the occupational group as 
follows: 
 
'An employer might lose his business if detected evading while another employer 
might believe that full compliance would put him out of business as all his 
colleagues evade'. 
  
The last groups of related questions concern the factors that determine the contribution 
evasion problem. More than half of the interviewees (6/10) referred to the contribution 
evasion problem as due to the ineffective LRS, followed by EF and a lack of CME. 
According to a few interviewees (3/10), the main issues associated with contribution 
evasion were, lack of administration effectiveness and fragile law and legislation, 
followed by immorality and social responsibility. Only a couple of interviewees (2/10) 
(one medium firm and one large firm) considered a lack of morality and social constraint 
as the main determinant factors followed by economic factors. 
 
Regarding the Social Security legislation (SSL) and the regulatory structure, a lot of 
attention was paid by eight of the interviewees (whether small, medium or large firms) to 
the lack of equity consideration in the scheme; they confirmed the importance of 
reforming the design and structure of the Scheme. They believed that there was frequent 
misuse of the schemes’ provision as well as being inconsistent legal regulations which 
make it easy for employers and employees to manipulate the scheme to their own benefit. 
In addition, the current scheme contains a number of overgenerous qualifying conditions, 
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such as early retirement pensions (at 45 years old) which do not have any sound actuarial 
reduction in respect of normal pensions. 
 
The Financial Managers of the two small manufacturing and services firms stated that: 
 
'We are ready to pay contributions to the extent that the SSS is ready to provide us 
with good pensions, compensations and benefits. Current 
contribution/compensation ratios are unequal; some are frustrated and try to 
equalise them, for example by decreasing their contribution, especially in the 
beginning of their participation in the SSS'. 
 
Most (7/10) considered limited social security provision
17
 as one of the greatest 
incentives to evade social security contributions. This was because contributors may have 
a greater requirement for basic and current needs, like health care or pensions. Therefore, 
linking the payments for the two may reduce Social Security contribution evasion. They 
emphasise the importance of the implementation of other social security provision 
insurance, for example: unemployment and health care. Also, more than half of the 
interviewees (6/10) reported that, the scheme contains some design features which 
encourage evasion. For example, the owner of the small firm in the ‘Other’ category 
agreed that:  
 
'As a small firm, an employee may claim to be self-employed if coverage of self-
employed workers is voluntary. Where employers must have a minimum number 
                                                 
17 The corporation currently implemented only two kind of insurance out of six (insurance against work injuries and 




 or turnover for coverage under a scheme, they plan to keep the 
number of employees below this number'. 
 
The EF continues to be very important. Most of the interviewees (8/10) believed that, 
having been inspected and expecting a higher probability of detection to a great extent 
reduces contribution evasion. Also, if firms recognise that a large number of firms in their 
line of work have been detected, their opportunity for contribution evasion decreases 
significantly. One of the interviewees affirmed that: 
 
'As an owner of a small construction firm in a business group that has evaded 
contribution, being discovered evading was not a surprise. I expect that the 
inspection department of JSSC will check samples of my occupational group 
because people who work in this kind of work are more likely to evade. Given this 
history, I believe it is better for me, next time, to comply.’ 
 
A few interviewees (3/10) believed that, contribution rates were too high in light of the 
benefits returned. They considered the current contribution rates as another important 
contribution evasion determinant. Half of the interviewees (5/10) expected there would 
be an increase in contribution compliance if more firms thought that if they were 
discovered evading, they would have to pay a high penalty. Whereas only a couple of 
                                                 
18Some countries, for example Jordan, set a minimum number of employees (5 employees) firm size for mandatory 




interviewees (2/10) were convinced that lack of money to pay contributions at the time 
contributions were due, was a major determinant for contribution evasion. 
 
More than half of the interviewees (6/10) agreed that, a high unemployment rate is an 
important EF in determining the contribution evasion problem. In an interview with the 
administrative manager of one of the medium-sized manufacturing firms, the 
interviewee stated: 
 
'I totally agree that numbers of employees reporting non-compliance in firms 
will massively increase if they have more opportunity to get anther job if they 
lose their job'. 
 
All of the interviewees thought that the role of the corporation was very important and it 
should develop its operations. In addition, all of them believed that the corporation was 
able to influence the mentality and attitudes of firms that evaded, in a positive way. The 
corporation has, they believe, the power and the authority to amend laws and regulations 
for example by changing the term and condition of the early retirement pensions.  
 
More than half of the interviewees (6/10) claimed that, there was inadequate and 
inaccurate information provided by the JSSC. They argued that firms needed to have the 
correct information from the corporation because of the responsibility it has if firms fail 
to pay contribution. In an interview with the Financial Manager of one of the medium 
construction firms, the interviewee stated:  
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'When you need any information about SSS you have to find it yourself; it is not 
easy to get it. Actually, we need more information than that is provided. In 
addition, we need more awareness campaigns of the benefits and services that the 
scheme can provide'.  
 
A couple of interviewees (2/10) reported that there are corrupt inspectors. For an 
employee to evade contributions; there is normally collusion with the employer. 
Additionally, the employer could collude with inspectors. Both of the interviewees stated 
that  
 
'In fact, I heard from a colleague that in a few cases there was cooperation 
between employees and the inspector for determining and covering contribution 
evasion. 
 
Most of the interviewees confirmed that there is inadequate information-sharing between 
the JSSC and other governmental bodies, such as the tax office and the minster of trade 
and industry. And, it is also necessary to have a better mechanism for chasing up those 
employers who do not pay.  
 
Regarding ESC, it was difficult to discuss these issues with the interviewees. Most of 
them (7/10) (5 small construction firms and 2 medium service and manufacturing firms) 
who had been identified evading, mentioned the fact that they had to pay a penalty but 
did not suffer any kind of social condemnation. They confirmed that, putting their firm’s 
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professional reputation at risk and feeling guilty as a result of evading wouldn’t be a 
powerful social or moral variable leading to more contribution compliance.  
 
Theoretically, contributors need to comply because they want the approval of others. 
Also they want to avoid the social stigma that could follow those that have been detected 
evading making contributions. Many people who have small firms or work as a self-
employed person confirmed that being detected evading was not a surprise. Such as the 
owner of a small construction company, said:  
 
I suspect that social security will also target specific groups because people who 
work on building sites are more likely to be fiddling’.  
 
However, when the same person was asked how easy it would be for him to cheat, he 
mentioned that there were opportunities for him to do so, and would not be very difficult 
to do so.  
 
8.6 The Employees of the JSSC Interviews  
 
Seven interviews were conducted with employees in the JSSC. All the interviewees 
agreed that there might be a serious evasion problem which threatened the sustainability 
of the scheme. But at the same time they indicated that things have improved.  In an 
interview with an Inspection Manager, the interviewee stated: 
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'Without doubt, things are getting better because in the last few years we’ve 
increased the number of Inspectors. We’ve supervised them better and provided 
them with good training and a good institutional infrastructure. In addition, 
we’ve brought about some improvements in our operation, such as the automation 
of tasks, which has increased steadily over the last five years. Actually, I’m very 
positive that we’re doing much better than before'.  
 
In an interview with the Auditing Manager, he affirmed: 
 
'We’ve concluded many things from the recent actuarial study, such as an urgent 
need to reevaluate the condition of early retirement pension. It was a good 
evaluation for our scheme and our corporation’s ability to perform. It directed 
our attention towards the problems that we have in the scheme. For example, 
regarding the evasion problem, actually, we have to pay more attention towards 
these problems because they might influence the sustainability of the scheme in 
the future'. 
  
The interviewees confirmed that contribution evasion is more frequent in small firms 
(construction, service, hotel and transportation) and with people who are self-employed. 
They believed these groups of people have better opportunities to evade as a result of a 
lower probability of being monitored. 
 
Regarding the interviewees' attitude towards contribution evasion, they thought that some 
of the people who work in their own business and some other firms, still tried hard to 
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identify any opportunity they might have to decrease social security contributions 
because of an ingrained mentality and culture. But they agreed that, not all firms have 
similar standards. Interviewees confirmed that the majority of the firms would like to pay 
contributions honestly. Sometimes there are instances where firms want to contribute, but 
are discouraged by JSSC employees. However, they stated that it would be incorrect to 
lay all the blame on one factor. One of the Inspectors emphasised that: 
 
 'The intention of the evaders was to evaluate ways to reduce their contributions 
with the lowest probability of auditing and punishment. Also some of these firms 
whose know-how in evading contributions was high, tended to talk, exchange 
experiences, and receive advice from colleagues and sometimes from JSSC 
employees themselves'. 
 
According to the interviewees, the main issue associated with contribution evasion 
problem was the mentality of evader firms towards the JSSS. They believed that the 
scheme was not very effective and needed to be reformed (e.g Reforming the terms and 
condition of early retirement). In addition, they believed it was important to work on such 
issues as poor administrative performance, ineffective contribution collection system, and 
the easy availability of opportunities to evade taxes. 
 
The Financial Manager and Inspection Manager claimed that: 
There are some weaknesses in aspects of our scheme and our corporation’s 
overall capabilities. But this doesn't confirm that the problem is only there. 
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Actually, we personally believe that it is an attitudinal and a cultural problem 
more than any one other thing'.  
 
Most of the interviewees (5/7) agreed that, the current scheme adds to the contribution 
evasion problem. They stated that, the scheme has at least four deficiencies which make it 
ineffective and inequitable. The scheme suffers from (1) unequal legal benefit provision
19
 
which makes it easy for firms to manipulate salary statements to their own benefit. In 
addition, the scheme has a number of overgenerous qualifying conditions
20
 (2) The non-
protection of serious risks (for example unemployment Insurance and Health Care 
insurance) (3) It has a low area of actual coverage as only around 1/2 of the labour force 
was covered by the Scheme (4) There was a lack of linkage between pensions and the 
inflation rate which influences the real monetary value of these pensions. 
 
Some of the interviewees proposed that, SSCE may be reduced by adjusting the formula 
used to calculate social security retirement benefits. They mentioned that, the effective 
net payroll contribution facing workers can be reduced by linking benefit payments to the 
individual's contributions. During the interview with the Financial Manager, he agreed 
that:   
'There are a lot of inconsistencies and distortions in the SSS structure and these 
needs to be resolved. Personally, I believe that this can be done. We are working 
                                                 
19
 Social security benefits are based on a worker's earnings over only a few years, such as the two years preceding 
retirement. This method of calculating benefits provides no incentive for the accurate payment of contributions on a 
worker’s earnings in earlier years. Employers and employees may collude in underreporting employee earnings for 
purposes of social security contributions for younger employees and over reporting for older employees. 
 




in that direction. We are responding. We are reviewing the scheme rules and 
regulatory structure. The benefits package is definitely not very good. But then, 
the JSSC cannot pay more because the current benefits package is a result of a 
weak level of contributions from Jordanian employees' salaries.’ 
 
In another interview with the Administrative Manager, he reported that: 
 
'There is a realisation in the Corporation that reform should be carried out. There 
is a mechanism for changing many aspects of the scheme. In addition, the overall 
scheme needs to be reformed and we are most likely going to do that in the near 
future. The changes we are now introducing will improve the situation. In the 
modified scheme we will provide more audits of a return and will amend different 
aspects of the scheme, particularly the early retirement requirements. 
Furthermore, the environment of hostility that exists between firms and social 
security inspectors will improve. Certainly, the reform of the scheme will bring 
about changes in social security laws and rules'.   
 
More than half of the interviewees (4/7) believed that EF is an important driver for 
contribution evasion behaviour. They agreed that, penalties should be higher in order to 
make firms afraid of being punished if they are detected evading. Furthermore, they 
confirmed that, contribution rates are fair related to the range of programmes that they 
finance now and that the rate should be re-evaluated to secure the sustainability of the 
scheme in the future as well as to improve the benefits package, if possible.  
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In addition, they agreed that auditing procedures should be improved by setting risk-
based auditing plans, and they are working towards this. All of the interviewees 
considered high unemployment rates in Jordan as an important factor in determining 
contribution evasion problem. Both Inspectors confirmed that: 
 
' It seems that  higher unemployment rates reduce non-compliance firms’ worries 
of employees complaining to the authorities because employees fear losing their 
jobs and it is harder looking for other jobs in light of a high unemployment rate'. 
 
Nearly half of the interviewees (3/7) deny that a high cost to firms of employing their 
own accountants to calculate their employees’ contributions could result in contribution 
evasion. This is because it was not difficult for them to comply even without accountants 
as long as the compliance procedures were easy implemented. 
 
They also agreed that, sometimes employers have an incentive not to contribute in order 
to reduce labour costs because they are paying contributions on behalf of their 
employees. They also agreed that financial hardship could drive some firms not to pay 
their contributions due to other priorities at the time contributions are due. 
 
All the interviewees declared that the corporation’s efficiency needs to be improved by 
enhancing its operations, institutional controls and accountability. They think that 
contribution evasion behaviour may be changed by building a better public image, in 
addition to the financial incentives of the scheme.  They believed that the corporation has 
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to keep going, however, as things cannot be changed overnight. In an interview with the 
Administrative Manager, the interviewee was certain that: 
 
'We are spending too little on education. We need to spend much more on public 
education and awareness. We need to change our image. Yes actually, the 
corporation is improving. Maybe slowly, but it is improving. I think public 
awareness is bringing about that change. The corporation has a definite role in 
awareness building with more concentration on the potential benefits of the 
scheme'.  
 
All the interviewees agreed that, the corporation is not free from corruption, but in fact it 
behaved responsibly as corruption is not systemic but sometimes it happens as a matter of 
individual’s behaviour. They emphasised that inspectors are becoming more highly 
trained, professional, courteous and qualified and they are moved around periodically in 
order to minimise the opportunity of collusion. In an interview with the Auditing 
Manager, he confirmed that: 
 
'We admit that some employees might have taken bribes. Because some of them 
work alone in the field, it may be difficult to supervise them. A supervisory agency 
is needed to be responsible for their honesty. Actually, we discovered a few 
employees were corrupt. We have definitely punished them'.  
All the interviewees confirmed that, there is a lack of coordination between the JSSC and 
other governmental bodies. Some of the interviewees proposed that the implementation 
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cross-check system among different government bodies and the use of the national social 
insurance identification number will provide greater potential co-operation between these 
agencies. The Information Technology Manager agreed that: 
  
”Cross-check systems and information sharing could be the solution for many 
problems we face, such as contribution evasion. Some say that is expensive, but it 
wouldn't be in the long run. A higher level of computerisation is required. The 
corporation’s management believes that modernisation of our activities will bring 
about a lot of changes. I believe that using social insurance identification 
numbers will facilitate record-keeping and the cross-checking of contributor 
information from different sources will lead to a dramatic reduction in the level of 
contribution evasion. 
 
Generally, the use of technology was felt by the interviewees to be instrumental in 
reducing errors, increasing speed, providing adequate and accurate information and 
facilitating greater co-operation between different formal institutions. 
 
Most of the interviewees (5/7) were less convinced that current ethical and social 
responsibility had a positive influence to play in contribution compliance. The Financial 
Manager said that: 
 
'Currently, I don’t think social disapproval and moral considerations constrain 
social security evasion behaviour. Feelings of shame and guilt are not 
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determinants of contribution evasion. Therefore, changing attitudes is very 
important. We need a social change to occur. I know the situation can't be 
changed overnight. It’s a gradual process. That is my belief. We collect 
contributions to allow the JSSC to work properly because the corporation has 
huge expenses to meet'. 
 
All the interviewees agreed that, their bureaucratic culture also needs to be changed. The 
corrective procedure can be started and moved ahead effectively if bureaucratic culture is 
modified first. In addition, they revealed that contributors have a lack of ethics regarding 
social security contributions evasion and this should motivate the JSSC to play an 
essential role to overcome that, for example, transparent, fair procedures and honest 
inspectors. 
 
8.7 Summary  
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the qualitative method used in this dissertation (semi-
structured interviews) conducted with ten representatives of non-compliance firms and 
seven employees in the JSSC. 
 
The main purpose of conducting these interviews was to identify the key factors in SSCE 
from the perspective of both groups. These factors reflected the interviewees' attitudes 
and their involvement in the process of contribution evasion.  
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Many of the key determinants of contribution evasion were identified by the 
interviewees. All the interviewees agreed that CE is common but it is a decreasing 
problem as a result of the improvement in corporation efficiency and in increasing the 
awareness level among firms towards scheme benefits. This result is supported by the 
results of descriptive analysis (chapter 6 section 6.3.1) as well as with the literature 
review that mentioned previously in chapter 1 (section 1.2). 
 
Evasion is more frequent among small firms (construction, hotel and transportation) and 
self-employed workers because of the low probability of auditing, and it is financially 
and socially accepted. Moreover, the incidence of such transactions among colleagues is 
higher. This result is consistent with many other studies results that were previously 
mentioned in literature review chapter (see e.g. Roth et al. 1989; Stalans et al., 1991; 
Hasseldine and Bebbington, 1991, Johnson et al. 1999, Houston and Tran 2001 and 
Gërxhani 2002).   
 
They added that, the contribution evasion problem was also due to the fragile design and 
structure of the contributory SSS, followed by EF and a lack of CME. The interviews’ 
findings indicated that, current ESC had no real influence in contribution compliance. 
This result supported by the regression results and descriptive analysis findings. 
 
Additionally, the interviews lead us to conclude that there was a lack of connection 
between contributions and benefits and the scheme contains some design features which 
encourage evasion. Therefore, interviewees stressed the importance of reforming the 
design and structure of the SSS.   
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Regarding the EF, all the interviewees believed that, a higher probability of detection 
and penalty will reduce contribution evasion. The interviewees of evader firms 
indicated that contribution rates are too high and should be reduced. More than half of 
the interviewees agreed that, high unemployment rates are an important EF in 
determining a contribution evasion problem. They also agreed that, employers have the 
incentive to evade in order reducing labour costs and the threat of financial hardship 
could drive some firms to evade as a result of the priorities of these firms set at the time 
contributions are due. 
 
All of the interviewees thought that the corporation’s role is very important and it should 
be encouraged to develop its operations. The interviewees emphasized the role of the 
corporation in influencing the mentality and the attitudes of firms' evaders in a 
constructive way. Most of the interviewees claimed that, there is inadequate and 
inaccurate information provided by the JSSC. They also reported that, there is no 
efficient information sharing system between the corporation and other governmental 
bodies and it is necessary to have a better system for following-up the evaders. 
 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, there is one more result to be addressed 
regarding JSSC interviewees. They considered the non-compliance employers' mentality 
as an important source of contribution evasion and the corporation can play an essential 
role in changing their mentality by building a better public image and changing its 
bureaucratic culture in addition to the financial incentives of the scheme. 
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Actually, the above results of the semi-structured interview chapter that were conducted 
above support the results of statistical findings of the survey data that was presented in 
this research. Additionally, the literature review identifies these factors mentioned above 
in determining taxpayer’s evasive behaviour. Thus, the surrounding literature confirmed 



























SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to conduct an empirical analysis into the problem of 
JSSCE, so as to understand and explain the key determinants of the problem at the firm 
level given the lack of previous studies in this area. 
 
The results from the analysis of related literature of tax evasion, and in particular the 
literature of SSCE, the survey questionnaire and the interviews have been supported to 
provide very important theoretical and empirical conclusions regarding JSSCE which will 
be addressed in this chapter. Additionally, the questionnaire and the interview methods 
have been designed to elucidate detailed strategy alternatives available to the JSSC in 
order to create suggestions for appropriate policy propositions and study 
recommendations for policy makers. This will be dealt with at length later in this chapter.  
 
This chapter falls in five discrete sections: section 9.1 is the introduction. Section 9.2 
provides a conclusion to the discussion concerning the previous literature on the effects 
of multi-factors that determine SSCE. Section 9.3 presents a summary of the main 
empirical findings of this research. Section 9.4 proposes alternative strategies to reduce 




9.2 Theoretical Conclusions  
 
The literature review in this thesis fell into two key areas of study. The first area 
examined the extent to which EUT concentrates on traditional economic variables (such 
as audits, penalties and contribution rates) and how they have influenced firms’ decisions 
in their choice of whether to evade social security contributions or not. (Allingham and 
Sandmo’s model (1972) based on the EUT explains taxpayer behavior as the result of a 
rational calculus, where taxpayers are ready to carry out an action based on the potential 
risk factors associated intention to avoid paying tax. They state that taxpayers balance 
opportunity cost in the attempt to maximise income against the likelihood of being found 
out and what sanctions or punishments would be applied in their particular cases 
(Sandmo, 2004).  
 
The Basic Economic Model on which their conclusions are built presumes that tax 
evasion is risky and also that the taxpayers are naturally risk averse. They considered it 
likely that a relatively simple static model that presumes taxpayers’ decisions depend on 
monetary income alone. The model proposes that the extent of tax evasion depends solely 
on the dual factors risk of being caught added to the size of the penalty.  
 
Other studies support the idea that the tax rate, the audit probability, and the fine rate are 
key variables in determining tax evasion behaviour (Blackwell 2002; Alm, et al, 2004; 
Hasseldine et al, 2007; Kumarasingam 2010), but, it is clear from the research and other 
related sources studied for this project that there are substantial limitations in the ability 
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of this model to explain major aspects of tax evasion behaviour (Elffers, 1991). 
Moreover, the most important problem with EUT analysis of tax evasion is that it 
considerably over-predicts the size of tax evasion (Dhami and Nowaihi, 2006). These 
findings diverted researchers’ attention significantly, allowing them to inaccurately 
extend the traditional focus of EUT and to suggest that evasion behaviour must be 
influenced by other variables more than that reported by the Basic Economic Model, in 
fact when this is not actually the case. 
 
As the first area of studies extended Basic Economic Model by incorporating new 
economic variables into a more sophisticated EUT, it led to an improvement of the 
predictive power of the Basic Economic Model. The extended economic models 
incorporated the amount of current consumption need, labour cost reduction, firms’ 
financial hardship, and the unemployment rate, as key variables which could lead 
employers to attempt to evade the payment of social security contributions (Yaniv, (1994; 
Mcgillivary, 2001; Ritsema et al 2003 and Strban 2007 ). It is evident; therefore, that tax 
evasion is a multidimensional problem: taxpayers’ behaviour can be influenced by a 
number of factors. Deterrence and economic forces are not the only causes that seem to 
shape the nature and level of tax evasion.  
 
A second area of studies was started in order to test the importance of rival theories to 
EUT (e.g., GT) and to analyse a number of related but non-economic factors with the 
intention to integrate them in formal models of tax evasion decision-making.  
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Many researchers are of the opinion that a tax authority is more interested than taxpayers 
in carrying out its operations in a coherent way that aims to maximise its performance 
(Alm, 1999). As a result of this, GT concepts permit a tax authority to modify their audit 
and enforcement strategies regarding the information present in a taxpayer’s report. This 
means a tax authority becomes a key element of the model. GT is a prescribed form in an 
interactive situation where a tax authority is able to identify those taking part, what their 
preferences are, their personal information, the choices of strategy they are able to make, 
and how these factors might sway the outcome (Chris Georges, 2009). 
 
Incorporating a tax authority into a GT analysis of tax evasion allows a greater 
opportunity for insights and predictions that are not possible in the Basic Economic 
Model of law enforcement. Taking into consideration the effects of both sides (the tax 
agency and the taxpayers) of the tax evasion problem, these often mean different 
conclusions than would come out from looking only at the taxpayer side of the evasion 
equation.  
 
In addition to this, it is evident that current economic models have added many non-
economic factors with regard to taxpayers' compliance decision behaviour. These factors 
have been studied in the fields of sociology, psychology, management, and law and can 
be easily reached by the inclusion of formal and informal institutions (Formal institutions 
include: tax authorities, laws, and rules, while informal institutions include norms of 
behaviour and established conventions for the purpose of evaluating what factors 
determine tax evasion. 
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This study aims to introduce an institutional analysis of tax evasion. It aims specifically 
to emphasise the role of tax authority has in influencing evasion literature. It is vital to 
integrate the tax authority as a central figure in strategies that involve GT. As long as tax 
authorities influence behaviour toward tax evasion and the implementation of the social 
security law, this must always be a key factor. The inclusion of institutionally induced 
variables is decisive in the understanding of SSCE as a pointer to the effectiveness of the 
evaluation of how effective the JSSC is. It must be a marker which not only gauges the 
apparent integrity and even-handedness of the JSSC, but also must show how taxpayers 
understand help and information they receive from the JSSC. In support of this, 
McGillivray (2001) states that ’A lot of attention is paid to the design, structure and 
administration performance of contributory social security schemes. However, unless an 
administrative operation is well implemented, all other aspects of the scheme are 
irrelevant’. 
 
However, one of the main problems of many countries, especially developing countries in 
this field, is the limited capacity of social security bodies in their ability to collect social 
security contributions. Thus, many countries are confronted with the challenge of 
reforming their SSS and the consequent administration. The likelihood of evasion could 
be decreased by more proactive behaviour undertaken by the tax authority towards 
groups of taxpayers and towards individuals. In short, high degrees of evasion can be 
seen by some experts as a result of the low public credibility of SSSs and reflect the 
quality of the scheme’s organisation and the efficiency of its administration. 
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Additionally, the intention of this study is to act as evidence for the importance of the 
Legal and Regulatory Structure (LRS) and to explore related areas such as tax complexity 
in their position as key players in tax evasion. By simplifying tax law and its regulations, 
taxpayers would be able to reduce their cost in time and money and conform more 
correctly to the relevant tax laws (Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992). 
 
Tyler, 1997 and Alm et al, 1999 argue that understanding people’s requirements during a 
legal procedure and how tax law and regulations are implemented helps explain why 
people are unhappy with the process of that law, and how it points towards a solution for 
building public trust in such matters. Tax compliance can be influenced by equity 
considerations as part of the input-output relationship and so the link between tax 
payment and the advantages provided by taxation bodies and government administration 
are highly important. It becomes clear, therefore, that an insufficiency in the efficiency of 
SS provision may well increase the incentive for people to cheat, making it more 
acceptable and easier to carry out (Strban, 2007). It is for these reasons that many 
researchers find some provisions of SSPS can enhance tax evasion. For example, the 
scheme may have been open to strategic manipulation by workers who were able to 
reorganise their employment to take better advantage of their expected pensions and 
minimise their contributions, which are reflected in high rates of tax evasion (see, 
McGillivary, 2001). 
 
This study has aimed its focus particularly at the area of social influence and ethical 
considerations of tax evasion (Elster; 1989, Paldam 2000, Murphy; 2004 and Torgler and 
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Schneider; 2007). Researchers in psychology and sociology emphasise the importance of 
the socialisation process in its ability to affect behaviour. There are two leading 
psychological theories that explain how the socialisation process works with respect to 
compliance behaviour. These are cognitive and social learning (see chapter 3). This study 
argues that a social influence ostensibly plays a significant role in the creation of 
everyday social intercourse and exchange. 
 
Researchers have criticised the Basic Economic Model on the basis that there are a 
number of evasive decisions and enforcement policies that cannot be studied effectively 
within its parameters. Therefore, economists have incorporated the ideas of social 
influence and moral taxpayers to improve the strength of the model. This new economic 
assumption of the interdependence of taxpayers has been added to Basic Economic 
Model by examples such as perceptions of inequity, and feelings of guilt and shame, as 
additional costs of tax evasion to improve the model’s predictability. These suggestions 
aim to enhance the understanding of taxpayers' decisions behaviour and their ability to 
better develop tax enforcement strategy.  
 
As a consequence, there are a greater number of economic models that have taken 
onboard a social agenda by extending the assumptions of the Basic Economic Model to 
incorporate taxpayers’ moral values and the role of their social environment. Research 
suggests that adding the element of tax-related ethics to models of tax compliance is, at 
present, a largely underdeveloped field of study which can, arguably, help to explain low 
levels of tax evasion (Andreoni, et al, 1998). 
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In conclusion, the principal summary findings of the previous studies discussed in 
chapter three suggest tax evasion cannot be explained wholly by tax administration 
deterrence polices and financial incentives, and that therefore, taxpayers’ evasion 
behaviour must be influenced by other factors more than that has been reported by the 
Basic Economic Model. It is very important to integrate the role of NEF in the Basic 
Economic Model of tax evasion. The argument advanced is that these groups of NEF, 
(CME, LRS and ESC) considerably affect and, indeed, determine the SSCE problem. So, 
an effective administration and regulatory procedure, along with, social and ethical 
factors are all important whatever the country, but particularly so in developing countries. 
 
9.3 Empirical conclusion 
 
The first step of this study’s empirical analysis was focused on the descriptive study of 
respondents’ attitudes to the extent of contribution evasion (see Chapter 6). From their 
responses, it can be objectively concluded that the majority of respondents felt SSCE is a 
common, but decreasing problem in Jordan. 
 
Participants demonstrated negative opinions towards the efficiency of JSSC’s audit 
program and penalty structure. In addition, the research demonstrated that the most 
important economic variables that caused an employer to report contribution evasion are 
the high levels of unemployment within the country, the likelihood of an employer 
attempting to minimise labour costs, and the presence of financial hardship at the time 
contributions were due. 
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Generally, survey findings suggest that there is moderate satisfaction with JSSC’s 
performance across the firms approached for this study. The problems highlighted, 
appear to stem from the lack of quality of information provided by JSSC, as well as the 
way in which the corporation treats firms, the relative satisfaction in the way that the 
administration handles its corporate affairs, and the lack of coordination between the 
corporation and outside parties. In addition, some firms believe there are real 
opportunities to collude with JSSC inspectors. 
 
The result also show that limited JSS provision and a lack of linkage between JSSS 
contributions and benefits ranked as the most important variables within LRS. In 
addition, the absence of a firm’s sense of duty and variable levels of morality towards 
JSSCE policy were considered as the most important reasons for the problem of 
contribution evasion within ESC. The respondents' results indicating that the former firm 
behaviour was unethical and socially irresponsible towards the problem of SSCE in 
Jordan. 
 
In order to investigate possible reasons for contribution evasion in depth, this thesis has 
employed quantitative and qualitative methodologies to gather information so as to carry 
out the research objectives. A quantitative approach was maintained by use of multiple 
regression analysis survey data, while the qualitative approach adhered to semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
Chapters seven and eight followed an empirical methodology and is devoted to the 
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analysis and interpretation of the results achieved from the multiple regression analysis 
and semi-structured interviews. Both instruments were used to examine the relationship 
between the four explanatory factors and the contribution evasion of 229 Jordanian firms 
drawn from the JSSC inspection department’s records. 
 
Two fundamental hypotheses were also set up in chapter four and tested in chapter seven, 
by a series of regression analyses to analyse the collected data. The analysis of the sample 
was undertaken at two levels: aggregated (the base regression model) and disaggregated 
levels (the supplementary regression model).  
 
 
At the aggregate level (the base regression model); the analysis undertook the 
examination of the collective relationship between the independent factors and the JSSCE 
for the full sample (the first fundamental hypothesis). The results of the regression model 
for the full sample of firms are indicated highly significant relationship, being at the 0.01 
significance level. They have the power to explain 73.3 % (R square = 0.733) of the 
variation in the contribution evasion. Thus, approximately 0.73 of the variance in the 
dependent variable can be explained by the four factors adopted for the model. The 
results show that the first fundamental hypothesis is supportable and therefore consistent 
with the assumptions of the researcher as to the bases of the general factors that make up 
contribution evasion. 
 
A further standardised coefficient (Beta) was performed to investigate the individual 
contribution of each of the independent factors in explaining contribution evasion. This 
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was so as to examine whether each factor alone was able to predict an outcome allowing 
for the other variables to be controlled.  
 
The regression model identified the EF, CME, LRS, and ESC, to be positively and 
significantly associated with the JSSCE problem. However, among these factors, the LRS 
were found to be the most powerful explanatory variable, where the beta coefficient was 
0.361 at the 1% significant level. The EF was established as being the second most 
important factor. This was directly followed by CME and ESC factors with betas 
equalling .347, .208 and .176 at the 1% significance level respectively. For that reason, it 
is fair to assert that each of these factors is a key determinant in the understanding of the 
contribution evasion problem. 
 
Based on the results obtained from the research methodology chapter (section 4.4.1), four 
sub-hypotheses were developed to obtain a better understanding of the relationships 
between the SSCE and the independent factors. The hypotheses were tested together with 
the ‘T-coefficient’ which indicates whether or not independent sub-factors contribute 
significantly variation in the dependent variable at a chosen significance level. Therefore, 
the relationships between independent factors and the contribution evasion are 
investigated separately using multiple regression analysis to examine the first, second, 
third and fourth alternative hypotheses of the aggregated stage:  
 
H1: There is a significant relationship between contribution evasion and the assessment 
of the Jordanian Social Security Law and its consequent regulations  
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H2: There is a significant relationship between economic factors and the contribution 
evasion problem. 
H3: There is a significant relationship between firms’ satisfaction with the Corporation 
management effectiveness and contribution evasion 
H4: There is a significant relationship between social influence, moral considerations and 
contribution evasion 
 
The result of the regression analysis provides evidence consistent with H1, H2, H3 and 
H4 at the 1% level of significance. Thus, it can be concluded that LRS, EF and CME 
show significant and considerable effects on the contribution evasion. The ESC is 
supported, but its coefficient was lower than other factors and thus gives less explanatory 
power to the determinant of JSSTE. This conclusion is also supported by the results of 
the interviews. 
 
Due to the fact that the purposive factors include a number of sub-factors; the study’s 
results provide evidence on the influence of these sub-factors that shape contribution 
evasion.  
 
Regarding the economic sub-factors, it was observed that the higher the contribution rate, 
the larger the relative size of the contribution evasion. The coefficient for high 
unemployment rates was found to be positive and highly significant with a t-coefficient 
of 3.123, which ostensibly means empirical results confirm the likelihood of being 
detected as a non-compliant firm is mainly the result of labour market conditions. The 
research data indicates a positive and significant coefficient rating regarding the influence 
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of a firm's ability to employ their own accountants for Jordanian firm evasion behaviour 
(t = 1.858). The results suggest that there are a higher proportion of evading firms 
amongst smaller businesses (66.82%). The reason for this may arguably be that they have 
relatively small numbers of employees and a limited budget. 
 
Regarding the coefficient correlation between the CME sub-factors and the contribution 
evasion, there was a negative coefficient relationship (t = - 3.308 and – 2.009 
respectively) at the 0.05 significance levels between the impact upon the ways the JSSC 
handles its affairs and whether the implementation of the compliance procedures by the 
corporation is complicated by the contribution evasion. Generally, these results are 
consistent with the result of McGillivray (2001) in the sense that more attention should be 
paid to the organisational management of SSS, its performance and its administrative 
operation. 
 
In addition, the approachability of corporation employees and the extent to which laws 
and rules are equally enforced by the corporation’s association with the contribution 
evasion are negative and significant (t = -2.341 and -3.461 respectively) at a 0.05 
significance level.  Generally, the previous results confirm that fairness and honesty have 
a significant positive effect on tax compliance behaviour (Feld and Frey 2002). The result 
revealed that lack of knowledge and information provided by the corporation has a 
negative impact on the contribution evasion with significant positive correlation (t = 
2.156) at the 0.05 significance level.  
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The association between the corporation’s efficient use of a computerised system and the 
contribution evasion is positive and significant (t= 8.004) at the .01 significant level. 
These findings are comparable to that obtained by (Masselli et al, 2000) who found that a 
lack of an efficient computerised tax system was likely to increase the level of tax 
evasion.  
 
Furthermore, a significant strong positive correlation was discovered between the lack of 
coordination between the corporation and other governmental bodies and the contribution 
evasion (t = 2.165, Sig = .031). This result is consistent with the result of Alm et al 
(1996) who found that information sharing between SSS and other official agencies could 
reduce the level of contribution evasion problem. 
 
Furthermore, the data analysis revealed three positive significant relationships among 
LRS sub-factors and contribution evasion at the .05 significance levels. There is also the 
concern that there is a lack of linkage between JSSS contribution and benefits and that 
limited SS provision is arguably one of the main reasons for contribution evasion. The 
results are highly positive and significantly related to the contribution evasion problem (t 
= 4.763, 3.242) respectively. Additionally, the statement that the JSSS contains some 
design features which encourage contribution evasion is found to be positive and 
significantly related to the evasion problem, (2.938). These findings are comparable to 
that obtained by (Smith 1992; Pommerehne et al, 1994, Peter and van Dijke, 2007) 
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With regard to the influences of ESC upon the decision of firm to evade or not, feelings 
of shame and guilt in the regression analysis revealed positive and significant coefficient 
correlations with contribution evasion (t = 4.206, Sig = .000). This means that the 
research sample shows a lack of shame and guilt regarding contribution behaviour. 
Actually, this corresponds with the results of descriptive analysis and interviews where 
the respondents showed that contribution evasion does not necessarily generate anxiety 
and guilt towards contribution evasion behaviour. Additionally, the regression model 
indicates the absence of influence of the evasion problem on the firm's professional 
reputation with a positive significant correlation (t = 1.702) at the 0.10 significance level. 
This finding is inconsistent with the finding that obtained by Sigala (2000) who found 
that British sole traders in their professional jobs avoid tax evasion because they believe 
that such actions put their professional reputation at risk.   
 
Furthermore, the regression result indicates a positive and significant correlation between 
the respondent’s morality and the contribution evasion (t = 2.764, Sig = .006). The results 
confirmed that evading Jordanian firms behave consistently in what could be considered 
an immoral way towards the paying of contribution to the JSSS. The finding for this 
variable is consistent with prior studies’ results (Schneider and Enste 2000; Gёrxhani, 
2004; Frey and Torgler 2007). All of these studies support the idea that if a high level of 
tax immorality is reported by group of firms, more evasion is anticipated by these firms. 
 
At the disaggregated stage (supplementary regression model), this part of multiple 
regression analysis aims to examine the influence of company characteristics on the 
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relationship between the independent research factors and the dependent variable (second 
fundamental hypothesis). The analysis was conducted with sub-samples at three levels: 
(1) Firm based on industry type. (2) Firm ownership. (3) Firm size classified according to 
number of employees (see chapter seven). The results show that these models are all 
significant at the 0.01 significance levels. As a result, the second fundamental hypothesis 
is supported.  
 
At the industry level, the regression model for each industry group proved that the LRS, 
CME and EF are the most significant factors in explaining variation in the JSSCE across 
almost each sector. The results for construction firms show that both LRS and CME 
factors have the strongest positive relationship upon the contribution evasion (.426 and 
.268 respectively).  
 
Additionally, the results confirm the importance of the LRS and CME factors in services 
and other sector categories as well as confirming the importance of the EF in services, 
industrial and other sectors ranging from .307 to .447. For the ESC, its coefficient was 
extremely low low—even insignificant in the service, industrial and other sector 
categories, at .05 levels. But there was notable significance for the construction and 
industrial sectors at .01 with (Sig = .000 and .062) respectively. 
 
The first sub-hypothesis of the disaggregated stage, in their alternate form, made the 
following conclusions:  
 
 304 
H5: There are no statistical differences in the level of importance placed on the ranking 
of independent factors among a firm’s occupational sector with respect to the 
contribution evasion problem. The hypothesis was confirmed significantly, except that 
the hypothesis regarding ESC is not fully supported by the multiple regression results. 
 
In the supplementary regression model of firm ownership, LRS and EF remain the most 
important determinants of JSSCE as in the base regression model, and their regression 
coefficient is relatively stable across limited partnership and limited partnership in share. 
Whereas the CME factor has a low coefficient and insignificant contribution to the 
determinant of contribution evasion for limited partnership in share (.062, sig = .528) and 
has a reasonably stable regression coefficient among limited partnership, limited liability 
ranges from.304 to .536 at the .05 significance level. 
 
The significance of the regression coefficients of ESC for firms’ ownership classification, 
is such that the results are found to be less of a contribution to the determinant of 
contribution evasion than the other factors used for limited partnership, having a  
significant positive coefficient of 0.156 at 5% level of confidence. Whereas the 
regression results show that there is a strong positive relationship between ESC factors 
and the contribution evasion in limited liability firms with 0.210 at a 5% level of 
confidence 
 
The second sub-hypothesis of the disaggregated stage, in their alternate form, made the 
following conclusions: 
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H6: There are no statistical differences in the level of importance placed on the ranking 
of independent factors among a firm’s ownership with respect to the contribution evasion 
problem. 
 
The supplementary regression results show higher coefficients of EF and LRS to 
contribution evasion obtained in limited partnership firms, which is the same result as 
with the base regression model. This relationship is though, not found in limited liability 
firms. The regression results do show though, that there is a strong positive relationship 
between the CME and the ESC factors and the contribution evasion in limited liability 
firms. Therefore, the hypothesis was mostly supported by the multiple regression results 
as explained above. 
 
Concerning the firm size sub-sample, there were no significant differences between the 
sub-samples based on small firms and the base regression model. LRS and EF continue to 
have higher positive coefficients and significance followed by the JSSC performance 
factor. The ESC factor, however, has a lower positive coefficient, and is significant at the 
5% level (Beta = 147). The results correlated from medium-sized firms indicated that 
economic, ethical and social factors are considered to be the most important determinants 
to the JSSTE problem. In this study, however, the results revealed larger ESC coefficients 
and significance in the large size firm group, followed by the EF. This is indicated by the 
positive and significant relationship found in large firms between these factors, and with 
JSSTE at  just 1%. The respect of rules and the importance of one’s own reputation were 
more of a concern. 
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The third sub-hypothesis of the disaggregated stage, in their alternate form, made the 
following conclusions:  
 
H7: There are no statistical differences in the levels of importance placed on the ranking 
of independent factors among firms’ size with respect to the contribution evasion 
problem. 
 
This regression result seems to convincingly support the sub-hypothesis mentioned above 
in the case of small firms. The sub-hypothesis, however, was not fully supported in the 
case of medium-sized firms, as the results indicate a partial inconsistency with the base 
regression model. In contrast, the large-sized firm category which represents only a small 
percentage (5.24% of sub-samples) of firms confirmed some significant differences with 
the base regression model. 
 
To summarise, the research data confirmed an agreement with the predictive assumptions 
of the model. Research results has have found strong evidence that the four factors 
significantly influence contribution evasion in Jordan. In all cases, the coefficient was 
significant, controlling for a variety of factors.  
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with the representatives of former 
evading firms and employees at different levels in the JSSC were analysed to support the 
results of the quantitative research. The findings from the interviews identified the same 
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key factors of the JSSCE from the perspective of both groups. These factors reflected the 
interviewees' attitudes and their involvement in the process of contribution evasion. 
 
All the interviewees agreed that contribution evasion is common in Jordan, but is a 
decreasing phenomenon as a result of the improvement in the corporate efficiency and 
increasing awareness level among Jordanian firms. It has a higher prevalence among 
small firms (construction, hotel and transportation) and self-employed workers because 
of the low probability of auditing, is generally financially and socially accepted and the 
incidence of such transactions among colleagues is higher.  
 
Interviewees referred to the contribution evasion problem as being due to the fragile 
design and structure of the contributory SSS, followed by economic factors and a lack of 
administrative efficiency. The interview findings indicated that, ethical and social 
responsibility had no strong influence in contribution compliance. Additionally, the 
interviews results lead us to conclude that there was a lack of equity consideration in the 
scheme and the scheme contains some design features which encourage evasion. 
Therefore, they stressed the importance of reforming the design and structure of the SSS.   
 
All the interviewees believed that, a higher probability of detection and evaders having to 
pay a higher penalty, reduce contribution evasion. The interviewees of formerly evading 
firms indicated that contribution rates are too high and should be reduced. More than half 
of the interviewees agreed that, high unemployment rates are an important EF in 
determining the contribution evasion problem. They also agreed that managers and 
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owners of companies have the motivation to evade in order reducing labour costs. 
Additionally, the threat of financial hardship might be a factor in making some firms 
evade as a result of the priorities of these firms set at the time contributions are due.  
 
All of the interviewees thought that the corporation’s role is very important and it should 
encourage the development of its operations. Most of the interviewees claimed that there 
is inadequate and inaccurate information provided by the JSSC. They also reported that 
there is no efficient information sharing between the Corporation and other governmental 
bodies and it is necessary to have a better system for following-up the evaders. 
 
Apart from the information considered above, there is another factor that needs to be 
considered with regard to the JSSC interviewees. They deemed employers' ways of 
thinking regarding non-compliance as an important source of contribution evasion. The 
JSSC, they argue, must play a central and vital role in forcing them to change these 
destructive ways of thinking by helping to bridge the gap between the corporation and the 
public by putting out a new and better corporate image, and by changing its bureaucratic 
culture so it is less corrupt, more open and forward thinking and supportive, in addition to 
the financial incentives of any scheme.9.4 Strategies to reduce contribution evasion. 
 
9.4. Critical reflections on the work undertaken 
 
 
CE is a huge problem in Jordan as noted in chapter 1, section 1.2. 25% of the members of 
the SSS have not paid their social security and tax dues according to their liability. 
Additionally, the viability of implementing the new extended coverage programme, as 
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adopted in Aqapa in 2009, is poor. The report from the study found that 36% of firms 
within the programme failed to pay their JSSC dues. IMF estimates in its report of 2011
21
 
noted that the percentage of those employed in the black economy in Jordan is around 
26% (where this percentage do not contribute to the retirement pension scheme). 
Therefore, quite plausibly, contribution evasion is rampant in Jordan. 
 
I chose to engage with this subject and the main reason for undertaking the research is 
rooted in my own experience as an employee in Social Security Corporation in Jordan 
since 1988. I am a member of avoiding and evasion contribution committee which has 
responsibility for advising the managements on matters of contribution evasion and 
avoiding strategy. I am also currently working as a head of risk management department 
in JSSC and this problem is one of the critical risk factors which face the sustainability of 
the Social Security Scheme (SSS). Additionally, my study is fully sponsored and funded 
by JSSC so it is very important to find some of managerial solution for some of the JSSS 
and its administration. 
 
As discussed in Chapter four, amalgamations of different methods were employed in this 
study. This was due to the design of the research so as to improve the quality and the 
accuracy of information required for conducting this research, as well as to confirm 
results from the use of different methods. The approach mentioned above is known as 
‘triangulation’, defined by Leedy and Ormrod (2001), as ‘…using two or more data 
source methods within one project so as to help make sure that any data produced by the 
competing methods are consistent with what is expected.’ 
                                                 
21
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Three types of data were employed in the study:  interviews, questionnaire, and literature 
review. Inferences from each data set were assessed with each other to increase the 
accuracy of the findings. In this way, corroborating evidence to support the study’s 
interpretations was able to be formed. This is important in interpretive research because 
the research itself is an actual instrument in the research process. 
 
The results from the analysis of the related tax evasion and SSCE literature, the survey 
questionnaire and the interviews have all supported arguably important findings 
regarding the research problem. Validity is often increased when it ensures that the 
research problem is examined through more than one method of investigation. Briefly, 
regarding triangulation, this occurs when there is a crosscheck on data for internal 
consistency and external validity. These are vital matters of concern for any study (Yin, 
1994; and Saunders et al., 2000). 
 
Additionally, in this study, the sample frame-list was supplemented by interviewing 
Inspection Departments within the JSSC to supply names, sectors, locations and 
telephone numbers of firms who have taken part in tax or social security evasion in the 
past. This kind of process is found to useful as an initial ice-breaker, allowing an 
approach to directly deal with members of the guilty firms, and providing a very quick 
and accurate way of generating a comprehensive sampling frame. There complicity in the 
crime allowed the circumvention of social resistance that would have occurred if the 
study had approached companies who might have refused to cooperate if they felt their 
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position were compromised by the study. The existence of an accurate official list helped 
greatly in overcoming this potential issue (Marsland et al, 1998). 
 
9.5. Contribution to the literature and to theoretical development. 
 
This study makes several theoretical contributions to the theory on contribution 
evasion.To the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to be conducted in Jordan 
and the problem has been investigated from the perspective of former contribution 
evaders. The aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap by evaluating the nature of 
contribution evasion at firm level and to develop an understanding of the main reasons 
why contribution evasion occurs in Jordan. The primary motivation behind this study has 
been to outline the necessity to make changes to the JSSC. This study has made, 
arguably, a notable contribution to the advancement of improvements in the tax evasion 
issue in developing countries, and especially in Jordan. 
 
The current state of the literature informs us that most studies focused on individual 
taxpayers and particularly on income tax in spite of the major evasion problems in other 
areas e.g social security contributions. As Sandmo (2004) mentions: “The models 
surveyed so far all concern evasion by individual taxpayers, while the role of firms has 
been very much in the background.” 
 
The lack of empirical studies on SSCE in many developing countries informs researchers 
in this field of the notable absence of reliable statistics regarding the cause and extent of 
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the evasion question. With this in mind, existing evidence from other research should not 
be relied on heavily to extrapolate conclusions for countries such as Jordan, as this 
empirical data was gathered mainly in America and Europe, and the consequent social 
and cultural differences between them are legion. Again, this study attempts to participate 
in filling in part of this knowledge gap. 
 
In addition, SSCE receives scant attention in the Social Security literature. In general, 
evasion can be investigated from a variety of perspectives. The major purpose of this 
thesis is to extend received knowledge on which factors have an impact on Jordanian 
Social Security contribution evasion (JSSCE) from the former firm evaders perspective. 
Furthermore, the researcher has been granted accesses to the JSSC archives (library) and 
the reports published by the JSSC such as Auditing and Inspection Department.  
 
Generally, as mentioned previously, findings, in the review of the literature, have 
revealed that the Basic Economic Model of Tax Evasion, based on an expected utility 
maximisation approach, predicts a lower level of tax compliance than that actually 
scrutinized. As a result, It is rational to think that there are other factors might explain 
such a lower evasion level. The theoretical model of this study, (the model is explained in 
detail in Chapter 4) used here to explain the Jordanian Social Security contribution 
evasion (JSSCE), gives special attention to economic and non-economic factors namely; 
the impact of Economic Factor (EF), the Corporation Management Effectiveness (CME), 
the Legal and Regulatory Structure (LRS), and Ethical and Social Considerations (ESC). 
In both regression models used in this thesis we will consider if Non-Economic Factors 
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(NEF) are revealed to have any impact compared to EF across the multiple regression 
analyses. 
 
It was found that, EF remains the next most significant determinant of the contribution 
evasion in both regression models, but non-economic factors are revealed to have a 
vitally important impact on the contribution evasion compared to EF across the multiple 
regressions analyses. 
 
9.4 Strategies to reduce contribution evasion 
 
It is arguably very clear from the findings of this study that the enforcement of frequently 
audited legal requirements with stringent penalties in itself is insufficient to prevent 
contributors from evading payment to the JSSC. Thus, based on the researcher experience 
and the outcomes of the research findings, the study recommends further options both 
within and beyond frequently mentioned strategies that are asserted to influence for 
contribution evasion.  
 
 Giving JSSC the legally enforced right to check employers’ records and give them 
unfettered access to any pertinent information such as employers’ bank statements, 
income tax returns, and other financial documentation, so the number of employees can 
be ascertained accurately, and that salaries and remunerations match with corporation 
registration and the records of all contributions paid. Confidentiality should not prevent 
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the JSSC from doing its statutory role of supporting compliance in SS contribution 
obligations 
 The JSSC should have an adequate number of trained inspectors who are sufficiently 
well paid  i.e., as well as civil servants in other similar roles, so as to ensure their honesty, 
and, a demonstrable availability of resources for them to carry out competent inspections 
so allowing them to strengthen their enforcement policy. 
 The JSSC can educate JSSC employers through educational programmes which 
involve sufficient, truthful and dependable information to allow them to make more 
knowledgeable decisions about different facets of JSSS legal requirements.  
 The JSSC should undertake public relations and educational campaigns to promote 
compliance. JSSS must convince workers through the benefits they provide and the 
efficiency of their operations, that, despite claims that their operations are untenable, they 
are dependable suppliers of benefits for insured and retired people. In addition, public 
perceptions need to be changed to come in line with the idea that noncompliance is 
unacceptable. 
 The JSSC should make a regular account of workers’ data statements that include 
their contributions and on their behalf so they can prove their contributions and ensure it 
has been properly remitted and recorded, while at the same time being reminded of the 
benefit rights they have.  
 The JSSC can enforce compliance indirectly through pragmatic rules which require 
an employer to be licensed by the JSSS as being of good character before being issued a 
business licence, to bid on government contracts, or to receive an export licence, for 
example.  
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 The JSSC can reform scheme design faults which dampen compliance in order to 
ameliorate the employers and workers’ incentives to contribute. For example, the JSSC 
can modify requirements which hearten strategic exploitation of contributory periods in 
order to maximise benefits and minimise contributions.  
 The JSSC can coordinate verification and enforcement activities with other collection 
authorities in order to examine whether employers or workers pay the correct corporate 
or personal income tax and whether or not they have paid their social correct security 
contributions. This task of coordination should involve cross-checking income records 
from various governmental bodies. Therefore, diverse authorities should cooperate 
together to stabilise Jordanian firms’ compliance behaviour. 
 
9.5 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
While this study has provided what is essentially valuable insight into the nature and 
forms of contribution evasion, there are some limitations. These limitations do have a 
bearing on the implications of the study results.  
 
The first comes from the poor publications of SSCE in general and a lack of contribution 
evasion statistics, particularly for example, the extent of SSCE practices. Statistics, either 
in Jordan, or the rest of Middle East and developing counties, were sometimes not found 
or sometimes were not reliable. This lack of coverage and even lack of transparency is a 
common factor in the context of the Middle East.  
The second limitation was that contribution evasion most often comes about ostensibly 
because there is a general regional failure to directly observe contribution evasion 
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behaviour, or that the will to observe it also is lacking. As such, most of the empirical 
evidence given here, is based on personal self-reports to describe particular evasion 
behaviour which has been, perhaps unfairly, extrapolated to wider society. Evaders’ 
behaviour could be affected by specific local circumstances, which are difficult to 
control, and may not necessarily show up in the results of the particular Jordanian firms 
interviewed here. People, in particular instances that relate to specific locations or 
cultures that do not extend beyond the target areas, might refuse to answer questions or 
moderate their views to reduce the possibility that information could be used non-
confidentially. Therefore, the difficulty facing researchers is how to encourage 
participants to respond, and then to provide honest responses that bear up to scrutiny. 
 
The direct result of this research is that there are a number of recommendations that have 
been posited for future research. First of all, the greatest potential progress for future 
research on contribution compliance might stem from sophisticated comparisons across 
occupational sectors, and in different cultures, cities or even nations. A comparative 
occupational sector analysis among firms is especially important as standard models of 
taxpayer behaviour do not pay close enough attention to the influence of occupational 
sectors on tax compliance behaviour. This will help to better understand the role of 
occupational groups for contribution evasion. Then, there is the opportunity to develop 
appropriate strategies to combat contribution evasion problems by targeting groups' 
sensitivity to their transactions with contribution evasion.  
Finally, the respondents' results indicate that the behaviour of firms that evaded 
contribution was unethical and socially irresponsible in many cases. The results of this 
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research may motivate researchers to do further research concerning this issue and thus 
contribute more effectively to the adjustment of compliance behaviour towards SS 



























































Akers, R.L. (1985), Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach, 3rd ed., Wadsworth, 
Belmont, CA 
Alexander J. & Austin. J. (1992) Handbook for Evaluating Objective Prison 
Classification Systems. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San 
Francisco, CA 94105. 
Allingham, G. and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis,” 
Journal of Public Economics Vol. 1, pp.  323-338. 
Alm, J. (1991). A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting, The 
Accounting Review. Vol. 66, pp, 577-593. 
Alm, J. (1999) Tax Compliance and Administration, in: W. B. Hildreth, J. A. Richardson 
(eds.), Handbook on Taxation. New York: Marcel Dekker: pp, 741-768. 
Alm, J. and N. J. McCallin (1990) Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion as a Joint Portfolio 
Choice, Public Finance. Vol. 45, pp, 193-200. 
Alm, J. et al. (1992a) “Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with 
Experimental Data”, National Tax Journal. Vol. 45 no. 1 pp. 107-114.  
Alm, J., B. R. Jackson and M. McKee (1993) Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision 
Institutions, and Tax Compliance, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization. Vol. 22, pp, 285-303. 
Alm, J., Erard, B., and Feinstein, J. S. (1996). The relationship between state and federal 
tax audits, in Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation (M. Feldstein and J. 
M. Poterba, eds.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 235-273. 
Alm, J., et al (1992). “Why Do People Pay Taxes?” Journal of Public Economics .Vol. 
48, pp, 21-48. 
Alm, J., et al (1999) “Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting”, 
KYKLOS.  Vol. 48. PP. 141-171 
Alm, J., G. H. McKee and W. Beck (1990). Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and Tax 
Compliance, National Tax Journal. 43: 23-37. 
 320 
Alm, J., J. Martinez-Vazquez and B. Torgler (2006) Russian Attitudes Toward Paying 
Taxes – Before, During, and After the Transition, International Journal of Social 
Economics. Vo.33, pp, 832-857 
Alm, J., J. Martinez-Vazquez and Friedrich Schneider (2004) ‘Sizing’ the Problem of the 
Hard-To Tax, paper presented at the “Hard to Tax: An International Perspective” 
in J. Alm, J. Martinez Vazquez, and S. Wallace (eds.) Taxing the Hard-to-Tax, 
Elsevier: Amsterdam. 
Alm. J. (1998) “Tax Compliance and Administration” Discussion Papers In Economics, 
Working Paper No. 98-12. 
Andreoni, J., B. Erard and J. Feinstein (1998) Tax Compliance, Journal of Economic 
Literature. Vol. 36.pp. 818-860. 
Antonides G; Robben H.S.J., December (1995) True positives and false alarms in the 
detection of tax evasion. Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 16. No. 4, pp. 
617-640. 
Arsham H., (1995) System Simulation: The Shortest Route to Applications, available 
from http://ubmail.ubalt.edu/~harsham/simulation/sim.htm#rwis, accessed 16.5. 
2006]. 
Awad, Y. et, al. (1998) “Non-compliance with the minimum wage law in Israel: an 
empirical investigation” Paper presented at the 2nd International Research 
Conference on Social Security Jerusalem, 25-28 January 1998.  
Babbie, E. (1998) "The practice of social research".4
th
 Ed. Belmont (CA): Wadsworth 
Publishing Company. 
Bagchi, A., Bird, R., and Das-Gupta, A. (1995). An economic approach to tax 
administration reform, Discussion Paper No. 3, International Centre for Tax 
Studies, University of Toronto. 
Bahl, R and Richard M. Bird, (2008), Tax Policy in Developing Countries: Looking Back 
and Forward, National Tax Journal Vol. 61, pp. 279-301 
Bailey, Clive and John Turner (2001) “”Strategies to Reduce Contribution Evasion in 
Social Security Financing.” World Development (February): No. 385-393. 
Baily, C.and Turner, J . (1997) Contribution Evasion and Social Security: Causes and 
Remedies, International Labour Office 
 321 
Baker, M. (2001) “Selecting a Research Methodology”, The marketing review. pp.  373-
397. 
Baker, M. (2002) "Sampling", The Marketing Review, Vol.3 No.1, pp.103-120. 
Beck, P. J. Davis and W. Jung (1994). Tax Advise and Reporting Under Uncertainty: 
Theory and A. Experimental Evidence. Working Paper, University of Illinois. 
Becker, S. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of 
Political Economy. Vol. 76. pp. 169-217. 
Berle, A. and G. Means, (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New 
York, Macmillan). 
Blackwell, C. (2002). A Meta-Analysis of Tax Compliance Experiments, Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society and Economic Science 
Association, San Diego, March 22-24, 2002. 
Blaikie, N. (2000) “Designing Social Research” Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Blalock, H. M., Jr. (1982). Conceptualization and Measurement in the social sciences. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.  
Blalock, H.M. Jr. (1969). Theory construction: From verbal to mathematical formulas. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Blanthorne C, Kaplan S. (2008) An egocentric model of the relations among the 
opportunity to underreport, social norms, ethical beliefs, and underreporting 
behavior. Account., Organizations Society Vo;. 33, pp, 684-703. 
Blumenthal, M. and J. Slemrod (1992) The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual 
Income Tax System: A Second Look after Tax Reform, National Tax Journal. 
Vol. 45.pp. 185-2002. 
Brautigam, D, Fjeldstad and Moore M (2008), Taxation and State Building in Developing 
Countries, Cambridge University Press 
Burges, R.; Stern, N. (1993): Taxation and Development, Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 31.No.2. pp. 762-830. 
Camerer, C.F., Loewenstein, G. and Rabin, M. (2004) “Advances in behavioural 
economics” Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Carroll, S. (1986) “A Cognitive-Process Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance.”   Prepared 
for the Symposium on Taxpayer Compliance Research, National Academy of 
 322 
Sciences, South Padre Island, Texas. Available from 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/2132/1/SWP-1739-20844667.pdf  
Casanegra de Jantscher, M. and R. M. Bird (1992). The Reform of Tax Administration, in 
: M. Casanegra de Jantscher and R. M. Bird (eds.), Improving Tax Administration 
in Developing Countries. Washington: International Monetary Fund: 1-18. 
Cebula, R. (1997) An empirical analysis of the impact of government tax and auditing 
policies on the size of the underground economy: the case of the United States, 
1973-94 - includes related article on underground economy. American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology. 56/ 2, pp.173-185. 
Choi, J and Thum M (2005), Corruption and the Shadow Economy, International 
Economic Review Vol. 46, pp. 817-836 
Christie E and Holzner, M (2006) What Explains Tax Evasion? An Empirical 
Assessment based on European Data by wiiw Working Papers, No. 40,  
Chung, P. (1976) On Complaints about High Taxes, an Analytical Note, Public Finance. 
Vol. 31.pp. 36-47. 
Coakes, S.J., Steed, L.G. (1997), SPSS: Analysis without Anguish, John Wiley & Sons, 
New York, NY. 
Coase, Ronald (1937). “The nature of the firm.” Economica Vol. 4, pp, 386-405. 
Colorado State University, (2004), Key Terms, Available from 
<http://writing.colostate.edu/references/research/glossary/#external_validity>, 
[accessed 11.5.2006]. 
Comrey A, Lee. H (1992) "A first course in factor analysis". Academic Press, San Diego, 
and University of California. 
Cowell, .A. (1990) “Cheating the Government, The Economics of Evasion”. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Cowell, A. (1992) “Tax Evasion and Inequity”, Journal of Economic Psychology. Vol. 
13, PP.521-543. 
Cowell, F. A. (1981) Taxation and labour supply with risky activities, Economica, Vol. 
48.pp.365-379. 
 323 
Cowell, F. A. (1991) Tax-Evasion Experiments: An Economist’s View, in: P. Webley, H. 
Robben, H. Elffers and D. Hessing, Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 123-127. 
Cowell, F. A. und J. P. F. Gordon (1988). Unwillingness to Pay: Tax Evasion and Public 
Good Provision. Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 36.pp. 305-321. 
Crane, S. E., and Nourzad, F. (1992) Analysing Income Tax Evasion Using Amnesty 
Data with Self-Selection Correction: The case of the Michigan Tax Amnesty 
Program, in Why People Pay Taxes (J. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 167-189. 
Cullis, J. and Lewis, A. (1997), "Why people pay taxes: From a conventional economic 
model to a model of social convention", Journal of Economic Psychology,, Vol. 
18, pp.305-321. 
Cummings, R. G., J. Martinez-Vazquez and M. McKee (2001). Cross Cultural 
Comparisons of Tax Compliance Behavior, Working Paper No. 01-03. George 
State University. School of Policy Studies. 
Das-Gupta, A. and D. Mookherjee (1995) Reforming Indian Income Tax Enforcement, 
IED, Discussion,  Paper Series, No. 52, Boston University. 
De Oliveira, F.(1997) “Basic Issues in Reforming Social Security Systems” TEXTO 
PARA DISCUSSÃO No. 535, Rio de Janeiro ( English).   
De Vaus, D.A (1991) “Survey in Social Research” 3
rd
 ed. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.  
Denzin NK, Lincoln YS (1998) “The Landscape of Qualitative Research”. London, 
Sage. 
Dhami, S & Al-Nowaihi, A (2006) "A Simple Model Of Optimal Tax Systems: Taxation, 
Measurement And Uncertainty," Manchester School, University of Manchester, Vol. 
74, No. 6, pp, 645-669 
Dimitrov, L., Gancheva, A., Pashev, K., 2004. The hidden economy in Bulgaria: 
Characteristics, structure and size. In: Iliev, P. (Ed.), The hidden economy in 
Bulgaria. Report, The Center for the Study of Democracy. Gillion, C., Turner, J., 
Bailey, C 
Dreher, A and Friedrich S (2006), Corruption and the Shadow Economy – An Empirical 
Analysis, CREMA Working Paper 2006-01. 
 324 
Dubin, J. A. and L. L. Wilde (1988). An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax 
Auditing and Compliance, National Tax Journal. Vol.41.pp. 61-74. 
E. Schneider & D. Enste (2000) Shadow economies: size, causes, and consequences, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.38, pp. 77–114. 
Easterby-Smith, M (1991), “Management Research: An Introduction”, Sage 
Publications, London.  
Easterby-Smith. M et al, (1997) “Management Research: an Introduction”. London, 
Sage. 
Elffers, H. (1991). Income Tax Evasion: Theory and Measurement. Amsterdam: Kluwer. 
Elster, J. (1989). “The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order”. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Erard, B. (1993). Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax 
Practitioners in Tax Compliance, Journal of Public Economics. 52: 163-197. 
Erard, B. (1997) Self-Selection with Measurement Errors: A Microeconometric Analysis 
of the Decision to Seek Tax Assistance and its Implication for Tax Compliance, 
Journal of Econometrics. Vol. 81. pp. 319-356. 
Erard. B and Feinstein. J (1994) “Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game” 
RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 25. No. 1. pp.1-20.  
Everest-Phillips, Max (2008a), Business Tax as state building in developing countries: 
applying governance principles in private sector development, International 
Journal of Regulation and Governance Vol.8, pp, 123-154. 
Falkinger, J. (1995). Tax Evasion, Consumption of Public Goods and Fairness, Journal of 
Economic Psychology. Vol. 16. pp. 63-72. 
Feinstein, J. S. (1991) An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its 
Detection, RAND Journal of Economics. 22: 14-35. 
Feld, P. and B. Frey (2002). “Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated”, 
Economics of Governance .Vol. 3. pp. 87-99. 
Filer, R.K. and Hanousek, J. (2002). Data watch. Research data from Transition 
Economies. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol.16/1, pp, 225-240. 
Fink A. (2003) “The survey handbook” 2
nd
 Edition. Sage Publications.  
 325 
Forest, A. and S. M. Sheffrin (2002). Complexity and Compliance: An Empirical 
Investigation, National Tax Journal. Vol. 55. pp. 75-88. 
Frank, R.H. (1988), Passions within Reason, W.W. Norton, New York, NY. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (1992). “Research methods in the social 
sciences” (4
th
 ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Franzoni, A. (1999) “Tax evasion and tax compliance” Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, PP. 52-94. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Frey, B. and B. Torgler (2007). “Tax morale and conditional cooperation”, Journal of        
Comparative Economics. Vol. 35. pp.136–159 
Frey, B. S. and R. Eichenberger (1999). The New Democratic Federalism for Europe. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Friedland, N. et al (1978). “A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion”, Journal of 
Public Economics. Vol. 10. pp. 107-116. 
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P., (1999): “Dodging the 
Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries”, 
Discussion paper, Washington D.C: World Bank, pp. 27. 
Gary, R. and Mitchell, O. (1995) “Social Security Administration in Latin America and 
the Caribbean”. Paper prepared for Public Sector Modernization and Private 
Sector Development Unit, World Bank Working Paper, March. 
Gërxhani K (2002). Tax Evasion in Albania: An Institutional Vacuum? Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam 
Gërxhani, K. (2003) Tax Evasion in Transition: Outcome of an Institutional Clash? - 
Testing Feige’s Conjecture in Albania – working paper available from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=643784 accessed on 12/10/06. 
Gill, J. & Johnson, Ph., (2002) “Research Methods for Managers”, 3
rd
 ed., Sage 
publishing, UK. 
Gillion, C., Turner, J., Bailey, C., Latulippe, D. (Eds.), 2000. Social security pensions. 
Development and reform. International Labour Organisation .Geneva. 
Gorard, S. (2001) "Quantitative Methods in Educational Research: The role of numbers 
made easy", London: Continuum 
 326 
Gorard, S. (2001) “International comparisons of school effectiveness: a second 
component of the 'crisis account’?” Comparative Education, Vol. 37, No. 3. PP. 
279-296. 
Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). Factor analysis. 2
nd
 ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Graetz, M. J. and Wilde. L. (1985) The Economics of Tax Compliance: Facts and 
Fantasy, National Tax Journal. Vol. 38: 355-363. 
Graetz. M. Beinganum. J and Wild L. (1986) The tax compliance game:  toward an 
interactive theory of law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization. Vol. 2.No.1. pp.1-32.   
Grasmick, H. G. and R. J. Bursick (1990) Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational 
Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, Law and Society Review. Vol. 24, pp. 
837-861 
Grasmick, H. G., R. J. Bursik and J. K. Cochran (1991). “Render Unto Caesar What Is 
Caesar’s“: Religiosity and Taxpayers‘ Inclinations to Cheat, Sociological 
Quarterly. Vol. 32. pp. 251-266. 
Grolier Encyclopaedia, (2003), Phenomenology, Available from 
http://pratt.edu/~arch543p/ help/phenomenology.html  
Gujarati, D. (2003) “Basic Econometrics”.4
th
 Edition, New York: Mecgraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Gёrxhani, K. (2004), ‘Tax Evasion in Transition: Outcome of an Institutional Clash? 
Testing Feige’s Conjecture in Albania’, European Economic Review, Vol.48, 
pp.729-745. 
Hair, J, F., Jr., Babin, , Money, B. Arthur H., and Philip.S. (2003). "Essentials of 
Business Research Methods". Wiley: Malloy Inc., USA. 
Hair, Jr., et al (1998) "Multivariate Data Analysis". 5
th
 ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ:   
Prentice Hall. 
Hanna, S. (1995) “Efficiencies of user participation in natural resource management”, in 
Property Rights and the Environment – Social and Ecological Issues, Beijer 
International Institute of Ecological Economics and The World Bank. 
Washington, DC. 
Hanousek, J and Palda, F. (2003). Tax Evasion in the Czech and Slovak Republics: A 
Tale of Twins, in: Boyan Beleg (ed.), The Informal Economy in Transition 
 327 
Countries: Measurement, and Implications for Policy. World Bank/Bertelsman 
Group. 
Hardin, R. (1982) Collective Action. J Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Hardin, R. (1998). Trust in Government, in: V. Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds.), 
Trust and Governance. New York: Russell Sage Foundation: pp. 9-27. 
Harding, S. (1987) “Feminism and methodology”. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Hart, K., (1973) “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana”, 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 11, 1, pp. 61-89. 
Hasseldine J, Hite P, James S, Toumi M (2007). Persuasive communications: Tax 
compliance enforcement strategies for sole proprietors. Contemp Account. 
Res.Vol. 24: pp, 171-194. 
Hasseldine, D. J. and Bebbington, J. (1991) "Blending Economic Deterrence and Fiscal 
Psychology Models in the Design of Responses to Tax Evasion: The New 
Zealand Experience" Journal of Economic Psychology. Vol.12, pp 299-324. 
Hasseldine, D. J., Kaplan, S. E., & Fuller, L. R. (1994). Characteristics of New Zealand 
tax evaders: A note. Accounting and Finance, Vol.34, pp. 79-93.  
Hatcher, L. (1994) A step-by-step approach to using the SAS(R) system for factor 
analysis and structural equation modeling. Cary, NC: SAS Institute.  
Hausman, D., and McPherson, M., (1996) “Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy”, 
Cambridge MA, Cambridge University Press 
Heiner, R. A. (1983) The Origin of Predictable Behavior, American Economic Review. 
Vol. 73. pp. 560-595. 
Heiner, R. A. (1990). Rule-Governed Behavior in Evolution and Human Society, 
Constitutional Political Economy. Vol.1.pp. 19-46. 
Hoinville, G. and Jowell, R. & Associates (1978) “Survey Research Practice”. 
Heinemann, Educational Book, London. 
Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System.” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 84.No. 4, pp. 972–91. 
 328 
Houston J and Tran A (2001). A Survey of Tax Evasion Using the Randomized Response 
Technique. Adv. Taxation, Vol.13, pp, 69-94. 
Hunt, S. et al (1982) “The pre-test in survey research: Issues and preliminary findings” 
Journal of Marketing Research. Vol.19. PP, 269-273 
ILO (2007) Main conclusions of the International Labour Office Concerning the Sixth 
Actuarial Valuation of the Jordanian Social Security Corporation as at 31 
December 2007. International Labour Office – Geneva, ILO publications. 
Ira N. Gang, Omkar Goswami, and Amal Sanyal, (2000) Corruption, Tax Evasion and the 
Laffer Curve. Public Choice. Vol. 105. pp. 61-78. 
Jackson, B. R. and V. C. Milliron (1986). Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems, 
and Prospects, Journal of Accounting Literature. Vol. 5, pp, 125-166. 
Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A Review. Journal of Economic Surveys. Vol.15. pp. 71-
121. 
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 3 
No. 4, pp. 305-360. 
Johnson, S., McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C., (1999) “Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and 
Unofficial Activity after Communism”, Discussion paper No. 2105, Center for 
Economic Policy Research, London. 
JSSC, Annual Report, 2004 
JSSC, Annual report, 2006  
JSSC, Annual Report, 2008 
JSSC, Annual Report, 2009  
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A, (1979) “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk” Econometrica. Vol. 2. No. 2. pp. 263-292.  
Kanniainen, V., S. Kari and J. Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005), The Start-Up and Growth Stages 
in Enterprise Formation: The "New View" of Dividend Taxation Reconsidered, 
CESifo Working Papers No. 1476, 2005. 
Kanniainen, Vesa and Jenni Paakkonen (2004), Anonymous Money, Moral Sentiments 
and Welfare, CESifo Working Paper Series No 1258. 
 329 
Kaplan, S. E. and Reckers, P. M. J. (1985). A study of tax evasion judgments. National 
Tax Journal, Vol. 38, pp. 97-102. 
Kasper, W. and M. E. Streit (1999). Institutional Economics. Social Order and Public 
Policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Kazemier, B. and van Eck, R. (1992). Survey Investigations of the Hidden Economy. 
Some Methodological Results. Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 13, pp. 
569-587. 
Kelchev, A. (2006) Tax and social security contributions evasion in Bulgaria. Working 
paper – Department of Economics, Stanford University. 
Kennedy, P. (1998) “A Guide to Econometrics”. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Kesner-Skreb, Marina, (1997), The Unofficial Economy and Development, paper 
presented in the International Workshop .The Importance of Unofficial Economy 
in Economic Transition., Zagreb. 
Klepper, S., and Nagin, D. (1989b). The role of tax practitioners in tax compliance, 
Policy Sciences, Vol.22.pp. 167-192. 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A 
Cross-Country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 4. pp. 1251-
1288. 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A 
Cross-Country Investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 4. pp. 1251-
1288. 
Kohlberg, L. (1984), Essays on Moral Development: Vol. II, Harper & Row, San 
Francisco, CA. 
Krathwohl, D. (1997). Methods of Educational and Social Science Research: An 
Integrated Approach, 2
nd
  Ed. Addison Wesley Longman 
Krause, K. (2000). “Tax Complexity: Problem or Opportunity”, Public Finance Review. 
Vol. 28. pp. 395-414. 
Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, 
Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press 
Laffont, J. J. (1975). Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics: an 
Introduction to Kantian Economics, Economic Journal. Vol.42.pp. 430-437. 
 330 
Levi, M. (1997). Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Levin, M. and G. Satarov (2000) Corruption and Institutions in Russia, European Journal 
of Political Economy. Vol.16.pp. 113-132. 
Levine, F.J., Tapp, J.L. (1977), "The dialectic of legal socialization in community and 
school", in Tapp, J.L., Levine, F.J. (Eds),Law, Justice and the Individual in 
Society: Psychological and Legal Issues, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 
NY. 
Lewis, A. (1982) “The Psychology of Taxation”. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 
Lewis, H. B. (1971) “Shame and Guilt in Neurosis”. New York: International University 
Press. 
Lieberman, E. (2002), Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: 
Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research, Studies of Comparative 
International Development Vol.36. No.1, pp. 89-115 
Long, J. E. and S. B. Caudill (1987) The Usage and Benefits of Paid Tax Return 
Preparation, National Tax Journal. Vol. 40. pp. 35-46. 
Marsland, N. et al (2001) Combining quantitative (formal) and qualitative (informal) 
survey methods. Socio-economic Methodologies for Natural Resources Research. 
Best Practice Guidelines. Chatham, UK: Natural Resources Institute. 
Marsland, N., Wilson, I., Abeyasekera, S., and Kleih,U. (1998) A Methodological 
Framework for Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Survey Methods – 
Background. Paper: Types of Combinations. Report written for DFID Research 
project R7033. 
Martin. L. (2000) “Effective data collection”, Total Quality Management, VoL. 11.  No. 
3, PP.341- 344. 
Mason J., (2002), “Qualitative researching” SAGE publication, London. 
Masselli, J., R. Ricketts, V. Arnold and S. G. Sutton (2000). The Impact of Embedded 
Intelligent Agents of Tax Compliance Decisions, unpublished manuscript, Texas 
Tech University. 
 331 
McClelland, S.B., (1994) “Training Needs Assessment, Data-gathering Methods: part 2-
Individual Interviews. Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 18 No. 2, 
pp. 27-31. 
McColgan P. (2001), Agency Theory and corporate governance: a review of the literature 
from a UK perspective, University of Strathclyde, draft paper May (2001). 
 
McDaniel, C., and R. Gates. (2002) “Marketing research: The impact of the internet”. 5
th
 
Ed. Cincinnati, OH: South–Western.  
McGill, G. A. (1988). The CPA’s Role in Income Tax Compliance: An Empirical Study 
of Variability in Recommending Aggressive Tax Positions, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Texas Tech University. 
McGillivray, W. (2001) “Contribution evasion: implications for social security pension 
schemes.” International Social Security Review. Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 3-22.  
Meca, B.; Xhumari, M.; Shehi, E., Poci, A. (2000) The evasion of social insurance 
contributions in agricultural self-employed, International Social Security 
Association Research Programme, The year 2000 International Research, 
Conference in Social Security, Helsinki, September. 
Mironov. M. (2006) Economics of Spacemen: Tax Evasion and Firm Performance. 
Evidence from Russian banking transaction data. available from 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~mmirono1/research/spacemen2.pdf accessed on 
22/1/07 
Murphy, K. (2004) An examination of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the Australian tax 
system: Findings from a survey of tax scheme investors. Working Paper No. 46. 
November 2004. 
Nichols, P. (1991). "Social Survey Methods. A fieldguide for Development Workers". 
Development Guidelines No. 6. Oxfam Publications, Oxford. 
North, D.C., (1990), the contribution of the new institutional economics to an 
understanding of the transition problem, WIDER Annual Lectures 1 (Helsinki: 
UNU/WIDER). 
North, D.C., (1994), Economic performance through time, The American Economic 
Review. Vol. 84. No.3. pp.359-368. 
 332 
Oppenheim, A.N. (1992): Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement. Pinter Publishers, London and New York 
Paldam, M. (2000) Social Capital: One or many? - Definition and measurement, Journal 
of Economic Surveys, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp, 629-653. 
Pallant. J. (2005) “SPSS Survival Manual: A Step by Step Guide to Data Analysis Using 
SPSS”. 2
nd
 Ed. Open University Press. 
Pashev, K., (2005). Corruption and tax compliance. Challenges to tax policy and 
administration. Report no.16, Center for the Study of Democracy. 
Penrose, E (1959), “The Theory of the Growth of the Firm”, Oxford University Press 
Peter, V. and van Dijke, M. (2007) A Self-Interest Analysis of Justice and Tax 
Compliance: How Distributive Justice Moderates the Effect of Outcome 
Favourability, Journal of Economic Psychology,  
Polinsky, A. and S. Shavell (1999) “Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement”, 
Working Paper 171, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law 
School. 
Polit, DF. et al (2001) Essentials of Nursing Research: Methods, Appraisal and 
Utilisation. Philadelphia, Lippincott. 
Pommerehne, W. W., A. Hart and B. S. Frey (1994), Tax Morale, Tax Evasion and the 
Choice of Policy Instruments in Different Political Systems, Public Finance. 49 
(Supplement): pp.52-69. 
Ralph. C. (2006) A contest with the taxman: the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and    
wastefully invested resources. European Economic Review, Vol. 50, pp 1071–
1104. 
Reinganum, J. F. and L. L. Wilde (1991). Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in 
the Presence of Tax Practitioners, Journal of Law Economics and 
Organization.Vol. 7. pp.163-181. 
Reynaldo. J.  and  Santos. A. (1999) Cronbach's Alpha: A Tool for Assessing the 
Reliability of Scale. The Journal of Extension.Vol.37 No. 2.  
Richardson G (2006). Determinants of tax evasion: a cross-country investigation. J. Int. 
Acc. Auditing Taxation, Vol.15, pp, 150-169. 
 333 
Ritsema, C. et al. (2003) “Economic and Behavioral Determinations of Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from the 1997 Arkansas Tax Penalty Amnesty Program,” Presented at 
the 2003 IRS research Conference.  
Rofman, R. and G. Demarco (1999): ‘Collecting and Transferring Pensio n 
Contributions’. Social Protection Discussion Paper. No. 9907. The World Bank. 
Washington. 
Rose-Ackerman (1997) The Political Economy of Corruption, in: K. A. Elliott (ed.). 
Corruption and the Global Economy. Washington D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics: 31-60. 
Rossman, G. B., & Wilson, B. L. (1991). Numbers and words revisited: Being 
“shamelessly eclectic”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL. (ERIC Document Reproduction 
Service No. (ED 377 235) 
Roth, J., et al (1989) “Taxpayer Compliance”. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Sakurai, Y. and V. Braithwaite (2001). Taxpayers’ Perceptions of the Ideal Tax Adviser: 
Playing Safe or Saving Dollars?, Working Paper No 5, The Australian National 
University, Centre of Tax System Integrity. 
Salant, P. and Dillman, D.A. (1994) “How to Conduct your Own Survey”. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., New York, Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore. 
Sandmo, A. (1975). “Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities,” Swedish Journal 
of Economics, pp. 86-98. 
Sandmo, A. (2004) “The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view” Discussion Paper 
31/04. 
Sapnas, K. G., and Zeller, R. A. (2002). Minimizing sample size when using exploratory 
factor analysis for measurement. Journal of Nursing Measurement, Vol.10, pp, 
135–154. 
Saunders, M. (2000) “Research methods for business students”, 2nd Ed, Financial 
Times/Prentice Hall. 
 334 
Scandura.T and Williams, E. (2000) Research methodology in management: current 
practices, trends, and implications. Academy of Management Journal. Vol.43. 
No.6 pp. 1248-1264.  
Schneider, F. (2007), Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: new 
estimates for 145 countries, Economics, The Open Access, Open Assessment e 
Journal, No. 2007-9. 
Schneider, F. and D. Enste (2000) Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences, 
Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 38, pp, 77-114. 
Scholz, J. T. and N. Pinney (1995) Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis 
of Citizenship Behavior, American Journal of Political Science. Vol.39.pp. 490-
512. 
Schwartz, R. and S. Orleans (1967) On Legal Sanctions, University of Chicago Law 
Review. Vol. 34. pp. 282-300. 
Scotchmer, S. (1989) The Effect of Tax Advisors on Tax Compliance, in: J. A. Roth and 
J. T. Scholz (eds.), Taxpayer Compliance: Social Science Perspective, Vol. 2. 
University of Pennsylvania Press: 182-199. 
Sekaran, U. (2003) "Research methods for business: A skill building approach". 4
th
 ed. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Sharlene, H. et al (2005) “The practice of qualitative research” .Saga publications. Inc. 
Sheffrin, S. M. and R. K. Triest (1992). Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and 
Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in: J. Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes. 
Tax Compliance and Enforcement, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 
pp.193-218. 
Shelton, S. T. (2002) Employees, Supervisors, and Empowerment in the Public Sector: 
The Role of Employee Trust. (PhD dissertation), North Carolina State University.  
Shih, FJ. (1998) Triangulation in nursing research: issues of conceptual clarity and 
purpose. Journal of Advanced Nursing. Vol. 28 NO. 3, PP. 631-641. 
Sigala, M. (2000) Social Norms, Occupational Groups and Income Tax Evasion: A 
Survey in the UK Construction Industry. Open Discussion Papers in Economics, 
available from http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/economics/research/ 
ecoressubset/ecoresinfopops/No26.pdf. Accessed on 18/10/06.   
 335 
Silvani, C. and K. Baer (1997) Designing a Tax Administration Reform Strategy: 
Experiences and Guidelines, IMF Working Paper 97/30. 
Slemrod, J. (1985) An empirical test for tax evasion, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics. Vol. 67.pp. 232-238. 
Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (1998) Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, NBER 
Working Paper 7473. 
Sloman, J. (1997). “Economics” .3
rd
 Ed. Prentice Hall. London.  
Smith M.J. (1998) “Social Science in Question”. London, Sage. 
Smith, K. W. (1992). Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, 
in: J. Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes. Tax Compliance and Enforcement, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: pp. 223-258. 
Smith, K. W. and L. J. Stalans (1991) Encouraging Tax Compliance with Positive 
Incentives: A Conceptual Framework and Research Directions, Law and Society 
Review. 13: 35-53. 
Smith, K. W., and Kinsey, K. A. (1987) Understanding taxpayer behavior: A conceptual 
framework with implications for research, Law and Society Review, Vol.21.pp. 
639-663. 
Smith, W. (1992). Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in: 
J. Slemrod (Ed.). Why People Pay Taxes. Tax Compliance and Enforcement. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press: pp.223-249. 
Smith.S. (1986) “Britain’s Shadow Economy”. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Song, Y. and Y. E. Yarbrough (1978) “Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey”, 
Public Administration Review. Vol.38. pp. 442-457. 
Spector, P.E. (1992). Summated rating scale construction: an introduction. Newbury 
Park, CA.: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Spicer, M. W. (1986). Civilisation at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, Journal of 
Public Economics. Vol. 46, pp, 13-20. 
Spicer, M. W. and J. E. Thomas (1982) Audit Probabilities and the Tax Evasion 
Decision: An Experimental Approach, Journal of Economic Psychology. Vol. 
2.pp. 241-245. 
 336 
Spicer, M. W. and L. A. Becker (1980) Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An 
Experimental Approach, National Tax Journal. Vol. 33.pp. 171-175. 
Spicer, W. (1974) A Behavioural Model of Income Tax Evasion, Dissertation, Ohio State 
University. 
Spicer, W. (1986). “Civilisation at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion”, Journal of 
Public Economics. Vol. 4. PP. 13-20. 
Stalans et al., (1991) “Listening of different voices: Formation of Sanction Believes and 
taxpaying norms”. Journal of Applied Social psychology, Vol.21, pp 119-138. 
Stapleton., C. (1997) Basic Concepts in Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) as a Tool to 
Evaluate Score Validity: A Right-Brained Approach. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Southwest Educational Research Association, Austin. 
Stevens, J. (1996). Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences (3
rd
 Ed.). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Strban, G, (2007) Contribution Collection Systems and Possible Measures to Improve 
Their Effectiveness, “Social I institutions Support programmed”, Ljubljana, 20th 
of April 2007. 
Sugden, R., (1984). Reciprocity: the Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary 
Contributions, Economic Journal. Vol. 94.pp.772-787. 
Sutinen.J and Kuperan. K (1999) “A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance” 
International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1/2/3, pp.174 193. 
Tabachnick, B. G., and Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics, 5th ed.  Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon. 
Tabachnick, B.G. and Fidell, L.S. (1996). Using Multivariate Statistics. NY: 
HarperCollins. 
Thomas, J. (1992). Informal Economic Activity. LSE Handbooks in Economics. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Tindigarukayo, J. (2001) Challenges in Conducting Sample Surveys in the Caribbean. 
Social and Economic Studies. Vol.50. No.2. pp. 167-188. 
Torgler, B and Schneider F. (2009), The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on 
the shadow economy, Journal of Economic Psychology Vol. 30, pp. 228-245 
 337 
Torgler, B. (2001). Is Tax Evasion Never Justifiable? Journal of Public Finance and 
Public Choice. Vol. 19, pp. 143-168. 
Torgler, B. (2003) Ancestors of the Contemporary Homo Economics, Homo 
Oeconomicus. Vol. 19. pp 519-541. 
Torgler, B. (2003b) Ancestors of the Contemporary Homo Economics, Homo 
Oeconomicus. Vol. 19. pp 519-541. 
Torgler, B. and F. Schneider (2009). The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality 
on the Shadow Economy, Journal of Economic Psychology. Vol. 30, pp 228-245. 
Trochim W., (2000), Research Method Knowledge Base, 
<http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/>, [accessed 22.5.2006].    
Tull, D. S., and Albaum, G. S. (1973) “Survey research: A decisional approach”. New 
York: Intext Educational Publishers 
Tyler, R. (1997). “Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law”, Swiss Journal of 
Economics and Statistics. Vol. 133. pp. 219-240. 
Tyler, R. and H. Smith (1998) Social Justice and Social Movements, in: D. T. Gilbert, S. 
T. Fiske and G. Lindzey (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 3. 
Boston: McGraw- Hill: pp. 595-629. 
Tyler, T. (1990), Why People Obey the Law, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London. Vogel, J. (1974), “Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an 
interpretation of recent survey data”, National Tax Journal, pp. 499-513. 
Vazquez-Caro, Jamie, Gary Reid and Richard Bird (1992) “Tax Administration 
Assessment in Latin America” Report 13, Regional Studies Program The World 
Bank. 
Vogel, J. (1974) Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: An interpretation of recent 
survey data. National Tax Journal, Vol. 27, pp, 499-513. 
Walster, E., G. W. Walster and E. Berscheid (1978) Equity: Theory and Research. 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Webley, P., H. Robben, H. Elffers and D. Hessing (1991). Tax Evasion: An Experimental 
Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wenzel, M. (2002) “An analysis of norm processes in tax compliance”. Technical Report 
Working Paper No. 33. 
 338 
Wenzel, M. (2002). The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on tax 
compliance: The role of taxpayers’ identity. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 
87.No. 4, pp, 629-645. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1964) The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial 
Objectives in a Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Williamson, O. E. (1976). “Franchise Bidding with Respect to CATV and in General.” 
Bell. Journal of Economics Vo. 7. No. 1. pp. 73-104. 
Witte, A. D. and D. F. Woodbury (1985) The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration 
on Tax Compliance, National Tax Journal. Vol. 38.pp. 1-14. 
Yaniv, G. (1994), “Complaining about non-compliance with the Minimum Wage Law”, 
International Review of Law and Economics. Vol. 14, pp.351-362. 
Yankelovich, Sk. and White, Inc. (1984). Taxpayer Attitudes Survey: Final Report, 
Public Opinion Survey Prepared for the Public Affairs Division, Internal Revenue 
Service, New York. 
Yin R. (1994) “Case Study Research- Design and methods” 2
nd
 Ed. Sage Publications.  
Yitzhaki, S. (1974) “A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, Journal of 





































The Questionnaire  
Respondent’s role in the firm: ___________________ Date of Questionnaire:     /    /  
Questionnaire number:_________________________ 
 
Direct tax includes income tax, surtax, contributions for social security, as well as profit 
tax and indirect taxes value added tax, excise on tobacco. (The Contribution gap for 
Social Security Corporation (SSC) is the mount that was not paid by firms on behalf of 
their Employees). Social Security Contribution Evasion (SSCE) by the firms: It is when 
firms fail to register some or all of their employees, they hire workers informally rather 
than as part of the official payroll, they claim workers are contractors rather than 
employees, or they fail to pay required contributions for their registered employees. 
Employers also underpay contributions and make late payments. 
 
Section .1.  General Assessment of the Jordanian Social Security Scheme (JSSS) 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements 





AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
a. The JSSS is quite suitable to the 
Jordanian economic situation 
     
b. The current JSSS benefits only 
firm’s owners 
     
c. The current JSSS benefits only 
employees 
     
d. The current JSSS benefits both 
employers and employees equally 
     
e. There is a lack of linkage between  
JSSS  contributions and benefits 
     
f. Limited Social Security provision 
is one of the main reasons for non-
compliance  
     
g. The JSSS contains some design 
features which encourage evasion 
     
h. Social Security Contribution 
evasion   ( SSCE) is common and 
extensive 
     
i. SSCE is a decreasing problem      
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Section 2-Factors and variables which may induce Contribution Evasion (CE)  
2.1. Economic factors 





AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
a. Social Security 
Contribution rates are 
relatively high considering 
the benefits returned  
     
b. The probability of being 
inspected is relatively low  
     
c. The fines for employers not 
making statutory 
contributions are relatively 
low 
     
d. Financial hardship of firms 
result in firms who avoid 
paying contributions  
     
e. Firms avoid contributions 
to  minimises labour costs 
     
f. High unemployment rates 
prevent employees  
complaining about firms 
not paying their 
contributions  
     
g. The high cost to firms of 
employing their own 
accountants to calculate 
their employees 
contributions could  result 
in CE 
     
 
2.2. Institutional and legal variables  
 
2.2.1 Administration performance of JSSC 





AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
a. The administration handles 
the JSSC affairs in an 
appropriate way  
     
b. There is a lack of 
coordination between SS 
Corporation and other 
government bodies 
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c. The JSSC acts as a service 
institution and treats 
taxpayers as partners 
     
d. The JSSC employees are 
highly trained and  
professional 
     
e. The JSSC employees are 
very approachable.   
     
f. Different employees from 
the SSC give different 
information. 
     
g. The JSSC has  an efficient 
contribution recording and 
collection  system  
     
h. Laws and rules are efficient 
and equally enforced by 
JSSC 
     
i. There are  easy 
opportunities to collude 
with SSC inspectors 
     
j. The JSSC compliance 
procedures are complicated 
     
        
 
 2.2.2. Law and regulation structure 





AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
a. Laws and rules are 
complicated and are very 
difficult to understand 
     
b. The JSSS Law can be 
manipulated by accountants in 
a creative way in the firm’s 
own interest  
     
c. There is no supervisory 
authority responsible for the 
honesty of the SSC 
inspectorate 





2.3. Technological, information and awareness variables. 
 






AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
a. There is a lack of 
knowledge and information 
provided by the SSC. 
     
b. Firms are aware that 
contribution evasion could 
cause serious financial 
problems for the JSSS in 
the future. 
     
c. Firms with better 
knowledge about SSS 
benefits are more compliant 
     
d. Firms with better 
knowledge about JSSS have 
more opportunities for 
contribution evasion.  
     
e. Computerised system used 
by the SSC are quite 
efficient  
     
 
2.4. Social and moral consideration 




AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
a. CE does not generate 
anxiety and guilt. 
     
b. CE does not put a firm’s 
professional reputation at 
risk 
     
c. High level of firm sense of 
duty play a vital role in 
combating contribution 
evasion. 
     
d. Most firms are honest 
through fear of getting 
caught  
     
e. Firms who do evade 
contributions don’t feel 
their actions are morally 
wrong. 
     
 
            
Section 3- General information about your firms 
  
 
1. In which sector do you classify your organisation? ______________ 
 
2. Which category best describes ownership of your firm?  
 
a. Limited Partnership.  
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b. Joint Venture.  
c. Limited Liability.  
d. Limited Partnership in Shares.  
e. Public Shareholding Companies.  
f. Other (specify) ____________ 
 
3. How many employees does your company have? 
 
 
employee Tick  
Less than 50  
50 – 200  
More than 200  
             
Is there anything else about CE that you would like to comment on? If so, please use 






















































The percentage distribution of the responses to each statement, it also contains the mean 


















5.2 47.2 5.2 42.4 - 3.1528 .63056 




relatively low.  
10.5 26.2 58.1 5.2 - 2.4192 .48384 
Financial 
hardship of firms 
results in firms 
who avoid paying 
contributions. 





12.2 63.3 10.5 14.0 - 3.7380 .7476 




to calculate their 
employees’ 
contributions 
could result in 
CE. 






about firms not 
paying their 
contributions. 
22.7 56.3 8.7 12.2 - 3.8952 .77904 
The 
administration 
handles the JSSC 
in an appropriate 
way. 
3.5 38.9 29.7 27.9 - 3.1790 .6358 










and professional.  












- 10.5 8.7 37.1 43.7 1.8603 .37206 





3.5 52.4 30.1 14.0 - 3.4541 .69082 




14.0 29.7 44.1 12.2 - 3.4541 .69082 
There are easy 
opportunities to 
collude with SSC 
inspectors.  
- 36.7 38.8 23.1 1.4 3.1004 .62008 










There is a lack of 
knowledge and 
information 
provided by the 
JSSC  
17.5 54.6 8.7 17.5 1.7 3.6856 .73712 
Computerised 
systems used by 
the JSSC are 
quite efficient. 
8.7 44.1 14.0 33.2 - 3.2838 .65676 
The JSSS is quite 











3.5 47.6 26.2 22.7 - 3.3188 .66376 
The current JSSS 
benefits only 
firm’s owners. 
5.2 38.4 10.5 35.4 10.5 2.9258 .58516 
The current JSSS 
benefits only 
employees. 
10.5 57.6 21.4 10.5 - 3.6812 .73624 





5.2 26.2 8.7 59.8 - 2.7686 .55372 




12.2 42.4 17.5 26.2 1.7 3.3712 .67424 
Limited SS 
provision is one 
of the main 
reasons for 
noncompliance. 
43.7 33.6 8.7 14.0 - 4.0699 .81398 
Laws and rules 
are complicated 
and are very 
difficult to 
understand 
5.2 23.1 15.7 41.9 14.0 2.6376 .52752 
Most firms are 
honest through 
fear of getting 
caught. 
1.7 40.2 9.2 40.2 8.7 2.8603 .57206 
CE does not put a 
firm’s 
professional 
reputation at risk. 
5.2 56.3 7.0 31.4 - 3.3537 .67074 
CE does not 
generate anxiety 
and guilt. 
3.5 61.1 12.7 19.2 3.5 3.4192 .68384 
High level of firm 
sense of duty play 




12.2 66.8 19.2 1.7 - 3.8952 .77904 
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problems for the 
JSSS in the 
future. 
10.5 49.3 8.7 31.4 - 3.3886 .67772 
Firms who do 
evade 
contributions 
don’t feel their 
actions are 
morally wrong. 




































Model   t Sig. 
    Tolerance VIF 
1.  q1 -1.167 .245 
2.  q2 4.925 .000 
3.  q3 2.969 .003 
4.  q4 -6.130 .000 
5.  q5 -4.891 .000 
6.  q6 -1.987 .049 
7.  q7 2.251 .026 
8.  q10 -4.034 .000 
9.  q11 -4.211 .000 
10.  q12 -2.440 .016 
11.  q13 1.409 .161 
12.  q14 -3.663 .000 
13.  q15 .613 .541 
14.  q16 -1.154 .250 
15.  q17 -.320 .749 
16.  q18 2.224 .027 
17.  q19 -.973 .332 
18.  q20 1.139 .257 
19.  q21 -1.367 .174 
20.  q22 -.595 .553 
21.  q23 -.116 .908 
22.  q24 -.455 .650 
23.  q25 -.847 .398 
24.  q26 -3.156 .002 
25.  q27 -1.511 .133 
26.  q28 .542 .589 
27.  q29 1.063 .289 
28.  q30 .377 .707 
29.  q31 -2.539 .012 
30.  q32 5.324 .000 
31.  q33 .095 .924 
32.  q34 1.237 .218 
a  Dependent Variable: dep 
 
 
 
 
 
